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LIBRARY 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

SANTA  BARBARA 


PRESENTED  BY 
DOUWE   STUURMAN 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 


BY 


ARTHUR  COLLIER 


EDITED  WITH  INTRODUCTION  AND  NOTES 
BY 

ETHEL  BOWMAN 
M.  A.  WELLESLEY  COLLEGE 


CHICAGO 
THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  CO. 

LONDON  AGENTS 

Regan  Paul,  French,  Trubi^er  &  Co.,  Ltd., 
1909 

jr 


Copyright  1909 

BY 

Open  Court  Publishing  Co. 
Chicago 


THE     TORCH     PRESS 

CEDAR  RAPIDS 

IOWA 


PREFATORY  NOTE 

By  this  edition  of  Collier's  "Clavis  Univer- 
salis" it  is  hoped  to  call  attention  to  a  book  other- 
wise inaccessible,  which,  though  curiously  parallel 
to  Berkeley's  contemporary  works,  has  undoubted 
independent  value;  and  which  anticipates  Kant's 
first  two  antinomies.  The  whole  history  of  phi- 
losophy perhaps  presents  no  more  striking  example 
of  undeserved  neglect,  and  no  more  curious  coin- 
cidence of  thought  than  the  eighteenth  century  in 
England.  By  entirely  different  modes  of  ap- 
proach and  unknown  to  each  other,  Berkeley  and 
Collier  reached  the  same  conclusion,  —  that  mat- 
ter, as  conceived  by  traditional  philosophy,  is  non- 
existent. 

This  edition  of  the  "Clavis  Universalis"  is  an 
exact  and  verified  copy  of  the  essay  as  it  appears 
in  Dr.  Parr's  "Metaphysical  Tracts  of  the 
Eighteenth  Century,"  a  book  now  out  of  print. 
The  Introduction  and  Notes  are  modified  extracts 
from  a  Master's  thesis  accepted  by  the  faculty  of 
Wellesley  College.  They  aim  to  show  the  direct 
dependence  of  Collier  upon  Des  Cartes,  Male- 
branche,  and  Norris,  as  well  as  the  parallelism  of 
Collier  and  Berkeley. 

The  thanks  of  the  editor  are  due  to  Professor 


iv  CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS 

Mary  Whiton  Calkins  who  suggested  and  directed 
the  work;  to  Dr.  Benjamin  Rand,  of  Harvard  Uni- 
versity, who  has  given  counsel  at  several  points; 
and  to  Mr.  James  Van  Allen  Shields  who  consult- 
ed the  British  Museum  copy  of  Taylor's  transla- 
tion of  Malebranche's  "Recherche  de  la  Verite." 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Introduction vii 

Clavis  Universalis 

The  Contents      ------  3 

The  Introduction       -----  ^ 

Part  I     -------      -  14 

Part  II  -       - 55 

The  Conclusion  of  the  Whole        -       -  118 

Notes 133 


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INTRODUCTION 

In  the  early  eighteenth  century,  metaphysical 
speculation  turned  from  the  material  world  toward 
the  inner  life  of  man.  Des  Cartes  and  Male- 
branche  in  France,  and  Locke  in  England,  had 
stripped  the  external  world  of  its  warmth  and  light 
and  color  and  had  left  to  it  little  save  the  character 
of  extension.  The  completely  idealistic  theory  of 
matter  was  formulated  at  nearly  the  same  time, 
and  in  apparent  independence,  by  George  Berkeley 
and  by  Arthur  Collier.  And  yet  Berkeley  alone 
commonly  has  credit  for  the  metaphysical  discov- 
ery, while  Collier's  little  volume  of  scarce  a 
hundred  pages  remained  practically  unnoticed  for 
more  than  fifty  years. 

The  book  seems  to  have  attracted  little  or  no 
attention  even  at  the  time  of  its  publication.  Had 
not  Dr.  Reid  chanced  upon  it  in  the  library  at 
Glasgow,  it  might  never  have  been  known.  Reid 
appreciated  the  value  of  the  book,  and  in  his  ''Es- 
says on  the  Intellectual  Powers  of  Man,"  published 
in  1785,  gives  it  brief  notice.  After  a  discussion 
of  Norris's  "Essay  toward  the  Theory  of  the  Ideal 
or  Intelligible  World,"  he  says  that  he  ought  not 
to  omit  mention  of  "an  author  of  far  inferior  name, 
Arthur  Collier.  .  .  .  His  arguments  are  the  same 


vin  CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS 

in  substance  with  Berkeley's;  and  he  appears," 
Rcid  adds,  "to  understand  the  whole  strength  of  his 
cause.  Though  he  is  not  deficient  in  metaphysical 
acuteness,  his  style  is  disagreeable,  being  full  of 
conceits,  of  new-coined  words,  scholastic  terms,  and 
perplexed  sentences."  Reid  ends  by  saying,  "I 
have  taken  the  liberty  to  give  this  short  account  of 
Collier's  book,  because  I  believe  it  is  rare  and 
little  known.  I  have  only  seen  one  copy  of  it, 
which  is  in  the  University  library  of  Glasgow."  ^ 
This  notice  attracted  Dugald  Stuart  to  the 
work,  and  in  his  "Dissertation:  Ex:hibiting  the 
Progress  of  Metaphysical,  Ethical,  and  Political 
Philosophy"  he  compares  Collier  with  Norris. 
"Another  very  acute  metaphysician,"  he  says, 
"has  met  with  still  greater  injustice.  His  name 
is  not  to  be  found  in  any  of  our  Biographical 
Dictionaries.  In  point  of  date,  his  publication  is 
some  years  posterior  to  that  of  Norris,  and  there- 
fore it  does  not  possess  the  same  claims  to  original- 
ity; but  it  is  far  superior  to  it  in  logical  closeness 
and  precision,  and  is  not  obscured  to  the  same  de- 
gree with  the  mystical  theology  which  Norris 
(after  the  example  of  Malebranche)  connected 
with  the  scheme  of  Idealism.  Indeed,  when  com- 
pared with  the  writings  of  Berkeley  himself,  it 


1  Thomas   Reid,   Essay   II,   p.   287   of  his   works,   edited   by   Sir 
Win.  Hamilton,  184$. 


CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS  ix 

yields  to  them  less  in  force  of  argument,  than  in 
composition  and  variety  of  illustration."  ^ 

These  notices  attracted  the  English  philos- 
phers  of  this  time  to  Collier's  writings,  and  fur- 
ther traces  of  his  life  and  works  were  sought.  Sir 
James  Mackintosh  and  Dr.  Parr  corresponded  on 
the  subject,  ^  but  their  efforts  met  with  no  impor- 
tant success.  But  interest  in  Collier  had  been 
aroused;  and  when,  some  time  before  1837,  the 
History  of  Modern  Wiltshire  was  published,  the 
absence  of  his  name  from  the  history  of  the  county, 
in  which  his  family  had  held  a  living  for  four 
generations,  called  forth  a  remonstrance.  This 
finally  resulted  in  the  publication  of  the  only  book 
which  is  a  direct  authority  on  Collier  outside  of 
his  own  few  published  writings. 

Robert  Benson  had  inherited,  with  other  docu- 
ments, all  that  remained  of  the  Collier  papers. 
Many  of  these  papers  had,  to  be  sure,  disappeared 
before  Robert  Benson  looked  into  them,  for  they 
were,  as  Benson  says,  "so  conveniently  placed  for 
the  housemaid  who  lighted  an  adjoining  bed-room 
fire,  that  it  is  not  easy  to  guess  how  many  of  them 
have  been  consumed."  '*  The  bulk  of  those  that  re- 
mained were  the  sermons  of  Arthur  Collier  and  his 
brother  William,  and  a  few  manuscript  essays  and 

2  Originally  published  in  1821.  Collected  Works  of  Dugald 
Stuart,  edited  by  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton,  1854,  p.  349. 

3  Robert  Benson's  "Memoirs  of  the  Life  and  Writings  of  the  Rev. 
Arthur  Collier,  M.  A.,"  London,  1837,  Preface  p.  IX. 

'♦  Benson's  "Memoirs,"  Preface,  page  XIIL 


X  CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS 

letters.  The  letters  and  essays  which  pertained  to 
his  metaphysical  studies,  as  well  as  to  the  details 
of  his  life,  were  collected  and  published  by  Benson. 
The  awakened  interest  in  Collier  evidenced 
itself  at  the  same  time  in  a  second  edition  of  the 
"Clavis."  The  copies  numbered  forty,  and  were 
"exclusively  bestowed  as  presents."  '  The  third 
and  last  edition  of  the  "Clavis  Universalis,"  still 
accessible  in  the  large  libraries,  was  brought  out 
in  1837  in  a  small  volume  prepared  by  Dr.  Parr, 
entitled  "Metaphysical  Tracts  of  the  Eighteenth 
Century."  Dr.  Parr  had  in  his  "remarkable  libra- 
ry" rare  metaphysical  tracts  of  English  authorship. 
Realizing  their  interest,  he  had  thrown  off  a  small 
impression  of  five  of  them,  with  an  abridgment  of 
the  sixth.  He  intended  to  publish  these,  with  an 
introduction  which  should  include  "an  historical 
disquisition  on  Idealisnx,  with  special  reference 
to  the  philosophy  of  Collier."  But  his  death  inter- 
rupted the  work  before  it  was  completed.  His 
library  was  sold,  and  the  impression  of  the  six  tracts 
was  purchased  by  a  Mr.  Lumley,  a  respectable 
London  bookseller,  ^  who  was  about  to  publish  the 
"Memoirs  of  Arthur  Collier"  which  Benson  had 
prepared.^     This  collection  of  tracts,  in  which  the 

5  Benson's  "Memoirs,"  Preface,  page  XIV. 

6  "Idealism ;  with  Reference  to  the  Scheme  of  Arthur  Collier" 
by  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton  (published  originally  in  the  Edinburgh  Review 
in  April,  1839),  in  "Discussions  on  Philosophy  and  Literature,"  London, 
1852,  p.   187. 

7  Dr.  Parr's  "Collection  of  Metaphysical  Tracts"  Advertisement. 


CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS  xi 

"Clavis  Universalis"  holds  first  place,  includes  the 
only  other  work  of  Collier  which  was  ever  printed 
in  full,  "A  Specimen  of  True  Philosophy;  in  a 
Discourse  on  Genesis ;"  and  also  an  abstract  of  the 
Logology  or  "Treatise  on  the  Logos."  Through 
this  collection,  the  "Clavis  Universalis"  is  known 
to  English  speaking  philosophers. 

In  Germany,  Collier  met  with  recognition 
sooner  than  in  his  own  country,  through  a  full  and 
able  abstract  of  the  "Clavis  Universalis"  made  in 
the  year  1717.  This  was  published  in  the  sixth 
supplemental  volume  of  the  "Acta  Eruditorum," 
a  Leipzig  publication  devoted  to  general  interests. 
In  concluding  the  article  the  reviewer  says :  "These 
are  the  paradoxes  of  our  Author,  which  doubtless 
will  be  received  with  no  more  approbation  than 
those,  which  to  the  same  import,  though  with  dif- 
ferent arguments,  a  contemporary  of  his,  George 
Berkeley,  attempted  to  defend  in  'Three  Dialogues 
between  Hylas  and  Philonous.'  "  ^  Through  this 
notice  Collier  became  known  to  German  philo- 
sophers, as  is  shown  by  the  quotations  from  him 
made  by  Wolff  and  Bilfinger,  and  by  the  full 
translation  which  followed.  But  John  Christ- 
opher Eschenbach,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Ros- 
tock, was  the  first  to  make  the  full  text  of  the 
"Clavis"  available  for  German  scholars;  and  Sir 
William  Hamilton  quotes  him  as  saying,  "  If  any 
book  ever  cost  me  trouble  to  obtain  it  the  Clavis 


8  Translated   from  the  original  Latin. 


xii  CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS 

is  that  book." '  Eschenbach  published  this  trans- 
lation, in  1756,  as  part  of  a  work  entitled  "A  Col- 
lection of  the  most  distinguished  Authors  who 
deny  the  existence  of  their  own  bodies,  and  of 
the  whole  material  world;  containing  the  dia- 
logues of  Berkeley,  between  Hylas  and  Philonous, 
and  Collier's  Universal  Key  translated,  with  Il- 
lustrative Observations,  and  an  Appendix,  wherein 
the  Existence  of  Body  is  demonstrated,  by  John 
Christopher  Eschenbach,  Professor  of  Philosophy 
in  Rostock."  In  this  work,  according  to  Hamil- 
ton, the  "remarks  are  numerous  and  show  much 
reading.  The  Appendix  contains : — (i)  An  ex- 
position of  the  opinions  of  the  Idealists,  with  its 
grounds  and  arguments.  (2)  A  proof  of  the  ex- 
ternal existence  of  body."  ^°  This  translation  is 
now  itself  rare  and  little  known. 

Of  Collier  himself  even  less  is  known  than  of 
his  writings,  for  the  Wiltshire  records  and  the 
papers  found  by  Benson  are  the  only  sources.  The 
family  came  from  Bristol  and  settled  in  Wiltshire 
where,  in  1608,  one  Joseph  Collier  was  presented 
to  the  rectory  of  Langford  Magna,  commonly 
called  Steeple  Langford,  near  Sarum  or  Salisbury, 
and  as  he  also  owned  the  advowson,  the  benefice 
was  handed  down  to  his  descendants.  His  son, 
Henry,  who  succeeded  him,  was  ejected  from  his 

9  "Discussions  on  Philosophy  and  Literature,"  p.  190. 

10  Note  S.  8.,  p.  584,  Vol.  I.,  "Collected  works  of  Dugald  Stuart," 
edited  by  Sir  Wm.  HamiltMi,  1854. 


CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS  xiii 

parish  during  the  Revolution  and  Protectorate,  and 
he  and  his  family  suffered  many  hardships.  After 
the  Restoration,  Henry  Collier  returned  to  Lang- 
ford  Magna,  and  remained  there  until  his  death 
in  1672.  His  youngest  son,  Arthur,  succeeded 
him;  and  to  him  and  his  wife  Anne,  daughter  of 
Thomas  and  Joan  Currey,  of  Misterton  in  Somer- 
setshire, was  born  Arthur  Collier.  Of  his  early 
youth  and  education  we  know  little.  He  probably 
attended  the  grammar-school  of  Salisbury,  after 
early  studies  at  home.  He  entered  Pembroke  Col- 
lege, Oxford,  in  July,  1697,  but,  upon  the  entrance 
of  his  younger  brother,  William,  to  the  Univer- 
sity, left  Pembroke  to  be  entered  at  Baliol  with  his 
brother  on  the  twenty-second  of  October,  1698." 

Of  his  studies  and  of  his  interests  during 
his  college  course,  there  is  little  indication. 
In  his  manuscripts  "there  is  no  trace  of  his  hav- 
ing made  any  proficiency  in  mathematical  studies, 
nor  even  that  the  mathematics  formed  a  part  of  his 
education.  [A]  .  .  .  letter  ...  in  answer  to  a 
scriptural  objection  then  often  urged  against  the 
Copernican  and  Newtonian  systems  of  the  world, 
shews  that  he  was  not  indifferent  to  the  progress  of 
natural  philosophy."  ^^  There  are  few  indications 
of  an  interest  in  literature;  but  as  he  says  in  the 
opening  page  of  the  "Clavis"  that  he  adopted  his 
theory  of  the  universe  in  1703,  a  year  before  he  took 

1^  Benson's  "Memoirs,"  p.  lo. 
12  Benson's   "Memoirs,"   p.    126. 


XIV  CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS 

up  his  residence  at  Langford  Magna,  his  phil- 
osophical studies  must  have  occupied  much  of  his 
time  and  thought  in  college.  With  what  systems 
he  was  familiar,  one  can  judge  only  from  the  refer- 
ences in  the  "Clavis"  and  in  the  "Specimen  of  True 
Philosophy."  He  evidently  knew  Aristotle  only 
through  the  Schoolmen,  for  his  quotations  are 
never  made  directly.  Plato  he  quotes  but  once,*^ 
although  Norris's  "Theory  of  the  Ideal  World," 
well-known  to  Collier,  is  filled  with  Platonic  refer- 
ences. But  the  scholasticism  of  the  following  cen- 
turies was  a  far  stronger  influence  on  Collier,  inter- 
ested as  he  was  in  theological  studies.  His  work 
shows  the  influence  of  scholastic  principles  and 
habits  of  thought;  and  to  him,  as  to  the  Schoolmen, 
the  interest  of  metaphysics  lay  in  its  relation  to 
Scripture.  St.  Augustine,  Porphyry,  ApoUina- 
ris,  Cassian,  Vincentius,  Lirinensis,  Suarez  are 
mentioned.  Through  the  "books  of  Metaphysicks" 
of  Scheibler  and  Baronius,  according  to  Sir  Wm. 
Hamilton,^'*  he  gained  all  his  knowledge  of  the 
Metaphysic  of  the  Schools.  The  original  thinkers 
with  whom  he  was  directly  familiar  and  whose 
works  formed  the  starting  point  of  his  own  were 
the  French  writers,  Des  Cartes  and  Malebranche, 
and  his  own  English  neighbor,  John  Norris. 

Six  months  after  Arthur  Collier  had  entered 


13  "Clavis  Universalis,"  p.  42.      (This  reference,  and   all  which 
follow  are  to  this  edition  of  the  "Clavis"). 

14  Sir  Wm.   Hamilton's  "Discussions  on  Philosophy  and  Litera- 
ture," p.   192. 


CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS  xv 

Pembroke  College,  his  father  died.  During  the 
seven  years  that  intervened  before  the  son  could 
take  upon  himself  the  duties  of  the  living,  Francis 
Eyre  held  the  benefice,  vs^hich  finally  in  1704, 
passed  to  Arthur  Collier,  the  fourth  of  his  family 
to  hold  the  office.  The  years  that  followed  seem 
to  have  been  uneventful.  From  the  dates  of  his  ser- 
mons one  may  argue  that,  until  his  death  in  1732,  he 
discharged  the  duties  of  his  parish  with  regularity, 
and  the  allusions  in  his  brother  William's  diary, 
give  a  hint  of  his  daily  life.  This  brother,  who 
had  been  his  college  mate  and  close  friend,  was 
"rector  of  Baverstock,  about  two  miles  and  a  half 
to  the  south  of  Langford;  and  his  Ms.  remains 
form  by  far  the  greater  portion  of  the  Collier 
papers."  ^^  The  brothers  evidently  were  much  to- 
gether, and  joined  in  the  diversions  of  the  neighbor- 
hood, attending  the  races  and  country  dances  and 
taking  a  hand  at  cards  with  their  friends.  Arthur, 
at  least,  seems  to  have  been  "intimate  at  the  palace 
of  Salisbury  during  Bishop  Burnet's  time;  and  we 
learn  that  he  occasionally  filled  the  cathedral  pul- 
pit." ^^  There  is  no  mention  in  either  his  brother's 
papers  or  his  own  of  travels,  or  even  prolonged 
absence  from  home ;  so  it  is  reasonable  to  conclude 
that  his  outward  life  was  bounded  by  the  limits  of 
his  parish.  He  was  married  to  Margaret,  daugh- 
ter of  Nicholas  Johnson,  a  paymaster  of  the  army, 
and  his  wife,  a  sister  of  Stephen  Fox.     The  parish 

15  Benson's  "Memoirs,"  pp.   140  and  141. 


xvi  CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS 

records  give  the  birth  of  the  eldest  child  as  October 
13,  1707.  Of  his  children  little  is  known.  Two 
sons  and  two  daughters  survived  him;  and  one  of 
the  latter,  Jane  Collier,  is  known  as  the  w^riter  of 
a  clever  book  called  "The  Art  of  Ingeniously  Tor- 
menting." *^  Owing  to  financial  difficulties  during 
the  latter  part  of  his  life,  he  finally  sold  the  "rever- 
sion of  Langford  Rectory  to  Corpus  Christi  Col- 
lege, Oxford,  for  sixteen  hundred  guineas." 

That  Collier  had  little  care  for  the  practical 
matters  of  everyday  life  can  easily  be  believed,  but 
his  intense  interest  in  matters  ecclesiastical  and 
theological  is  evidenced  by  his  activity  in  church 
politics  and  by  the  close  union  of  his  philosophical 
and  religious  beliefs.  His  philosophical  system 
was  to  be  the  "universal  key"  by  which  to  unlock 
the  secrets  of  the  Scriptures.  Yet  his  sermons  have 
no  suggestion  of  his  theory.^''  Indeed,  at  this  period, 
only  his  manuscript  works  and  his  letters  contain 
his  exposition  of  the  idealistic  theory  which  so  ab- 
sorbed him.  Among  his  papers  there  is  an  "outline 
of  an  essay,  in  three  chapters,  on  the  question  of  the 
visible  world  being  without  us  or  not,"  dated  Janu- 
ary, 1708.  Dated  171 2,  are  "two  essays,  still  in 
manuscript,  one  on  substance  and  accident,  and  the 
other  termed  'Clavis  Philosophica.'  "  ^^  In  1713, 
he  published  the  "Clavis  Universalis,  or  a  new  In- 

16  Benson's   "Memoirs,"   p.    162. 

17  Benson's  "Memoirs,"  p.  139. 

18  Benson's  "Memoirs,"  p.  18. 


CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS  xvii 

quiry  after  Truth,  being  a  Demonstration  of  the 
Non-Existence,  or  Impossibility  of  an  External 
World,"  which  gives  his  perfected  theory  of  the 
non-existence  of  matter.  After  this,  a  period  of 
almost  twenty  years  elapsed,  with  only  his  corres- 
pondence to  show  his  interest  in  the  application  of 
his  theory  until  in  1730,  he  published  the  "Speci- 
men of  True  Philosophy."  This  was  followed  in 
1732  by  his  "Logology,"  which  is  the  last  of  his 
published  writings.  The  monumental  work  of  his 
life,  the  explication  of  the  Scriptures,  of  which  the 
"Genesis"  and  "Logology"  were  the  beginnings, 
was  never  completed,  for  he  died  in  the  year  in 
which  the  latter  was  printed.  He  was  buried  in 
the  Langford  Church,  September  9th,  1732. 

But  although  Collier  himself  laid  such  stress 
upon  the  theological  bearing  of  his  theory,  the 
treatises  which  discuss  the  interpretation  of  the 
Scriptures  have  little  value  when  compared  with 
the  one  philosophical  essay,  which  seemed  to  him 
to  serve  mainly  as  an  introduction  to  what  was  to 
follow.  At  most,  the  interest  of  these  theological 
treatises  lies  in  the  more  definite  suggestions  of  the 
positive  aspect  of  his  philosophic  thought.  Disen- 
tangled from  its  scholastic  phraseology,  his  system 
is  a  theistic  spiritualism.  It  rests  on  two  funda- 
mental propositions:  (i)  "God  made  heaven  and 
earth,  or  the  whole  material  world, 'Ev 'Apx^i^"  and 
(2)  "the  visible  or  material  world  exists  in  mind, 
i.  e.,  immediately  in  the  mind  of  him  that  seeth  or 


xviii  CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS 

perceiveth  it,"  ^'  and  has  no  existence  independent 
of  mind.  The  first  of  these  propositions  Collier 
accepts  "as  an  unquestionable  axiom,"  ^'  inasmuch 
as  it  is  the  word  of  God.  The  second  he  has  dem- 
onstrated in  the  "Clavis  Universalis."  But, 
though  he  has  there  proved  that  body  must  exist 
in  mind,  he  has  not,  beyond  bare  suggestions,  shown 
how  this  is  possible.  In  the  "Clavis,"  the  quasi- 
externeity  of  visible  objects  is  spoken  of  as  the 
''effect  of  the  will  of  God,  —  (as  it  is  his  will  that 
light  and  colours  should  seem  to  be  without  the 
soul)."^°  Also  Collier  speaks**  of  the  "great 
mundane  idea  of  created  (or  rather  twice  created) 
matter,  by  which  all  things  are  produced,  or  rather 
....  by  which  the  great  God  gives  sensations  to 
all  his  thinking  creatures."  To  the  more  careful 
study  of  the  implications  of  the  doctrine  that  "the 
material  world  exists  in  mind,"  Collier  devotes  the 
"Specimen  of  True  Philosophy."  In  brief,  he 
holds  that  matter  is  an  accident  or  form  of  mind 
and  has  no  existence  apart  from  mind;  that  the 
sensible  world  of  each  individual  exists  by  reason 
of  his  perceiving  it,  and  has  the  relation  of  simili- 
tude, not  of  absolute  identity,  to  that  of  every  other 
individual ;  and,  finally,  that  these  individual  minds 
or  spirits  exist  only  in  dependence  on,  and  as  far 
as  they  participate  in,  the  one  original  substance, 
which  is  itself  mind  or  spirit. 

19  Specimen  of  True  Philosophy,  p.  115  in  the  Parr  edition. 

20  "Clavis  Universalis,"  p.  9.     **  Ibid.,  p.  12. 


CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS  xix 

Collier's  claim  to  recognition  lies,  however,  in 
the  negative  aspect  of  his  teaching.  Both  he  and 
Berkeley  opposed  the  theory  current  in  the  philos- 
ophy of  that  time,  that  matter,  though  prac- 
tically unknown  to  us,  has  an  existence  of  its  own, 
and  at  least  one  property,  extension,  by  which  it 
arouses  in  us  the  idea  of  the  sensible  world.  Berk- 
eley argues  against  the  conception  of  matter  as  ''un- 
known support"  which  Locke  upholds  in  his  "Es- 
say on  Human  Understanding."  Collier,  on  the 
other  hand,  aims  to  prove  the  non-existence  of  mat- 
ter as  conceived  by  Des  Cartes  and  Malebranche, 
and  by  their  English  disciple,  John  Norris.  Upon 
the  philosophy  of  Des  Cartes,  Malebranche  had 
made  one  important  advance.  With  Des  Cartes, 
matter,  though  dependent  upon  the  will  of  God, 
has  an  existence  of  its  own  in  its  property,  exten- 
sion, by  which  it  aflfects  finite  minds.  Male- 
branche likewise  grants  to  matter  an  existence  out- 
side of  its  being  in  God;  yet  the  material  world 
plays  no  part  in  his  system.  In  the  fact  that  he 
does  not  discard  this  vague  something,  which  he 
has  practically  proved  to  be  nothing,  lies  his  great 
inconsistency.  His  forward  step  is  in  the  demon- 
stration that  not  even  by  the  Cartesian  "unknown 
motion  of  unknown  parts"  can  body  become  known 
to  a  finite  mind;  that  this  knowledge  is  only  pos- 
sible if  both  knower  and  known  are  taken  up  and 
united  in  one  spiritual  substance.  In  criticism, 
Collier  points  out  that  Malebranche  himself  claims 


XX  CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS 

that  the  external  world  cannot  be  an  object  of  sense 
since  the  idea  which  we  perceive  must  be  intimate- 
ly united  to  the  mind  and  hence  cannot  be  of  a  dif- 
ferent nature.^^  But  whereas  Malebranche  still 
clings  to  this  vague  unknown  something  as  cause 
of  sensible  ideas,  Collier  claims  that  the  very  exist- 
ence of  body  lies  in  its  being  perceived. 

But  despite  its  close  dependence  upon  the  the- 
ories of  Des  Cartes  and  Malebranche,  the  "Clavis" 
refers  much  more  closely  to  the  system  of  Norris. 
John  Norris,  rector  of  Bemerton,  near  Sarum,  had 
apparently  received  much  the  same  philosophical 
education  as  Collier,  that  is,  he  had  a  knowledge 
of  the  early  Greeks  through  the  Schoolmen,  and  a 
familiarity  with  the  modern  French  philosophers. 
His  "Theory  of  the  Ideal  or  Intelligible  World," 
is  designed  to  complete  the  system  of  Malebranche, 
who,  as  Norris  thought,  had  not  carried  sufficiently 
far  his  theory  that  "all  things  are  seen  in  God." 
To  quote  his  own  words,  "Mr.  Malebranche  has 
ventured  the  farthest  of  any  that  I  know  of  upon 
this  Discovery  [into  the  Ideal  World.]  .  .  .  But 
even  this  great  Apelles  has  drawn  the  Celestial 
Beauty  but  halfway."  ^^  Although  Norris  in  real- 
ity only  enlarges  upon  Malebranche's  doctrines  in- 
stead of  pressing  this  "Discovery"  to  its  logical  con- 
clusion, his  book  is  valuable  to  students  of  idealistic 

21  "Recherche  de  la  Verite,"  Livre  3"ie^  2nde  Partie,  Chap.  I. 

^2  An  Essay  towards  the  Theory  of  the  Ideal  or  Intelligible 
World,"  by  John  Norris,  Rector  of  Bemerton,  London,  1701-1704,  Part 
I,  p.  \. 


CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS  xxi 

thought.  According  both  to  Malebranche  and  to 
Norris,  reality  is  of  two  kinds,  spiritual  and  ma- 
terial; and  God,  the  supreme  spirit,  contains  both 
the  intelligible  world  of  Ideas  and  the  finite  spirits, 
who  are  thus  in  direct  communion  with  him. 
Since  these  two  are,  both  alike,  in  him  and  of  his 
substance,  the  divine  ideas  are  directly  intelligible 
to  finite  minds  without  proof  or  intervention. 
These  divine  ideas  are  the  representative  forms  of 
material  bodies  in  a  natural  world,  which  is  some- 
how caused  by  God,  and  inadequately  represents 
him,  but  is  yet  outside  and  apart  from  him.  The 
existence  of  this  material  world  Norris  practically 
disproves,  though  he  still  clings  to  its  reality  on  the 
foundation  of  faith.  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton  remarks 
that  Malebranche  as  a  Catholic  was  "obliged  to 
burden"  his  theory  with  the  incumbrance  of  matter, 
but  that  to  Norris  as  a  Protestant,  little  credit  is 
due  for  not  rejecting  this  material  world.  It  re- 
mained for  Collier  and  Berkeley  to  give  up  the  ma- 
terial world  altogether  as  a  sacrifice  to  the  received 
philosophy  of  ideas.^^ 

The  fact  that  these  two  men,  Collier  and  Berk- 
eley, came  to  the  same  conclusion  at  precisely  the 
same  time,  seems  to  many  critics  a  coincidence  too 
curious  to  be  accidental ;  and  the  reputation  of 
Berkeley,  compared  with  the  neglect  of  Collier, 
seems  hardly  due  to  chance  alone.     Yet  the  facts 


23  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton  in  "Discussions  on  Philosophy  and  Litera- 
ture,"  pp.   199   ff. 


xxii  CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS 

of  the  case  as  we  know  them  point  to  the  indepen- 
dence of  Collier's  thought.  In  point  of  time,  the 
promulgation  of  these  doctrines  is  almost  identical. 
In  1709,  George  Berkeley  published  his  "Essay 
toward  a  New  Theory  of  Vision,"  which  contained 
suggestions  of  his  metaphysical  theory.  For  the 
purpose  of  his  arguments  he  grants,  in  this  work, 
the  external  existence  of  tangible  matter,  but  he 
teaches,  by  implication,  that  visible  matter  exists 
only  in  the  mind  of  him  who  sees  it.  In  1710, 
Berkeley  published  the  "Principles  of  Human 
Knowledge,"  which  contains  the  exposition  of 
his  doctrine  in  detailed  form.  This  was  followed, 
in  1713,  by  the  "Three  Dialogues  between  Hylas 
and  Philonous,"  intended,  as  Berkeley  says,  "to  in- 
troduce the  notions  I  advance  into  the  mind  in  the 
most  easy  and  familiar  manner."  In  this  same 
year,  1713,  appeared  Collier's  little  volume,  the 
"Clavis  Universalis."  The  facts  that  Berkeley's 
first  suggestion  of  his  theory  was  published  four 
years  before  Collier's  theory  was  advanced,  and 
that  his  finished  arguments  were  made  public  three 
years  before  Collier's,  seem  at  first  glance  to  settle 
in  the  negative  the  question  of  Collier's  indepen- 
dence. But  two  further  considerations  make  the 
conclusion  doubtful.  In  the  first  place,  we  know 
by  Collier's  own  word  ^^  that  he  had  adopted  his 
own  theory  ten  years  before  he  put  it  into  outward 
form,  which  brings  the  date  of  its  conception  not 

24  "Clavis   Universalis,"   p.   5. 


CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS  xxiii 

later  than  1703.  Berkeley  gives  no  direct  date  of 
the  birth  of  his  theories,  but  it  can  be  supplied  ap- 
proximately from  his  "Commonplace  Book."  In 
this  book,  according  to  Fraser,  he  "seems  to  have 
set  down  .  .  .  stray  thoughts  which  occurred  to 
him  in  the  course  of  his  mathematical  and  meta- 
physical studies  at  Trinity  College,  Dublin. 
These  common-places  seem  to  have  been  formed 
gradually,  apparently  in  1705  and  some  following 
years.  .  .  .  Considerable  portions  imply  that  he 
was  at  the  time  maturing  his  thoughts  with  a  view 
to  the  publication  of  the  Essay  on  Vision  and  the 
Principles  of  Human  Knowledge]  but  the  form 
which  the  projected  work  (or  works)  was  to  take 
does  not  appear  to  have  been  finally  settled  in  his 
mind."  ^^  It  is  not  possible  to  compare  definite 
dates  here.  We  can  only  say  that  in  1703  Collier 
was  convinced  of  his  theory,  and  that  in  1705  Berk- 
eley was  testing  his  doctrine  by  applying  it  to  all 
branches  of  knowledge.  If  these  dates  bear  any 
weight,  we  may  conclude  that  the  two  men,  while 
they  were  both  under  the  age  of  twenty-five  and 
while  they  were  still  continuing  their  college  stud- 
ies, independently  conceived  this  new  theory  of 
matter.  From  the  references  in  the  letters  written 
in  the  few  years  following  the  publication  of  the 
"Clavis,"  it  is  evident  that  in  the  meantime  Collier 
had  become  acquainted  with  some  one  book  of 
Berkeley;  and  the  further  reference  in  the  "Speci- 

25  Note  I  by  Fraser  on  p.  419  of  the  "Collected  Works,"  Vol.  IV. 


xxiv  CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS 

men  of  True  Philosophy"  identifies  this  book  with 
the  "Dialogues." '' 

Whatever  one's  conclusion  about  the  relation 
between  Collier  and  Berkeley,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  Collier's  "third"  and  "fourth"  argu- 
ments anticipate  Kant's  first  and  second  antino- 
mies. Just  as  Kant  argues  that  "the  world  is  not  a 
whole  existing  in  itself"  from  the  fact  that  it  can 
be  proved  to  be  both  finite  and  infinite  in  time  and 
in  space,  so  Collier  argues  that  "an  external  world 
....  must  be  both  finite  and  infinite,"  and  that 
"that  which  is  both  finite  and  infinite  in  extent  is 
absolutely  non-existent."^^  And  as  Kant  argues 
that  material  substances  are  "nothing  outside  our 
representations"  from  the  fact  that  they  can  be 
shown  to  be  both  infinitely  divisible  and  ultimately 
indivisible,  so  Collier  affirms  "in  like  manner  as  be- 
fore, that  external  matter  is  both  finitely  and  in- 
finitely divisible,  and,  consequently,  that  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  external  matter."  ^* 

It  must  be  granted  that  the  "Clavis  Univer- 
salis"  is   more   than   a   "metaphysical   curiosity." 

26  As  Leslie  Stephen  points  out,  in  his  article  on  Collier  in  the 
Dictionary  of  National  Biography,  this  reference  (on  p.  114  of  the 
"Specimen  of  True  Philosophy"  as  given  in  the  Parr  edition)  is  the 
only  one  in  Collier's  published  writings.  Stephen  credits  Collier  with 
entire  independence  in  the  conception  of  the  theory. 

27  "Clavis   Universalis,"   p.   63. 

28  Since  this  introduction  was  written,  in  its  first  form,  the  com- 
parison has  been  made  in  more  detail  by  Professor  Arthur  O.  Lovejoy 
in  a  paper  on  "Kant  and  the  English  Platonists"  in  "Essays  Philosoph- 
ical and  Psychological  in  honor  of  William  James"  by  "His  Colleagues 
at   Columbia   University."     Longmans,   Green  &  Co.,   1908. 


CLAVIS    UNIVERSALIS  xxv 

Although  the  greater  length  and  detail  of  Berk- 
eley's arguments,  combined  with  his  grace  of  liter- 
ary style,  make  his  works  more  desirable  for  the 
general  introduction  to  idealism,  Collier's  book  is 
of  real  value  to  the  student  in  connection  with  the 
study  of  Berkeley.  The  "Clavis"  gives  in  conclu- 
sive form  Berkeley's  chief  arguments.  It  adds, 
moreover,  two  of  the  arguments  which  Kant  later 
made  famous.  More  than  this,  the  two  systems 
together  show  how  an  idealistic  theory  of  the  uni- 
verse was  an  inevitable  result  of  the  thought  of  the 
early  eighteenth  century. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS: 

OR,  A 

New  Inquiry  after  Truth. 

BEING 

A  DEMONSTRATION 

OF  THE 

Non-Existence,  or  Impossibility, 
OF  AN 

EXTERNAL  WORLD. 


BY  ARTH.  COLLIER, 

RECTOR  OF  LANGFORD  MAGNA,  NEAR  SARUM. 


Vulgi  Assensus  &  Approbatio  circa  Materiam 
Difficilem  est  cerium  Argumentum  Falsitatis  istius 
Opinionis  cut  Assentttur. 

Mr.  Maleb.  De  Inquir.  Verit.  Lib.  iii.  P.  194. 


LONDON, 

Printed  for  ROBERT  GOSLING,  at  the  Mitre  and 

Crown  againft  St.  Dunftan's  Church 

in  Fleet-ftreet.     1713. 


The 
CONTENTS. 


THE  INTRODUCTION. 

Wherein  the  question  in  general  is  explained 
and  stated,  and  the  whole  subject  divided 
into  two  particular  heads    -       -       -  5 

Part  I. 

Chap.  I.  Wherein  the  first  question  is  con- 
sidered, viz..  Whether  the  visible  world 
is  external  or  not    ------       14 

Sect.  I.  That  the  seeming  Externeity  of  a 
visible  object,  is  no  argument  of  its  real 
externeity 16 

Sect.  II.     That  a  visible  object,  as  such,  is  not 

external    --------       2g 

Chap.  II.     Objections  answered      -       -       -       43 


4  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

Part  II. 

That  there  is  no  external  world,  and  that  an 
external  world  is  a  being  utterly  impos- 


stole  - 

-      55 

Chap.  I. 

Argument  I.     -       -       ■ 

-      55 

Chap.  II. 

Argument  II.  - 

-      59 

Chap.  III. 

Argument  III. 

-      63 

Chap.  IV. 

Argument  IV. 

-      68 

Chap.  V. 

Argument  V.   -       -       - 

-      78 

Chap.  VI. 

Argument  VI. 

-      83 

Chap.  VII. 

Argument  VII. 

-      87 

Chap.  VIII. 

Argument  VIII.     - 

-      93 

Chap.  IX. 

Argument  IX. 

-      95 

Chap.  X. 

Objections  answered 

-      lOI 

The  conclusion  of  the  whole. 

Of  the  use  and  consequences  of  the  foregoing 

treatise n8 


The 
INTRODUCTION, 

Wherein  the  Question  in  general  is  explained  and 

stated,  and  the  whole  subject  divided  into 

two  particular  heads. 

Though  I  am  verily  persuaded,  that  in  the 
whole  course  of  the  following  treatise,  I  shall  or 
can  have  no  other  adversary,  but  prejudice;  yet, 
having  by  me  no  mechanical  engine  proper  to  re- 
move it;  nor,  being  able  to  invent  any  other  method 
of  attacking  it,  besides  that  of  fair  reason  and  argu- 
ment; rather  than  the  world  should  finish  its  course 
without  once  offering  to  enquire  in  what  manner 
it  exists,  (and  for  one  reason  more,  which  I  need 
not  name,  unless  the  end  desired  were  more  hope- 
ful;) I  am  at  last,  after  a  ten  years  pause  and  de- 
liberation, content  to  put  myself  upon  the  trial  of 
the  common  reader,  without  pretending  to  any  bet- 
ter art  of  gaining  him  on  my  side,  than  that  of  dry 
reason  and  metaphysical  demonstration. 

The  question  I  am  concerned  about  is  in  gen- 
eral this,  whether  there  be  any  such  thing  as  an  ex- 
ternal world.  And  my  title  will  suffice  to  inform 
my  reader,  that  the  negative  of  this  question  is  the 
point  I  am  to  demonstrate. 

In  order  to  which,  let  us  first  explain  the 


6  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

terms.  Accordingly,  by  worlds  I  mean  whatso- 
ever is  usually  understood  by  the  terms,  body,  ex- 
tension, space,  matter,  quantity,  &c.  if  there  be  any 
other  word  in  our  english  tongue,  which  is  synon- 
imous  with  all  or  any  of  these  terms.  And  now 
nothing  remains  but  the  explication  of  the  word 
external. 

By  this,  in  general,  I  understand  the  same  as 
is  usually  understood  by  the  words,  absolute,  self- 
existent,  independent,  &c.  and  this  is  what  I  deny 
of  all  matter,  body,  extension,  &c. 

If  this,  you  will  say,  be  all  that  I  mean  by  the 
word  external,  I  am  like  to  meet  with  no  adversary 
at  all,  for  who  has  ever  affirmed,  that  matter  is  self- 
existent,  absolute  or  independent? 

To  this  I  answer,  what  others  hold,  or  have 
held  in  times  past,  I  shall  not  here  inquire.  On  the 
contrary,  I  should  be  glad  to  find  by  the  event,  that 
all  mankind  were  agreed  in  that  which  I  contend 
for  as  the  truth,  viz.  that  matter  is  not,  cannot  be 
independent,  absolute,  or  self-existent.  In  the 
mean  time,  whether  they  are  so  or  no,  will  be  tried 
by  this. 

Secondly,  and  more  particularly,  that  by  not 
independent,  not  absolutely  existent,  not  external, 
I  mean  and  contend  for  nothing  less,  than  that  all 
matter,  body,  extension,  &c.  exists  in,  or  in  depend- 
ence on  mind,  thought,  or  perception,  and  that  it 
is  not  capable  of  an  existence,  which  is  not  thus 
dependant.^ 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  7 

This  perhaps  may  awaken  another  to  demand 
of  me  how?  to  which  I  as  readily  answer,  just  how 
my  reader  pleases,  provided  it  be  somehow.  As 
for  instance,  we  usually  say,  an  accident  exists  in, 
or  in  dependence  on,  its  proper  subject;  and  that  its 
very  essence,  or  reality  of  its  existence,  is  so  to  exist. 
Will  this  pass  for  an  explication  of  my  assertion? 
if  so,  I  am  content  to  stand  by  it,  in  this  sense  of 
the  words.  Again,  we  usually  say,  (and  fancy  too 
we  know  what  we  mean  in  saying,)  that  a  body  ex- 
ists in,  and  also  in  dependance  on,  its  proper  place, 
so  as  to  exist  necessarily  in  some  place  or  other. 
Will  this  description  of  dependance  please  my  in- 
quisitive reader?  If  so,  I  am  content  to  join  issue 
with  him,  and  contend  that  all  matter  exists  in,  or  as 
much  dependantly  on,  mind,  thought,  or  percep- 
tion, to  the  full,  as  any  body  exists  in  place.  Nay,  I 
hold  the  description  to  be  so  just  and  apposite,  as 
if  a  man  should  say,  a  thing  is  like  itself :  for  I  sup- 
pose I  need  not  tell  my  reader,  that  when  I  affirm 
that  all  matter  exists  in  mind,  after  the  same  man- 
ner as  body  exists  in  place,  I  mean  the  very  same 
as  if  I  had  said,  that  mind  itself  is  the  place  of 
body,  and  so  its  place,  as  that  it  is  not  capable  of 
existing  in  any  other  place,  or  in  place  after  any 
other  manner.  Again,  lastly,  it  is  a  common  say- 
ing, that  an  object  of  perception  exists  in,  or  in  de- 
pendance on,  its  respective  faculty.  And  of  these 
objects,  there  are  many  who  will  reckon  with  me, 
light,   sounds,   colours,   and   even   some   material 


8  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

things,  such  as  trees,  houses,  &c.  which  are  seen, 
as  we  say,  in  a  looking-glass,  but  which  are,  or 
ought  to  be  owned  to  have  no  existence  but  in,  or 
respectively  on,  the  minds  or  faculties  of  those  who 
perceive  them.  But  to  please  all  parties  at  once, 
I  affirm  that  I  know  of  no  manner,  in  which  an 
object  of  perception  exists  in,  or  on,  its  respective 
faculty,  which  I  will  not  admit  in  this  place,  to  be 
a  just  description  of  that  manner  of  in-existence, 
after  which  all  matter  that  exists,  is  affirmed  by  me 
to  exist  in  mind.  Nevertheless,  were  I  to  speak 
my  mind  freely,  I  should  chuse  to  compare  it  to 
the  in-existence  of  some,  rather  than  some  other 
objects  of  perception,  particularly  such  as  are  ob- 
jects of  the  sense  of  vision ;  and  of  these,  those  more 
especially,  which  are  allowed  by  others,  to  exist 
wholly  in  the  mind  or  visive  faculty;  such  as  ob- 
jects seen  in  a  looking  glass,  by  men  distempered, 
light-headed,  ecstatic,  &c.  where  not  only  colours, 
but  intire  bodies,  are  perceived  or  seen.  For  these 
cases  are  exactly  parallel,  with  that  existence  which 
I  affirm  of  all  matter,  body,  or  extension  whatso- 
ever. 

Having  endeavoured,  in  as  distinct  terms  as 
I  can,  to  give  my  reader  notice  of  what  I  mean  by 
the  proposition  I  have  undertaken  the  defence  of, 
it  will  be  requisite  in  the  next  place,  to  declare  in 
as  plain  terms,  what  I  do  not  mean  by  it. 

Accordingly,  I  declare  in  the  first  place,  that 
in  affirming  that  there  is  no  external  world,  I  make 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  9 

no  doubt  or  question  of  the  existence  of  bodies,  or 
whether  the  bodies  which  are  seen  exist  or  not.  It 
is  with  me  a  first  principle,  that  whatsoever  is 
seen,  is.  To  deny,  or  doubt  of  this,  is  errant  scepti- 
cism, and  at  once  unqualifies  a  man  for  any  part 
or  office  of  a  disputant,  or  philosopher;  so  that  it 
will  be  remembered  from  this  time,  that  my  en- 
quiry is  not  concerning  the  existence,  but  altogether 
concerning  the  extra-existence  of  certain  things  or 
objects;  or,  in  other  words,  what  I  affirm  and  con- 
tend for,  is  not  that  bodies  do  not  exist,  or  that  the 
external  world  does  not  exist,  but  that  such  and 
such  bodies,  which  are  supposed  to  exist,  do  not 
exist  externally;  or  in  universal  terms,  that  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  an  external  world. 

Secondly,  I  profess  and  declare,  that  notwith- 
standing this  my  assertion,  I  am  persuaded  that  I 
see  all  bodies  just  as  other  folks  do;  that  is,  the  vis- 
ible world  is  seen  by  me,  or,  which  is  the  same, 
seems  to  me  to  be  as  much  external  or  independant, 
as  to  its  existence,  on  my  mind,  self,  or  visive  fac- 
ulty, as  any  visible  object  does,  or  can  be  pretended 
to  do  or  be,  to  any  other  person.  I  have  neither, 
as  I  know  of,  another  nature,  nor  another  knack 
of  seeing  objects,  different  from  other  persons,  suit- 
able to  the  hypothesis  of  their  existence  which  I 
here  contend  for.  So  far  from  this,  that  I  believe, 
and  am  very  sure,  that  this  seeming,  or  (as  I  shall 
desire  leave  to  call  it)  quasi  externeity  of  visible  ob- 
jects, is  not  only  the  effect  of  the  will  of  God,  ^  (as  it 


lo  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

is  his  will  that  light  and  colours  should  seem  to  be 
without  the  soul,  that  heat  should  seem  to  be  in  the 
fire,  pain  in  the  hand,  &c.)  but  also  that  it  is  a 
natural  and  necessary  condition  of  their  visibility; 
I  would  say,  that  though  God  should  be  supposed 
to  make  a  world,  or  any  one  visible  object,  which 
is  granted  to  be  not  external,  yet  by  the  condition 
of  its  being  seen,  it  would,  and  must  be  quasi  exter- 
nal to  the  perceptive  faculty;  as  much  so  to  the 
full,  as  is  any  material  object  usually  seen  in  this 
visible  world. 

Moreover,  thirdly,  when  I  affirm  that  all  mat- 
ter exists  dependantly  on  mind,  I  am  sure  my 
reader  will  allow  me  to  say,  I  do  not  mean  by  this, 
that  matter  or  bodies  exist  in  bodies.  As  for  in- 
stance, when  I  affirm  or  say,  that  the  world,  which 
I  see  exists  in  my  mind,  I  cannot  be  supposed  to 
mean  that  one  body  exists  in  another,  or  that  all 
the  bodies  which  I  see  exist  in  that,  which  common 
use  has  taught  me  to  call  my  body.  I  must  needs 
desire  to  have  this  remembered,  because  experience 
has  taught  me  how  apt  persons  are,  or  will  be,  to 
mistake  me  in  this  particular.  ^ 

Fourthly,  when  I  affirm  that  this  or  that  visi- 
ble object  exists  in,  or  dependantly  on,  my  mind,  or 
perceptive  faculty,  I  must  desire  to  be  understood 
to  mean  no  more  than  I  say,  by  the  words  mind  and 
perceptive  faculty.  In  like  manner  I  would  be 
understood,  when  I  affirm  in  general,  that  all  mat- 
ter or  body  exists  in,  or  dependantly  on,  mind.     I 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  ii 

say  this  to  acquit  myself  from  the  imputation  of 
holding,  that  the  mind  causes  its  own  ideas,  or 
objects  of  perception ;  or,  lest  any  one  by  a  mistake 
should  fancy  that  I  affirm,  that  matter  depends  for 
its  existence  on  the  will  of  man,  or  any  creature 
whatsoever.  '*  But  now,  if  any  such  mistake  should 
arise  in  another's  mind,  he  has  wherewith  to  rectify 
it;  in  as  much  as  I  assure  him,  that  by  mind,  I 
mean  that  part,  or  act,  or  faculty  of  the  soul,  which 
is  distinguished  by  the  name  intellective,  or  percep- 
tive, as  in  exclusion  of  that  other  part  which  is  dis- 
tinguished by  the  term  will. 

Fifthly,  when  I  affirm  that  all  matter  exists  in 
mind,  or  that  no  matter  is  external,  I  do  not  mean 
that  the  world,  or  any  visible  object  of  it,  which  I 
(for  instance)  see,  is  dependant  on  the  mind  of  any 
other  person  besides  myself;  or  that  the  world,  or 
matter,  which  any  other  person  sees,  is  dependant 
on  mine,  or  any  other  person's  mind,  or  faculty  of 
perception.  On  the  contrary,  I  contend  as  well  as 
grant,  that  the  world  which  John  sees  is  external  to 
Peter,  and  the  world  which  Peter  sees  is  external  to 
John.  That  is,  I  hold  the  thing  to  be  the  same  in 
this,  as  in  any  other  case  of  sensation ;  for  instance, 
that  of  sound.  Here  two  or  more  persons,  who  are 
present  at  a  concert  of  music,  may  indeed  in  some 
sense  be  said  to  hear  the  same  notes  or  melody;  but 
yet  the  truth  is,  that  the  sound  which  one  hears,  is 
not  the  very  same  with  the  sound  which  another 
hears,  because  the  souls  or  persons  are  supposed  to 


la  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

be  different;  and  therefore,  the  sound  which  Peter 
hears,  is  external  to,  or  independant  on  the  soul  of 
John,  and  that  which  John  hears,  is  external  to  the 
soul  or  person  of  Peter.  ^ 

Lastly,  when  I  affirm  that  no  matter  is  alto- 
gether external,  but  necessarily  exists  in  some  mind 
or  other,  exemplified  and  distinguished  by  the 
proper  names  of  John,  Peter,  &c.  I  have  no  de- 
sign to  affirm,  that  every  part  or  particle  of  matter, 
which  does  or  can  exist,  must  needs  exist  in  some 
created  mind  or  other.  On  the  contrary,  I  believe 
that  infinite  worlds  might  exist,  though  not  one 
single  created,  (or  rather  merely  created,)  mind 
were  ever  in  being.  And  as  in  fact  there  are  thou- 
sands and  ten  thousands,  I  believe,  and  I  even  con- 
tend, that  there  is  an  universe,  or  material  world  in 
being,  which  is,  at  least,  numerically  different  from 
every  material  world  perceived  by  mere  creatures. 
By  this,  I  mean  the  great  mundane  idea  of  created 
(or  rather  twice  created)  matter,  by  which  all 
things  are  produced;  or  rather,  (as  my  present  sub- 
ject leads  me  to  speak,)  by  which  the  great  God 
gives  sensations  to  all  his  thinking  creatures,  and 
by  which  things  that  are  not,  are  preserved,  and 
ordered  in  the  same  manner  as  if  they  were. 

And  now  I  presume  and  hope,  that  my  mean- 
ing is  sufficiently  understood,  when  I  affirm,  that 
all  matter  which  exists,  exists  in,  or  dependantly  on, 
mind;  or,  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  external 
world. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  13 

Nevertheless,  after  all  the  simplicity  to  which 
this  question  seems  already  to  be  reduced,  I  find 
myself  necessitated  to  divide  it  into  two.  For,  in 
order  to  prove  that  there  is  no  external  world,  it 
must  needs  be  one  article  to  shew  that  the  visible 
world  is  not  external,  and  when  this  is  done,  though 
in  this  all  be  indeed  done,  which  relates  to  any 
opinion  yet  maintained  by  men,  yet  something  still 
is  wanting  towards  a  full  demonstration  of  the 
point  at  large,  and  to  come  up  to  the  universal 
terms,  in  which  the  question  is  expressed. 

Accordingly,  I  shall  proceed  in  this  order. 
First  to  shew,  that  the  visible  world  is  not  external. 
Secondly,  to  demonstrate  more  at  large,  or  simply, 
that  an  external  world  is  a  being  utterly  impossible. 
Which  two  shall  be  the  subjects  of  two  distinct 
parts  or  books.  ^ 


PART  I. 

CHAP.  I. 

Wherein  the  first  question  is  considered,  viz. 
Whether  the  visible  World  is  external  or  not. 
First,  then,  I  affirm  that  the  visible  world  is 
not  external.  By  the  visible  world,  I  mean  every 
material  object,  which  is,  or  has  been,  or  can  be 
seen.  I  say  can  be  seen,  (which  is  the  import  of 
the  word  visible,)  in  order  to  comprehend  what- 
ever worlds  there  are,  or  may  be  conceived  to  be, 
(besides  that  which  we  see  who  live  on  this  earth,) 
whether  planetary,  celestial,  or  supercelestial 
worlds.  Be  they  what,  or  how  many  they  will, 
supposing  they  are  visible,  that  is,  actually  seen  by 
some  particular  souls  or  other,  they  are  all  under- 
stood and  comprehended  within  the  notion  of  the 
visible  world:  for  my  subject  leads  me  to  affirm, 
that  a  visible  world,  as  visible,  is  not  external.  Some 
perhaps  will  be  apt  to  prevent  my  inquiry,  by  urg- 
ing that  it  is  not  capable  of  being  a  question,  wheth- 
er the  visible  world  be  external  or  not;  it  being 
self-evident,  that  a  visible  object,  as  visible  or  seen, 
is  and  must  be  external ;  that  an  object's  being  seen 
as  external,  is  a  simple  and  direct  proof  of  its 
being  really  external ;  and  consequently  that  there 
is  no  foundation  for  the  distinction  between  the 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  15 

quasi  and  real  externeity  of  a  visible  object,  which 
I  laid  down  in  my  introduction. 

I  answer,  then  indeed  I  am  blown  up  at  once, 
if  there  be  any  truth  or  consequence  in  the  objec- 
tion. But  the  best  of  it  is,  that  I  had  never  any 
design  to  palm  this  distinction  upon  my  reader 
gratis,  foreseeing  it  might  stick  with  him.  Never- 
theless, he  must  allow  me  the  common  benefit  of 
words,  whereby  to  explain  my  meaning;  and  this 
was  all  the  liberty  I  presumed  upon,  in  premising 
that  distinction.  Whether  the  seeming  externeity 
of  a  visible  object,  be  indeed  an  argument  of  its 
real  externeity,  I  leave  to  be  proved  by  all  those 
who  will  affirm  it.  However,  it  cannot  be  denied, 
but  that  it  is  capable  of  being  a  question.  For 
though  the  truth,  (or  fact)  be  against  me,  yet  visi- 
ble objects  seem  to  be  external;  and  herein  we  all 
agree ;  so  that  one  member  of  the  distinction  is  al- 
lowed by  all  to  be  good.  If  so,  what  should  hinder 
it  from  being  a  fair  question,  whether  this  seeming 
be  an  argument  of  its  real  externeity?  For  my  own 
part,  I  am  far  from  taking  it  for  granted,  that  this 
distinction  is  good,  or  built  upon  real  facts,  (though 
every  one  must  allow  the  distinction  to  be  good  in 
general  between  real  and  apparent,)  for  this  would 
be  to  take  a  main  part  of  the  last  question  for 
granted.  But  then,  on  the  other  hand,  it  cannot 
be  expected  that  I  should  admit  an  adversary  to 
take  it  for  granted,  that  this  distinction  (with  re- 
gard to  visible  objects)  is  not  good;  in  other  words, 


l6  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

that  there  is  no  difference  in  the  thing,  between 
seeming  and  real  externetty,  or  between  visible  and 
external.  For  this  would  be  to  grant  away  at  once 
the  whole  matter  I  am  concerned  for.  If  there- 
fore another  would  have  me  grant  or  allow  this, 
let  him  fairly  set  himself  to  shew,  wherein  lies  the 
connection  between  these  two  different  terms,  or 
prove  what  is  affirmed  in  the  objection,  namely, 
that  a  visible  object,  as  visible  or  seen,  is  and  must 
be  external.  Here,  the  least  thing  to  be  expected 
is,  that  he  point  or  single  out  one  visible  object, 
which  is  allowed,  or  may  be  plainly  proved  to  be 
external.  In  the  mean  time,  or  till  something  of 
this  kind  be  attempted  by  another,  all  must  allow 
me  the  liberty  of  doubting,  whether  there  be  any 
such  connection  or  not;  at  least  bear  with  me, 
whilst  I  am  content  to  prove  that  there  is  no  such 
connection. 

Let  this  then  be  the  first  step  by  which  I  rise 
to  my  last  conclusion;  namely,  to  shew,  that  the 
seeming  externeity  of  a  visible  object,  is  no  argu- 
ment of  its  real  externeity.  Or,  in  other  words,  that 
a  visible  object  may  exist  in,  or  dependantly  on,  the 
mind  of  him  that  seeth  it,  notwithstanding  that  it 
is  seen,  and  is  allowed  to  seem  to  be  external  to,  or 
independant  on  it. 

SECT.  I. 

That  the  seeming  externeity  of  a  visible  object,  is 
no  argument  of  its  real  externeity. ' 
To  s'how  this,  I  think  the  best  way  will  be  by 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  17 

instances,  or  an  induction  of  particular  objects, 
which,  though  they  seem  as  much  to  be  external, 
as  any  objects  whatsoever,  yet  are,  or  must  needs 
be  granted,  to  be  not  external.  *  These,  to  speak  as 
orderly  as  I  can,  shall  be  divided  into  two  sorts, 
possibles  and  actuals. 

By  actuals  are  meant  certain  instances  of  per- 
ception, which  are  ordinary  and  usual,  or  which, 
at  least,  have  been  in  fact.  And  by  possibles  are 
meant  certain  instances  of  perception,  which  have 
never  indeed  been  fact,  but  which  need  nothing 
but  an  increase  of  power,  to  make  them  so  at  any 
time.     And, 

First,  for  the  last  of  these,  viz.  of  possible 
instances  of  perception;  where  the  object  perceived 
is  allowed  to  be  not  external,  though  it  appears 
to  be  as  much  so  as  any  objects  whatsoever. '  Of 
this  sort  I  shall  mention  two,  and  that  according 
to  their  degrees  of  actuality.     And, 

First,  for  that  which  is  the  least  actual  of  the 
two,  which  shall  be  an  instance  of  a  man's  perceiv- 
ing a  creature,  which  has  not  so  much  as  in  its 
kind,  existed  externally;  (supposing  here  for  the 
present  that  some  things  have  so  existed;)  I  mean, 
one  of  those  they  usually  call  chimaera's.  Of  these 
there  are  distinctions  and  names,  of  which  one  is 
centaur. 

A  centaur,  is  an  ens  or  being,  partly  horse, 
and  partly  man :  a  mere  fiction  of  poets  or  painters ; 
that  is,  a  creature  which  has  never  existed,  or  been 


i8  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

seen,  any  otherwise  than  in  imagination.  But  in 
imagination  it  has,  or  is  supposed  to  have  been 
seen,  and  as  such  it  has  existed,  and  does  or  may 
continually  exist. 

Well  now,  let  some  particular  person  be  sup- 
posed, in  whose  mind  or  imagination,  a  centaur 
does,  this  instant  exist;  and  let  his  name  be  called 
Apelles.  Apelles  then  perceives  a  centaur,  and 
that  vividly  or  distinctly  enough  to  draw  the  pic- 
ture of  it,  or  describe  its  shape  and  proportions 
with  his  pencil. 

These  things  supposed,  I  demand  how  does 
this  centaur  seem  to  Apelles?  Either  as  within  or 
without  him,  whilst  he  fixes  the  eye  of  his  mind 
upon  it,  so  as  to  describe  it?  For  an  answer  to  this 
question,  I  appeal  to  every  person  living,  whether 
an  object  of  imagination  does  not  seem  or  appear 
to  be  as  much  external  to  the  mind,  which  sees  it, 
as  any  object  whatsoever;  that  is  as  any  of  those 
which  are  called  objects  of  vision.  If  so,  I  might 
here  observe,  that  we  have  already  one  instance  ot 
an  object  perceived,  which,  as  perceived,  is  seen  as 
without,  yet  is  indeed  not  so,  but  altogether  existent 
in,  or  dependant  on,  the  mind  that  perceives  it. 
But  I  am  content  to  suppose  that  it  will  be  urged 
to  me,  that  this  is  not  an  instance  to  the  intended 
purpose,  which  was  not  concerning  imagination, 
but  sense,  and  particularly  that  of  vision.  Well, 
I  submit  to  the  charge  of  fact,  lest  I  should  seem 
too  rigorous,  and  so  overstrain  my  point:  but  then 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  19 

my  reader  will  agree  with  me  in  the  conclusion  I 
contend  for,  if  from  this  very  instance  I  shew  him 
a  like  possible  case  of  vision,  wherein  the  object 
perceived  is  not  external. 

In  speaking  of  possibles,  allowed  to  be  such, 
I  have  all  power  at  my  command,  or  the  liberty 
of  supposing  the  power  of  God  himself  to  produce 
effects  for  me.  Suppose  then  an  almighty  power 
ready  at  hand  to  produce  this  imagined  centaur 
into  an  object  of  vision ;  what  is  to  be  done  in  this 
case,  or  to  this  end?  Must  an  external  centaur  be 
created  that  Apelles  may  see  it?  Perhaps  so,  but 
is  there  no  easier  or  shorter  way  than  this  for  Ap- 
elles to  see  a  centaur?  Nay,  but  he  is  supposed 
already  to  see  a  centaur,  only  that  we  do  not  use 
to  call  it  seeing,  but  imagining,  because  of  the 
faint  and  languid  manner  after  which  he  seeth  it. 
But  if  this  be  all  the  difference  between  what  we 
use  to  call  seeing  and  imagining,  they  may  easily 
coincide,  without  any  considerable  difference  in 
the  object  perceived,  or  in  any  thing  else  with 
which  we  are  at  present  concerned.  For  what  is 
that  which  is  perceived  or  seen,  when  an  object 
visible  is  before  our  eyes?  Why  nothing  that  I 
can  think  of  but  figure  and  colour?  Well,  Apelles 
imagines  or  perceives  a  centaur;  he  perceives  then 
a  certain  figure  which  we  call  a  centaur;  he  per- 
ceives it  indeed  in  a  certain  languid  manner,  or 
not  so  vividly  as  some  objects  are  perceived,  which 
greater  vividness  we  use  to  call  colour,  but  still 


ao  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

he  is  supposed  to  perceive  a  centaur.  If  so,  add 
colour  of  this  perception,  and  the  centaur  which 
was  before  only  imagined,  is  now  become  a  seen 
or  visible  object,  and  yet  still,  as  being  the  same 
figure  or  extension,  is  as  much  in  his  mind,  or  as 
little  external,  as  it  was  before. 

Perhaps  my  reader  will  not  be  content  to 
grant  me,  that  the  difference  between  imagination 
and  vision  is  only  that  of  more  and  less,  or,  that 
an  object  in  one  is  perceived  with  or  with  such  a 
degree  of  colour,  and  in  the  other,  either  with  fig- 
ure only,  or  with  a  much  less  degree  of  colour.^" 
Perhaps  so;  but  he  will  doubtless  grant  this,  that 
whilst  Apelles  imagines  a  centaur,  God  may  so 
act  upon  his  mind,  as  that  by  degrees  he  shall  per- 
ceive it  more  and  more  distinctly  or  vividly,  till 
he  comes  to  perceive  it  to  the  full  as  vividly  as  any 
object  is  or  can  be  perceived  or  seen.  If  so,  I  leave 
it  with  them  to  distinguish  imagination  from  vis- 
ion any  otherwise  than  I  have  done,  who  allow  not 
my  manner  of  doing  it;  and  in  the  meantime  must 
demand  of  them  one  mark  or  sign  whereby  to  dis- 
tinguish the  centaur  thus  vividly  perceived,  or 
supposed  to  be  perceived,  from  an  object  which 
they  would  call  truly  visible,  or  seen. 

The  other  instance  which  I  promised  to  give 
is  indeed  much  like  the  former,  only  that  the  ob- 
ject perceived,  (or  one  like  it,)  is  here  supposed  to 
exist  amongst  the  ordinary  objects  of  the  visible 
world ;  and  it  is  this. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  21 

When  a  man  with  his  eyes  shut,  or  at  noon- 
day, has  a  mind  to  think  on  the  moon  at  full,  it  is 
certain  he  may  think  on  it.  This  moon,  as  being 
truly  perceived,  truly  exists:  it  exists  also  in  the 
mind  of  him  that  seeth  it,  and  that  so  really  and 
entirely,  that,  though  every  external  object  were 
supposed  to  be  annihilated,  or  not  one  besides  my- 
self had  ever  been  created,  yet  still  I  might  see  or 
imagine  a  moon. 

Well  now,  suppose  as  before,  that  whilst  I 
thus  imagine  a  moon,  God  should  so  act  upon  my 
mind  by  insensible  degrees,  or  otherwise,  as  to 
make  this  imagined  moon  appear  brighter  and 
brighter  to  me,  till  it  comes  to  be  to  the  full  as 
vivid  as  the  moon  supposed  to  be  in  the  heavens, 
or  as  any  moon  whatsoever.  In  this  case,  I  say, 
we  have  an  instance  of  a  visible  or  seen  object, 
^^hich,  to  appearance,  is  as  much  external  as  any 
object  whatsoever,  but  is  not  indeed  external: 
which  therefore  is  a  demonstration  that  the  visible 
externeity  of  an  object  is  no  argument  for  any  real 
externeity  of  it. 

II.  And  now  from  possible  I  come  to  actual 
cases,  or  instances  of  the  same  thing.    And  here, 

I.  The  first  shall  be  of  certain  other  sensa- 
tions, or  modes  of  sensible  perception,  wherein  the 
objects  perceived  exist  only  in  the  mind,  though 
they  seem  to  exist  externally  to,  or  independant  on, 
it;  such  as  sounds,  smells,  tastes,  heat,  pain,  pleas- 
ure, &c. 


22  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

If  any  one  doubts  whether  these  things  be 
within  or  without  the  souls  or  perceptive  faculties 
of  those  who  sense  them,  they  must  excuse  me  if  I 
am  unwilling  to  digress  so  far  as  to  undertake  the 
proof  of  what  I  here  suppose;  and  that  partly  on 
the  account  of  its  evidence ;  but  I  am  content  to  say 
chiefly,  because  the  thing  has  been  already  done 
often  to  my  hands,  particularly  by  Mr.  Des  Cartes, 
Mr.  Maleb ranch,  and  Mr.  Norris,  in  several  parts 
of  their  much  celebrated  writings,  whither  I  chuse 
to  refer  my  inquisitive  reader." 

Supposing  then  that  these  objects  of  sense  ex- 
ist truly  and  really  in  their  respective  faculties,  I 
am  sure  no  one  will  doubt  whether  they  do  not 
seem  to  exist  altogether  without  them.  For  this  I 
appeal  to  every  one's  experience,  and  to  the  dif- 
ficulty which  so  many  find  in  believing,  that  they 
do  not  indeed  exist  without  them.  If  so,  we  have 
then  several  instances  together  of  certain  objects 
of  sense,  which,  notwithstanding  that  they  seem  as 
much  external  as  any  objects  whatsoever,  yet  really 
and  truly  are  not  external. 

"Moreover,  there  is  of  this  sort  a  particular 
instance  often  mentioned  by  philosophers,^^  which 
is  very  home  to  this  purpose ;  and  that  is,  of  a  man's 
feeling  pain  in  a  member  which  he  has  lost.  This 
is  usually  said  to  depend  on  certain  motions  made 
by  certain  humours  or  animal  spirits  on  the  nerves 
or  fibres  of  the  remaining  part;  but  of  this  I  make 
no  other  use  or  account  at  present,  than  only  to  col- 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  23 

lect  from  hence,  that  the  efifect  would  still  be  the 
same  though  the  absent  member  were  as  well  an- 
nihilated as  lost.  If  so,  I  ask,  where  is  this  member 
which  the  man  is  sensible  of?  Where,  I  say,  is, 
or  can  it  be,  but  in  the  mind  or  soul  of  him  that 
feels  it?"" 

2.  The  next  instance  shall  be  of  light  and 
colours,  which  are  allowed  to  be  objects  properly 
visible.  These  appear  or  seem  as  much  at  a  dis- 
tance or  external  as  any  objects  whatsoever,  yet 
scarce  any  thing  is  more  evident  than  that  they  are 
not  so. 

In  this  I  speak  more  particularly  to  Cartes- 
ians ;  and  on  this  occasion  I  desire  to  ask  them,  how 
has  it  come  to  pass,  that  they,  who  all  agree  that 
light  and  colours  are  not  external,  should  yet  hap- 
pen to  overlook  the  same  conclusion,  with  relation 
to  the  bodies,  subjects,  or  extensions,  which  sus- 
tain these  accidents?^"*  For  can  any  thing  be  more 
true  or  proper  than  to  say,  such  a  body  is  luminous, 
or,  of  this  or  that  colour?  Or  more  evident  than 
that  light  and  colour  exist  in,  or  are  accidents  of 
matter?  And  shall  we  say  that  the  subjects  exist 
without,  and  the  accidents  within  the  soul?  Even 
those  very  accidents  whose  totum  esse  is  inesse  in 
their  particular  or  respective  subjects?  ^^  But  to 
return:  as  for  those  who  are  not  yet  content  so 
much  as  to  grant  that  light  and  colours  exist  in 
the  soul,  I  must  refer  them,  as  before,  for  their  sat- 
isfaction in  this  point.   In  the  mean  time  this  will 


34  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

doubtless  be  admitted  by  all  sides  or  parties,  that 
if  light  and  colours  are  not  external,  I  have  given 
them  an  instance  of  some  visible  objects,  which  are 
very  apparently,  but  yet  are  not  really  external, 
which  is  all  the  labour  I  shall  be  at  in  this  partic- 
ular. 

3.  My  next  instance  shall  be  of  those  who  on 
some  occasions  see  many  objects  which  no  other 
persons  see,  and  which  are  unanimously  granted 
to  have  no  existence,  but  in  the  minds  or  faculties 
of  those  who  see  them.  Such  are  those  who  see 
men  walking  the  streets  with  halters  about  their 
necks,  or  with  knives  sticking  in  their  bodies.  Such 
are  those  who  see  themselves  or  others  in  the  fig- 
ures of  cocks,  bulls,  or  wolves,  or  with  the  equipage 
of  sovereign  princes.  And  such,  lastly,  are  those 
who  see  and  converse  with  several  persons,  see 
houses,  trees,  &c.  which  no  other  person  seeth,  or 
perhaps  hath  ever  seen. 

These,  you  will  say,  are  mad  or  light-headed. 
Be  it  so,  that  they  are  mad,  or  drunk,  or  whatsoever 
else  you  will,  yet,  unless  we  will  be  like  them  we 
must  needs  grant  the  fact,  viz.  that  they  really 
see  the  things  or  objects  they  pretend  to  see.  They 
see  them  also  as  external  or  without  them;  and  yet 
we  all  grant,  and  even  contend,  that  they  are  not 
without  them,  which  is  as  much  as  I  am  here  con- 
cerned for.^^ 

4.  Another  instance  of  vision,  which  infers 
the  same  conclusion,  is  of  persons  whose  minds  or 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  25 

perceptive  faculties  are  acted  in  an  extraordinary 
manner  by  the  spirit  of  God:  such  was  Ezekiel, 
such  was  St.  John,  the  author,  to  us,  of  the  Apoca- 
lypse, and  such  have  been  many  others :  these  were 
neither  mad  nor  light-headed,  and  yet  they  tell  us 
of  strange  things  which  they  have  seen  as  evidently, 
and  as  externally  to  appearance,  as  any  objects 
whatsoever;  but  yet  such  things  as  never  really  ex- 
isted without  the  minds,  or  perceptive  faculties  of 
those  who  are  supposed  to  have  seen  them. 

5.  Another  instance  of  vision  which  infers 
the  same  conclusion,  shall  be  one  of  which  every 
person  may  have  the  experience.  Let  a  man,  whilst 
he  looks  upon  any  object,  as  suppose  the  moon, 
press  or  distort  one  of  his  eyes  with  his  finger;  this 
done,  he  will  perceive  or  see  two  moons,  at  some 
distance  from  each  other;  one,  as  it  were,  proceed- 
ing or  slid'ng  off  from  the  other. 

Now  both  of  these  moons  are  equally  external, 
or  seen  by  us  as  external;  and  yet  one  at  least  of 
these  is  not  external,  there  being  but  one  moon  sup- 
posed to  be  in  the  heavens,  or  without  us.  There- 
fore an  object  is  seen  by  us  as  external,  which  is 
not  indeed  external,  which  is  again  the  thing  to  be 
shewn. ^^ 

6.  The  last  instance  which  I  shall  mention 
to  this  purpose,  shall  be  one  likewise  of  which  we 
have  every  day's  experience,  but  yet  is  little  ob- 
served; and  that  is,  the  usual  act  of  seeing  objects 
in  a  looking-glass. 


a6  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

Here  I  see  sun,  moon,  and  stars,  even  a  whole 
expanded  world,  as  distinctly,  as  externally,  as 
any  material  objects  are  capable  of  being  seen. 

Now  the  question  (if  it  can  be  any  question) 
is.  Where  are  these  things?  Do  they  exist  within 
or  without  my  soul,  or  perceptive  faculty?  If  it 
is  said  that  they  exist  without,  I  must  still  ask 
where?  Are  they  numerically  the  same  with  that 
sun,  &c.  which  I  see  without  a  glass,  and  are  here, 
for  a  time,  supposed  to  be  external?  This  cannot 
be,  for  several  reasons:  as  first,  I  see  them  both 
together;  that  is,  I  as  evidently  see  two  distinct 
objects  (suppose  suns)  as  ever  I  saw  two  houses, 
trees,  &c.  that  is,  I  have  the  same  simple  evidence 
of  sense  for  their  being  two  distinct  suns,  as  I  have, 
or  can  have,  that  one  object  is  not  two,  or  two  one, 
or  that  one  is  not  ten  thousand.  Secondly,  I  can, 
and  have  often  seen  one  of  these  suns,  viz.  either 
of  them  singly,  without  seeing  the  other.  Again, 
thirdly,  instead  of  two,  I  have  sometimes  seen  at 
least  twenty  or  thirty  suns,  all  equally  seen,  equally 
seen  as  external.  Moreover,  fourthly,  we  often 
see  the  object  in  the  glass  very  different  from  that 
which  is  like  it,  and  goes  by  the  same  name,  with- 
out the  glass.  As  for  instance,  one  shall  be  in  mo- 
tion, whilst  the  other  is  at  rest;  one  shall  be  of  one 
colour,  nay  also,  figure  and  magnitude,  and  the 
other  shall  be  of  another;  to  which  may  be  added, 
many  other  particular  differences  of  which  every 
one's  experience  will  prove  a  sufficient  testimony. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  a? 

If  then  an  object  seen  as  in  a  glass,  be  not  the 
same  with  any  seen  without  a.  glass;  and  if  it  be 
still  affirmed  that  it  exists  without  the  soul  which 
perceives  it,  I  still  proceed  to  demand.  Where 
does  it  exist?  Shall  we  say  that  it  exists  in  the 
glass?  Perhaps  so,  but  this  must  be  made  at  least 
intelligible,  before  another  can  assent  to  it.  What, 
a  whole  expanded  world  in  a  piece  of  glass?  Well, 
let  those  who  think  so  enjoy  their  own  opinion. 
For  my  part,  I  freely  own  I  am  not  a  match  for 
such  reasoners;  and  so  I  grant,  as  to  a  superior 
genius,  whatsoever  they  shall  be  pleased  to  require 
of  me.  As  likewise  to  those  who  shall  seriously 
contend,  that  the  objects  seen  as  in  the  glass,  are 
not  indeed  in  the  glass,  but  in  the  e>e  of  him  that 
seeth  them;  not  thinking  it  possible  to  urge  any 
thing  to  the  contrary,  which  will  be  of  the  least 
weight  or  moment  to  alter  their  opinion. 

Nevertheless,  I  expect  to  find  some,  either  of 
the  learned  or  unlearned  part  of  the  world,  who, 
upon  the  first  suggestion,  will  very  readily  agree 
with  me,  that  the  objects  seen  as  in  the  glass,  are 
not  external  to  the  mind  which  sees  them;  and  in- 
deed this  is  to  me  so  simply  evident,  that  I  cannot 
induce  my  mind  to  set  formally  about  the  proof  of 
it,  and  do  almost  repent  me  that  I  have  said  so 
much  already  on  this  head,  or  that  I  did  not  at 
once  lay  it  down  as  a  thing  universally  taken  for 
granted,  at  least  which  would  be  granted  upon  the 
first  suggestion.    However,  till  such  time  as  I  am 


28  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

apprized  of  an  adversary,  I  will  now  conclude 
that  the  objects  seen  as  in  a  glass,  are  not  external 
to  the  soul,  or  visive  faculty  of  him  that  seeth 
them;  and  consequently,  that  I  have  here  again 
given  an  instance  of  a  visible  object,  as  much  ex- 
ternal to  appearance,  as  any  object  whatsoever, 
but  which  is  not  indeed  external. 

Now  from  all  and  every  of  these  instances  it 
follows,  that  the  visible  or  apparent  externeity  of 
an  object,  is  no  argument  of  its  real  externeity;  and 
consequently  (if  it  be  not  the  same  thing  again 
in  other  words)  that  there  is  a  true  and  real  dif- 
ference between  the  quasi  and  any  real  externeity 
of  an  object;  which  justifies  the  distinction  laid 
down  in  my  introduction.^® 

This  conclusion  follows,  with  the  same  force 
or  evidence,  from  the  possible  as  from  the  actual 
instances ;  and  as  much  from  one  of  either  sort,  as 
from  ten  thousand.  For  if  but  one,  and  that  a  pos- 
sible instance,  be  given  and  allowed  of,  wherein 
an  object  may  be  seen,  with  all  the  visible  marks 
of  being  external,  which  attend  any  visible  or  seen 
object  whatsoever,  but  which  yet  is  not  indeed  ex- 
ternal; this  one  intirely  destroys  all  connection 
between  apparent  and  real  externeity;  and  so  the 
consequence  will  be,  that  an  object's  appearing  to 
be  external,  is  no  manner  of  argument  that  it  is 
really  so. 

Yet  I  have  instanced  in  many  things,  for  my 
reader's  sake,  as  well  as  my  own.    For  my  own  in- 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  39 

deed,  in  the  first  place,  in  as  much  as  by  this  means 
I  have  many  strings  to  my  bow,  which  must  every 
one  be  broken  before  the  bow  itself  can  be  bent 
the  other  way.  But  yet  not  forgetting  my  reader's 
benefit,  (if  he  will  allow  it  to  be  any)  inasmuch 
as,  amongst  so  many  instances,  he  may  meet  with 
one  at  least  which  will  hit  in  with  his  way  of 
reasoning,  and  so  dispose  him  to  read  what  fol- 
lows with  the  more  pleasure. 


SECT.  II. 


That  a  visible  object,  as  such,  is  not  external. 

HAVING  shewn  that  there  is  no  consequence 
from  the  visible  or  quasi  externeity  of  an  object  to 
any  real  externeity  of  it,  I  come  in  the  next  place 
to  shew,  that  a  visible  world  is  not,  cannot  be  ex- 
ternal. 

But  before  I  enter  upon  this  task,  what  should 
hinder  me  from  asserting  my  privilege  of  standing 
still  in  this  place,  and  demanding  to  have  some 
other  argument  produced  for  the  externeity  of  the 
visible  world,  besides  that  of  its  seeming  externe- 
ity? This  is  that  which  convinces  people  of  every 
age,  and  sex,  and  degree,  that  the  objects  they  be- 
hold are  really  external;  and  this  I  am  sure,  with 
far  the  greater  part,  is  the  only  reason  which  in- 
duces this  persuasion.  With  such,  and  even  with 
all,  till  some  other  argument  be  produced,  I  may 


30  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

be  allowed  to  argue,  as  if  this  were  the  only  argu- 
ment: that  is,  to  conclude  outright,  that  no  visible 
object  is  indeed  external.  For  to  remove  all  the 
pillars  on  which  a  building  stands,  is  usually 
thought  to  be  as  effectual  a  way  to  demolish  it,  as 
any  direct  force  or  violence. 

But  not  to  insist  on  every  point  of  property, 
when  so  large  a  field  is  before  me,  I  will  here  im- 
mediately enter  upon  the  work  of  proving  it  to 
my  reader,  according  to  my  promise.    And  here, 

I.  First  of  all,  let  him  try  once  more  the  ex- 
periment already  mentioned,  of  pressing  or  dis- 
torting his  eye  with  his  finger.  In  this  case  I  ob- 
served before,  (with  an  appeal  for  the  truth  of  it 
to  common  experience,)  that  two  like  objects  ap- 
pear, or  are  seen.  Hence  I  concluded,  that  only 
one  of  these  can  be  external;  that  is,  that  one  of 
them  is  not  so.  But  here  I  argue  from  the  same 
fact,  that  neither  of  them  is  external. 

Let  an  instance  be  put,  as  suppose  the  object 
which  we  call  the  moon,  by  pressing  my  eye  I  see 
two  moons,  equally  vivid,  equally  external;  if  so, 
they  are  both  external,  or  neither.  But  we  are 
agreed  already  that  they  are  not  both  so,  therefore 
neither  of  them  is  external. 

If  any  one  will  affirm,  that  only  one  of  these 
moons  is  external,  I  must  desire  him  to  give  me 
one  mark  or  sign  of  the  externeity  of  one,  which  is 
not  in  the  other.  In  the  mean  time  let  him  try  this 
experiment  with  himself. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  31 

In  the  act  of  seeing  two  moons,  let  him  call 
one  of  them  the  true  external  moon,  and  the  other 
only  an  appearing  or  false,  or  by  any  other  name 
which  he  shall  please  to  give  it:  this  done,  let  him 
(with  his  eyes  or  mind  still  intent  upon  these  ob- 
jects) remove  his  finger,  and  press  the  other  eye 
in  like  manner;  or  shut  either  one  of  his  eyes,  still 
keeping  the  other  intent  on  the  same  object,  and 
he  will  find  by  manifest  experience,  that  the  moon, 
which  he  calls  the  true,  will  prove  to  be  the  false, 
and  that  which  he  calls  the  false,  will  prove  to  be 
the  true.  This,  I  think,  is  plain  and  palpable  dem- 
onstration, that  they  are  both  equally  true,  or  (as 
we  here  understand  the  word)  both  equally  ex- 
ternal. Since  therefore  no  more  than  one  can  be 
pretended  to  be  external,  to  say  that  they  are  both 
equally  so,  is  the  same  as  to  say  that  they  are  neither 
of  them  so. 

Note  I.  That  the  same  argument  here  pro- 
ceeding on  the  instance  of  the  moon,  is  the  very 
same  with  relation  to  any  other  visible  object.  So 
that  the  conclusion  comprehends  the  whole  visible 
world  at  once;  or,  in  other  words,  every  visible  ob- 
ject considered  as  visible  or  seen. 

Note  2.  The  same  conclusion  likewise  fol- 
lows from  every  one  of  the  instances  mentioned  in 
the  former  section.  Since,  as  on  one  hand  it  ap- 
pears that  there  is  no  consequence  from  the  appar- 
ent to  any  real  externeity  of  an  object;  so  in  the 
very  act  of  supposing  certain  objects,  which  are  as 


32  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

much  apparently  external  as  any  objects  whatso- 
ever, but  which  indeed  are  not  external,  we  must  of 
course  suppose  them  to  be  as  much  indeed  external 
as  any  objects  whatsoever.  Since  therefore  some  are 
not  external,  we  must  conclude  that  none  are  so. 
And  this  conclusion  will  and  must  hold  good  till 
some  mark  or  sign  be  given  of  the  externeity  of  one 
object,  which  is  not  also  in  the  other;  the  very  at- 
tempt of  which  is  contrary  to  the  supposition.  But 
to  proceed. 

II.  It  is  a  maxim  in  philosophy  that  like  is 
not  the  same,  and  therefore  much  more  one  would 
think  should  it  be  allowed  that  things  vastly  dif- 
ferent are  not  the  same.  As  for  instance,  that  light 
is  not  darkness,  nor  darkness  light;  that  greater  is 
not  less,  nor  less  greater,  &c.  And  yet  on  such 
plain  and  simple  principles  as  these  it  follows  that 
the  visible  world  is  not  external. 

Here  then  let  us  again  single  out  an  object 
which  will  answer  for  the  whole  visible  world,  and 
let  it  be  the  same  as  before,  viz.  the  moon.  The 
question  is,  Whether  the  moon  which  I  see  is  ex- 
ternal or  not?  In  this  question  there  is  not  a  word 
but  what  is  plain  and  simple,  or  which  has  been 
explained  already:  let  us  then  proceed  to  the  trial 
of  it  by  the  plain  rule  before-mentioned,  viz.,  that 
things  different  are  not  the  same,  which  indeed  is 
the  same  thing  in  other  words  with  the  first  princi- 
ple of  science,  viz.  Impossibile  est  idem  esse  & 
non  esse}^ 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  33 

I.  First  then  I  am  content  for  a  while  to 
grant  that  there  is  an  external  world,  and  in  this 
world  an  external  moon  in  a  place  far  distant  from 
us,  which  we  call  the  heavens.  Still  the  question 
returns,  whether  the  moon  which  I  see  be  that  ex- 
ternal moon  here  supposed  to  be  in  the  heavens? 
Well  now,  the  moon  which  I  see  is  a  luminous  or 
bright  object.  But  is  the  moon  supposed  to  be  in 
the  heavens  a  luminous  thing  or  body?  No;  but 
a  dark  or  opacious  body,  if  there  is  any  truth  in 
the  unanimous  assent  of  all  philosophers.  Again, 
the  moon  which  I  see  is  a  plain  surface;  but  is 
the  moon  in  the  heavens  a  plain  surface?  No;  all 
the  world  agree  that  the  moon  in  the  heavens  is 
rotund  or  spherical.  Again,  the  moon  which  I 
see  is  semicircular  or  cornuted;  but  is  this  the 
figure  of  the  moon  supposed  to  be  in  the  heavens? 
No;  we  all  affirm  that  the  moon  in  the  heavens 
is  round  or  dircular.  Again,  lastly,  the  moon 
which  I  see  is  a  little  figure  of  light,  no  bigger 
than  a  trencher,  nay  so  little,  as  to  be  intirely  cov- 
erable  by  a  shilling.  But  is  this  a  just  descrip- 
tion of  the  moon  supposed  to  be  in  the  heavens? 
No ;  the  moon  in  the  heavens  is  by  all  allowed  to 
be  a  body  of  prodigious  size,  of  some  thousands  of 
miles  in  its  diameter.  Well  then,  what  follows 
from  all  this,  but  that  the  moon  in  the  heavens  is 
not  the  moon  which  I  see ;  or,  that  the  moon  which 
I  see  is  not  in  the  heavens,  or  external  to  my  per- 
ceptive or  visive  faculty? 


34  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

2.  Secondly,  As  we  have  seen  that  the  moon 
which  I  see,  is  not  the  same  with  any  moon  sup- 
posed to  be  in  the  heavens,  and  consequently,  that 
the  moon  which  I  see  is  not  external,  by  a  compar- 
ison of  the  visible  or  seen  moon,  with  that  which 
is  supposed  to  be  external ;  so,  the  same  thing  will 
appear  by  a  comparison  of  visible  things  with  vis- 
ible, or,  of  the  same  thing,  (as  I  must  here  speak, 
for  want  of  more  proper  words,)  with  itself.  But 
to  explain. 

At  this  instant  I  see  a  little  strip  of  light, 
which  common  use  has  taught  me  to  call  the  moon. 
Now  again  I  see  a  larger,  which  is  still  called  by 
the  same  name.  At  this  instant  I  see  a  semicircle; 
a  while  after  I  see  a  circle  of  light,  and  both  these 
are  called  the  moon.  Again,  now  I  see  a  circle  of 
light  of  such  or  such  a  magnitude;  a  while  after 
I  see  a  circle  of  light  of  a  much  greater  magnitude ; 
and  both  these,  as  before,  I  am  taught  to  call  the 
moon.  But  really  and  truly,  instead  of  one,  I  see 
many  moons,  unless  things  different  are  the  same. 
How  then  can  I  believe  that  the  moons  which  I 
see  are  either  one  or  all  of  them  external?  That 
they  are  all  so  cannot  be  pretended,  for  no  one  ever 
dreamt  of  more  than  one  external  moon;  and  I  am 
as  confident  on  the  other  hand,  that  no  one  will 
pretend  that  either  one  of  them  is  external,  as  in 
exclusion  of  the  rest.  I  conclude  then  that  they 
are  all  alike  external,  that  is,  that  neither  of  them 
is  so;  and  consequently,   (there  being  nothing  in 


I 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  35 

this  but  what  is  equally  true  of  every  other  object 
of  the  visible  world,)  that  no  visible  object  is,  or 
can  be,  external. 

III.  But  why  such  long  fetches  to  prove  a 
simple  truth?  It  is  no  wonder  that  my  reader 
(who  perhaps  has  never  thought  of  this  subject 
before)  should  overlook  the  exact  point  of  the 
question,  when  I  myself  can  scarce  keep  it  in  view. 
I  would  beg  leave  therefore  to  remind  myself  and 
him,  that  the  question  in  hand  does  not  any  way 
proceed  upon,  or  so  much  as  need  the  mention  of 
any  bodies  supposed  to  be  external,  and  unknown 
to  us;  but  the  question  is,  whether  the  extensions, 
figures,  bodies,  (or  whatever  else  you  will  call 
them)  which  I  see  quasi  without  me,  be  indeed 
without  me  or  not. 

But  can  the  resolution  of  any  case  be  more 
plain  and  simple  than  of  this?  For  is  there  any 
other  possible  way  of  seeing  a  thing  than  by  having 
such  or  such  a  thing  present  to  our  minds?  And 
can  an  object  be  present  to  the  mind,  or  visive  fac- 
ulty, which  is  affirmed  to  be  external  to  it?  Then 
may  we  think,  without  thinking  on  any  thing;  or 
perceive,  without  having  any  thing  in  our  mind. 
If  then  the  presentialness  of  the  object  be  necessary 
to  the  act  of  vision,  the  object  perceived  cannot 
possibly  be  external  to,  at  a  distance  from,  or  inde- 
pendent on,  us:  And  consequently,  the  only  sense 
in  which  an  object  can  be  said  to  exist  without  us, 
is  its  being  not  seen  or  perceived.     But  the  objects 


36  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

we  speak  of  are  supposed  to  be  seen,  and  therefore 
are  not  external  to  us,  which  is  the  point  to  be  de- 
monstrated. ^° 

[To  this  I  might  add  another,  which  (if  pos- 
sible) is  a  yet  more  simple  manner  of  proceeding 
to  the  same  conclusion.  And  it  is  this.  The  ob- 
jects we  speak  about  are  supposed  to  be  visible; 
and  that  they  are  visible  or  seen,  is  supposed  to  be 
all  that  we  know  of  them,  or  their  existence.  If 
so,  they  exist  as  visible,  or  in  other  words,  their 
visibility  is  their  existence.  This  therefore  de- 
stroys all,  or  any  distinction  between  their  being, 
and  their  being  seeUj  by  making  them  both  the 
same  thing;  and  this  evidently  at  the  same  time 
destroys  the  externeity  of  them.  But  this  argu- 
ment has  the  misfortune  of  being  too  simple  and 
evident,  for  the  generality  of  readers,  who  are  apt 
to  fancy  that  light  itself  is  not  seen,  but  by  the  help 
of  darkness;  and  so,  without  insisting  any  farther 
on  this  head,  I  proceed  to  some  other  points  which 
may  seem  to  be  more  intelligible.] 

IV.  Surely,  could  the  most  extravagant 
imagination  of  man  have  conceived  a  way,  how  an 
object  supposed  to  be  external,  could  ever  possibly 
become  visible,  philosophers  would  never  have 
been  at  so  great  an  expence  of  fruitless  meditation, 
as  to  forge  the  strange  doctrine  of  the  active  and 
passive  intellect,  impressed  and  expressed  species, 
&c.  whereby  to  account  for  our  manner  of  seeing 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  37 

objects.  This  doctrine,  as  I  remember,  is  as  fol- 
loweth. 

It  is  supposed,  that  when  a  man  stands  oppo- 
site to  an  object,  there  are  certain  scales  or  images, 
(which  proceed  from  this  object  representing  it) 
which  fly  in  at  the  eye,  where  they  meet  with  a 
certain  being,  faculty,  or  power,  called  the  active 
intellect,  which,  in  an  instant,  spiritualizes  them 
into  ideas,  and  thence  delivers  them  to  the  inmost 
recess  of  the  soul,  called  the  passive  intellect,  which 
perceives  or  sees  them. 

Now  far  be  it  from  me  to  move  the  least  objec- 
tion against  this  account  of  vision.  They  are 
doubtless  all  plain  and  simple  ideas,  or  else  Aris- 
totle had  not  chosen,  neither  had  the  tribe  of  phil- 
osophers since  patronized  them.^^ 

I  only  observe  first,  that  this  antient,  and  al- 
most universal  account  of  vision,  supposes  that  the 
object  seen  is  this  supposed  scale  or  effluvium. 
And  consequently,  secondly,  that  in  order  to  the 
act  of  vision,  there  is,  and  must  be,  an  intimate 
union  between  faculty  and  object. 

For  if  the  soul  can  see  an  object  which  is  not 
present  with  it,  there  had  been  no  need  of  images 
of  the  object  to  become  present  to  the  soul,  by  pass- 
ing through  the  eye,  &c.  However,  they  need  not 
be  images,  but  any  other  fashioned  particles  would 
have  done  as  well,  if  the  objects  seen  were  not  those 
very  images  thus  spiritualized  in  the  active,  and 
thence  passing  on  to  the  passive,  intellect. 


38  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

Why  then  should  not  I  conclude,  even  with 
universal  consent,  that  the  objects  seen  are  not  ex- 
ternal, but  intimately  present  with,  or  existent  in, 
the  soul? 

Those  who  patronize  this  hypothesis  of  vision, 
will,  doubtless,  tell  me,  that  it  is  the  least  of  their 
thoughts  thereby  to  affirm  and  conclude,  that  the 
visible  world  is  not  external.  On  the  contrary, 
that  the  hypothesis  itself  supposes  an  external 
world,  or  outward  objects,  from  whence  these 
images  or  efifluviums  proceed. 

I  answer,  it  does  so;  but  it  does  not  say  or 
suppose,  that  these  external  objects  are  visible  or 
seen,  but  only  that  they  are  or  exist  eternally.  On 
the  contrary,  the  objects  seen  are  supposed  to  be 
these  images,  which,  in  order  to  be  seen,  must  first 
cease  to  be  external ;  that  is,  must  pass  into  the  soul, 
and  become  ideally  present  with  it.  So  that  this 
account  of  vision  supposes  the  visible  world,  as 
such,  to  be  not  external. 

If,  together  with  this,  men  will  yet  hold  or 
affirm  that  the  visible  world  is  external,  I  can  only 
shew  them  that  their  own  account  supposes  the 
direct  contrary.  But  it  is  neither  in  mine,  nor  any 
other  person's  power,  to  hinder  another  from  hold- 
ing contradictions. 

V.  From  the  old  1  proceed  to  the  hypothesis 
of  vision,  which  is  a  part  of  the  new  philosophy. 
Every  one,  I  suppose,  has  heard  of  the  doctrine 
of  seeing  the  divine  ideas,  or  (as  Mr.  Malebranche 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  39 

expresses  it)  seeing  all  things  in  God.^^  By  this 
every  mode  of  pure  or  intellective  perception  is 
accounted  for ;  but  I  am  here  concerned  only  with 
that  w^hich  is  distinguished  by  the  name  of  vision. 
With  regard  to  this  the  hypothesis  is  as  foUoweth. 

In  every  act  of  vision  they  distinguish  two 
things,  viz.  sensation  and  idea^  in  other  words  col- 
our and  figure.  Colour,  they  say,  is  nothing  dif- 
ferent from  the  soul  which  seeth  it,  it  being  only 
a  modification  of  thought  or  mind.  And  as  for 
figure,  viz.  this  or  that  particular  figure  which  is 
seen,  they  call  it  part  of  that  intelligible  extension 
which  God  includes,  or  contemplates,  thus  and 
thus  exhibited  to  our  minds. 

Now  I  say,  nothing  is  more  evident  than  that 
this  account  of  vision  supposes  that  external  matter 
is  not  visible ;  and  consequently,  that  visible  matter 
is  not  external.  So  evident,  that  I  depend  even  on 
my  Aristotelian  reader,  (who  neither  approves, 
nor  so  much  as  understands,  what  these  new  phil- 
osophers mean,)  that  he  will  perceive  at  first  sight 
that  this  must  needs  be  meant  by  it. 

However,  when  I  am  apprized  of  any  one 
who  doubts  of  it,  I  shall  not  only  be  ready  to  argue 
this  matter  fairly  with  him,  but  will  also  undertake 
to  produce  several  express  passages  from  the  writ- 
ers of  this  sort,  which  directly  affirm  and  contend, 
that  external  matter  is  not,  cannot,  become  visible. 

Nevertheless,  I  am  sensible  of  the  opposition 
which  may  be  made  to  this  assertion,  from  several 


40  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

other  passages  taken  from  the  same  writers.  But 
I  cannot  help  it  if  men  will  speak  inconsistently 
with  themselves;  or  explain  their  meaning  so  by 
halves,  as  that  the  same  thing  shall  appear  to  be 
both  affirmed  and  denied  by  them. 

But  the  truth  is,  I  fear  but  little  opposition 
as  to  this  point:  since  no  one  will  have  zeal  enough 
to  undertake  it,  but  those  who  professedly  patron- 
ize this  new  pholosophy:  and  I  have  so  good  an 
opinion  of  these,  as  to  believe  that  they  will  rather 
take  the  hint,  and  agree  with  me,  upon  due  re- 
flection, than  set  themselves  to  oppose,  from  any 
partial  regard  to  their  own  preconceived  opinions. 

VI.  I  shall  therefore  once  more  endeavour  to 
persuade  my  Aristotelian  reader,  that  it  is  accord- 
ing to  the  principles  of  his  own  philosophy  to  as- 
sert, that  visible  matter  is  not  external.^^ 

For  this  I  would  refer  him  to  what  he  will 
find  in  the  first  book  of  philosophy,  he  shall  hap- 
pen to  light  on,  which  has  anything  on  the  general 
subject  of  matter.  For  instance,  let  him  consult 
Suarez,^"*  Scheibler,"  or  Baronius,^^  on  this  sub- 
ject, which  will  be  found  in  their  books  of  meta- 
physicks;  which  authors  I  mention  more  particu- 
larly, because  with  these  I  myself  have  been  most 
acquainted;  not  but  that  I  dare  appeal  to  the  first 
philosopher  on  this  subject  which  my  reader  shall 
happen  to  lay  his  hands  on:  But  to  the  point. 

I  do  not  here  affirm,  that  any  one  philosopher 
of  this  sort  has  ever  once  asserted,  that  visible  mat- 


1 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  41 

ter  is  not  external,  or  so  much  as  ever  moved  the 
question,  whether  it  be  so  or  not:  on  the  contrary, 
I  verily  believe,  that  if  the  question  had  been  put 
to  every  individual  of  them,  they  would  unani- 
mously have  affirmed  that  it  is  certainly  external. 
Nevertheless,  I  still  appeal  to  my  impartial  reader, 
whether  the  questions  which  they  move,  and  the 
resolutions  which  they  agree  in,  concerning  the 
thing  which  they  call  matter^  do  not  plainly  sup- 
pose that  they  are  speaking  of  an  object  which  they 
do  not  see,  and  which  is  utterly  invisible. 

As  for  instance,  it  is  usual  for  them  to  enquire 
whether  matter  exists  or  not.  Whether  it  has  an 
actus  entitativus ;  or  whether  it  be  only  pura  poten- 
tia}^     How  it  is  capable  of  being  known,  &c. 

As  to  the  first  of  these  questions  they  use  to 
resolve  it  thus.  That  matter  must  needs  exist,  be- 
cause it  is  supposed  to  be  created,  and  also  because 
it  is  supposed  to  be  a  part  of  a  compositum.  And 
here  again  they  will  tell  you,  that  if  it  were  alto- 
gether nothing,  it  could  do  nothing  in  nature;  it 
could  not  be  the  subject  of  generation  and  cor- 
ruption; it  could  not  be  true,  that  all  things  in 
their  corruption  are  reduced  to  matter;  and  be- 
sides, if  matter  was  nothing,  there  would  be  a  con- 
tinual creation  and  annihilation,  which  is  absurd, 
&c. 

As  to  the  second  question,  viz.  whether  it  be 
pura  potentia,  or  not,  they  distinguish  of  a  twofold 
actus]    actus    physicus,    and    actus    metaphysicus. 


4a  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

Secundum  actum  physicum^  they  say,  matter  is  al- 
lowed to  be  pura  potentia^  but  not  secundum  actum 
metaphysicum^  &c. 

And  then  lastly,  as  to  the  other  question,  viz. 
quomodo  materia  possit  cognosci/^  they  resolve  it 
thus,  That  God  and  angels  are  supposed  to  know 
it  per  propriam  speciem ;  but  we  are  supposed  to 
know  it  only  by  consequence,  or,  as  they  say,  per 
proportionem  seu  analogiam  ad  materiam  rerum 
artificialium^  &c.  whence  Plato  is  quoted  by  them, 
as  saying,  that  matter  is  knowable  only  adulterina 
cognitione.^^ 

Now  I  say,  for  what  are  all  these,  and  several 
other  such  like  fetches  which  I  could  name,  if  the 
matter  they  inquire  about  be  that  which  is  visible 
or  seen?  Can  it  be  doubted  whether  that  exists  or 
not  which  is  supposed  to  be  seen?  Whether  such 
an  object  as  this  be  actus  entitativus,  or  pura  po- 
tential And  whether  we  know  anything  of  the 
existence  of  an  object  which  we  are  supposed  to 
see? 

If  visible  matter  were  the  matter  they  are  de- 
bating about,  can  it  possibly  be  accounted  for,  that 
not  the  least  mention  is  ever  made  of  our  seeing  it? 
Or,  that  for  its  existence,  &c.  they  should  never 
think  of  rrferring  us  to  our  senses?  And  yet  I  defy 
another  to  shew  me  but  one  word  of  this  sort  in 
any  philosophic  disputation  on  this  subject. 

Nay,  they  plainly  tell  us,  that  the  matter  they 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  43 

speak  about  is  not  by  us  seen,  but  is  directly  know- 
able  only  by  God  and  angels. 

If  then  the  inquiry  they  make  about  matter 
be  not  about  any  matter  supposed  to  be  seen  by  us, 
yet  nothing  is  more  evident,  than  that  the  matter 
they  speak  about  is  supposed  to  be  external.  So 
that  what  should  hinder  us  from  concluding,  that 
it  is  the  unanimous  opinion  of  these  philosophers, 
(though  indeed  they  have  never  in  express  words 
affirmed  it,)  that  external  matter  is,  at  least  to  us, 
invisible;  and  consequently,  that  visible  or  seen 
matter  is  not  external  \  which  is  all  that  I  am  here 
concerned  for,  leaving  others  to  explain  for  them 
what  they  mean  when  they  affirm,  that  external 
matter  is  visible  to  God  and  angels. 


CHAP.  II. 

Objections  answered. 

HAVING  proved  my  point  after  my  own 
manner,  it  may  be  expected  that  I  now  attend  to 
what  another  may  offer  on  the  contrary  part.  This, 
I  confess,  is  a  piece  of  justice  which  I  owe  a  fair 
adversary,  and  accordingly  I  here  profess  I  will 
be  ready  at  any  time,  either  to  answer  his  objec- 
tions, or  submit  to  the  force  of  them.  But  how  can 
it  be  expected  that  I  myself  should  oppose  any- 
thing to  the  point  I  have  been  contending  for? 


44  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

For  my  reader  may  remember,  that  I  have  already 
declared,  that  I  know  of  no  one  reason  or  argu- 
ment, either  in  myself  formerly,  or  from  others, 
for  the  externeity  of  the  visible  world,  besides  its 
seeming  externeity.  But  if  I  have  not  already 
shewn  the  inconsequence  of  this  argument,  I  con- 
fess I  have  been  very  idly  employed ;  and  if  I  have, 
I  have  at  once  answered  every  objection  that  can 
reasonably  be  expected  from  me,  to  be  urged 
against  the  point  I  am  concerned  for. 

There  may  be  cavils  indeed  enough,  and  of 
these  I  expect  my  share  from  a  certain  quarter; 
for  having  endeavoured,  with  a  serious  air,  to 
demonstrate  a  proposition  which  is  so  contrary  to 
common  prejudice,  and  which  some  perhaps  will 
be  resolved  not  to  admit;  nay,  I  myself  am  not  so 
abstracted  from  my  former  self,  as  not  to  be  able 
very  easily  to  invent  a  set  of  arguments  of  this 
sort.  But  what  can  in  reason  be  expected  that  I 
should  do  with  an  adversary  of  this  sort?  Shall  I 
study  a  means  to  convert  those  whom  confessedly 
it  is  not  in  my  power  to  convince?  But  I  have 
said  already  that  I  know  of  no  mechanical  engine 
proper  to  remove  prejudices;  and  I  must  still  pro- 
fess the  same,  till  this  awakened  age  shall  bless 
the  world  with  the  discovery.  Shall  I  then  alto- 
gether pretermit  the  mention  of  such  objections, 
affecting  to  despise  them,  as  not  worth  the  labour 
of  answering  them?  This  indeed  I  would  do  if 
I  wrote  on  the  side  of  a  prevailing  party;  but  a 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  45 

whole  world  against  one  is  too  considerable  an 
adversary  to  be  despised,  though  they  were  not 
only  in  the  wrong,  but  were  little  better  than  id- 
eots.  But  I  have  reason  to  expect,  that  not  only 
such,  but  even  the  wise  and  learned,  at  least  by  far 
the  greater  part,  will  be  my  adversaries  in  this 
point,  after  all  the  endeavour  which  I  have  used 
to  justify  it;  and  therefore,  till  I  am  apprised  of 
some  other,  I  must  suppose  them  to  be  so,  in  virtue 
of  such  objections  as  I  can  think  of  at  present,  or 
have  by  accident  heard  from  others  in  conversa- 
tion, which  are  these  that  follow. 

Objection   i. 

First,  I  expect  to  be  told,  that  in  arguing 
against  the  extra-existence  of  the  visible  world,  I 
oppose  a  known  evidence  of  truth,  viz.  the  uni- 
versal consent  of  mankind,  that  it  is  external.^*^ 

Answer. 

This  now  is  one  of  the  things  which  I  just  now 
called  cavils,  which  I  think  is  the  best  name  that 
an  argument  deserves,  which  is  nothing  at  all  to 
the  purpose  in  that  wherein  it  is  true;  at  least  such 
a  one  as  is  false,  both  in  principle  and  in  conse- 
quence, which  will,  I  suppose,  appear  to  be  the 
case  of  the  present  objection.     For, 

First,  as  to  the  fact  or  minor  part  of  the  argu- 


46  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

ment,  what  should  hinder  me  from  denying  it? 
For,  first,  who  can  assure  me  that  since  the  world 
began,  not  one  or  two,  or  two  hundred  persons, 
have  not  been  of  that  opinion  which  I  am  here  con- 
cerned for?  How  many  may  have  written  on  this 
subject  in  former  times,  and  we  not  hear  of  it  in 
the  present?  And  how  many  more  may  have  lived 
and  died  of  this  opinion,  and  yet  have  never  writ- 
ten on  it?  But,  secondly,  what  if  we  allow  that 
not  one  has  ever  written  on  this  subject  before? 
This  will  but  turn  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  ob- 
jection. For  where  then  is  the  universal  consent 
before  spoken  of?  Do  we  mean  the  same  by  it  as 
universal  silence?  Silence  in  this  case  will  amount 
to  but  a  very  slender  argument  of  consent;  and  in- 
deed so  slender,  that  the  bare  opinion  or  affirma- 
tion of  any  one  person  to  the  contrary,  who  has 
professedly  considered  and  inquired  about  the 
matter,  will  outweigh  a  silence  ever  so  universal, 
and  may  even  justly  challenge  the  evidence  of  con- 
sent, be  it  more  or  less,  on  his  side  of  the  question.^^ 
If  therefore  the  question  about  the  externeity 
of  the  visible  world,  has  never,  before  this  time, 
been  professedly  considered,  I  may  fairly  plead 
universal  consent  for  that  part  which  I  defend; 
since  the  consent  of  all  that  have  ever  considered 
it,  must  needs  be  all  that  is  meant  by  universal  con- 
sent. If  therefore  there  be  found  on  the  contrary 
part,  any  thing  in  mankind  which  is  like  consent, 
it  must  lose  its  name,  and  be  called  prejudice  or 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  47 

inclination;  which  is  an  adversary  (as  I  have  ob- 
served before)  I  have  no  arms  to  contend  with. 
But  lastly,  methinks  it  should  weigh  something 
towards  consent  on  my  side,  that  I  have  shewn  al- 
ready^^  that  it  is  consistent  with,  and  even  neces- 
sary to  the  principles  of  philosophers  of  all  sides, 
to  hold  that  which  I  contend  for.  And  if  this  be 
true,  the  utmost  that  can  be  said  in  answer  to  it 
will  be  this  only,  that  they  have  contradicted  them- 
selves, which  I  am  as  ready  to  admit  of,  as  any  one 
can  be  to  urge,  since  this  will  make  the  authority 
of  ten  thousand  of  no  value  against  the  point  I  am 
concerned  for.    But, 

Secondly,  What  if  it  were  true,  or  admitted, 
that  universal  consent  lay  opposite  to  my  conclu- 
sion? Must  it  therefore  be  condemned  without 
trial,  or  hearing  of  anything  in  its  defence?  If  not, 
then  it  is  allowed  to  be  possible,  that  a  proposition 
may  be  true,  though  it  happen  to  cross  the  consent 
of  all  mankind.  And  if  so,  how  can  the  contrary 
be  true  too,  namely,  that  a  proposition  is  therefore 
false,  because  contrary  to  consent?  But  now,  if  a 
proposition  may  be  true,  which  is  against  universal 
consent,  I  immediately  affirm  that  this  is  the  case 
of  the  proposition  I  am  contending  for.  Well,  and 
how  shall  this  be  tried?  How,  I  say,  but  by  reason 
and  disputation?  So  that  unless  universal  consent 
be  held  to  be  an  argument  universally  conclusive, 
it  concludes  nothing  at  all,  (there  being  a  contra- 
dictory distance  between  these  two  propositions, 


48  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

viz.  a  thing  may  be  true  which  is  contrary  to  con- 
senty  and  a  thing  may  not  be  true  which  is  contrary 
to  consent.)  And  therefore  the  mention  of  con- 
sent is  here  altogether  needless,  at  least,  its  intro- 
duction serves  only  to  convince  us,  that  it  is  much 
better  it  had  not  been  introduced.     But 

Some  perhaps  will  hold  this  argument  to  be 
universally  conclusive,  viz.  A  proposition  may  not 
be  true  which  is  contrary  to  universal  consent;  and 
this,  I  suppose,  must  be  the  meaning  of  those  who 
will  pretend  to  mean  anything  by  the  words  of  the 
objection.  But  is  there  a  man  upon  earth  who  will 
join  issue  with  me  on  this  foot?  Perhaps  so,  but 
he  must  excuse  me  if  I  declare  beforehand  that  I 
will  not  do  so  with  him  whilst  he  continues  to  be 
of  this  opinion.  And  I  am  fool  enough  to  say  this, 
because  I  think  I  have  reason  for  it.  But  this  alone 
unqualifies  me  to  hold  discourse  with  one  who  will 
contend,  that  universal  consent  is  a  simple  evidence 
of  truth.  Whereas  if  this  be  true,  then  universal 
consent  is  truth,  and  reason,  or  the  common  stand- 
ard of  every  particular  truth.  Consequently,  by 
this  rule,  a  proposition  may  become  true  which  is 
simply  false,  or  false  which  is  simply  true ;  that  is, 
all  that  which  I  have  been  used  to  call  truth  and 
reason  is  destroyed  at  once.  But  now,  whatsoever 
proposition  I  defend  or  deny,  I  must  take  it  for 
granted  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  truth,  inde- 
pendent and  immutable,  and  that  reason  is  reason, 
though  ever  so  many  people  dissent  from  me,  or 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  49 

deny  it;  that  is,  I  must  take  the  question  between 
us  for  granted,  as  my  first  step  towards  the  dis- 
putation of  it.  And  therefore,  as  on  one  hand  I  can 
do  no  otherwise  than  thus,  and  on  the  other  I  am 
sure  no  adversary  will  allow  me  to  take  this  meth- 
od with  him,  we  must  even  part  fairly,  as  being 
unqualified  for  each  other's  conversation.  And 
this  is  my  best  answer  to  the  first  objection. 

Objection  2. 

Does  not  the  sense  of  feeling  assure  us  of  the 
extra-existence  of  the  visible  world?    To  this  I" 

Answer. 

First.  If  for  instructions  sake  only  you  pro- 
pose this  question,  you  are  doubtless  disposed  to 
take  my  word  for  an  answer;  accordingly  I  answer. 
No;  the  sense  of  feeling  does  not  assure  us  of  the 
extra-existence  of  the  visible  world.  If  this  does 
not  satisfy,  you  are  desired,  instead  of  questions, 
to  give  me  an  argument,  whereby  it  may  appear 
that  the  sense  of  feeling  does  assure  us  of  the  extra- 
existence  of  the  visible  world.  What  makes  this 
the  more  necessary  is,  because  I  have  proved  al- 
ready in  great  variety  that  the  visible  world  is  not 
external;  and  amongst  the  rest,  that  the  sense  of 
vision  gives  us  evident  assurance,  that  a  visible  ob- 
ject, as  such,  is  not,  cannot  be,  external.    And  me- 


so  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

thinks,  if  this  is  not  false,  it  should  be  true;  or  if 
false,  yet  should  not  be  so  called,  till  either  the 
arguments  are  answered  by  which  it  is  defended, 
or  some  other  argument  be  produced,  which  con- 
cludes against  the  truth  of  it:  for  till  one  of  these 
things  be  done  I  have  but  the  objector's  bare  as- 
sertion against  me,  whereas  he  has  mine,  and  I 
think  something  else  on  the  other  side.    But, 

Secondly,  I  am  content  to  go  on  with  the  la- 
bouring oar  in  my  hand,  and  shew  the  contrary 
to  that  which  is  affirmed  in  the  objection.  Accord- 
ingly I  affirm, 

First,  That  be  the  object  of  the  sense  of  feel- 
ing what  it  will,  or  leaving  the  decision  of  this  mat- 
ter at  large,  feeling  is  no  argument  of  the  extra- 
existence  of  this  object.  For  the  truth  of  this  I  will 
only  refer  my  reader  back  to  what  has  been  al- 
ready observed  on  this  subject;  or  rather  I  presume 
that  he  remembers  both  that^  and  hoiv  I  have  pre- 
vented the  force  of  this  part  of  the  objection;  so 
that  till  I  hear  farther  on  this  point  I  may  save  my- 
self the  pains  of  adding  anything  in  this  place. 
But  I  affirm  also, 

Secondly,  that  the  sense  of  feeling  is  so  far 
from  assuring  us  of  the  extra-existence  of  the  vis- 
ible world,  that  it  does  not  so  much  as  say  any- 
thing of  its  existence  simple.  I  say  not  here  with 
a  certain  Author,*^'*  that  we  cannot  feel  existence^ 
it  being  the  same  thing  to  do  so  as  to  feel  a  propo- 

•Mr.  Norris's  Theory  of  the  Ideal  World.    Vol.  1,  p.  198.    §13. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  51 

sition.  This  may  be  a  good  argument  for  aught 
I  know,  but  I  profess  it  is  too  high  or  too  low  for 
me,  for  I  do  not  understand  it.  But  what  I  affirm 
is  this,  that  whatever  be  the  object  of  the  sense  of 
feeling,  and  even  admitting  that  it  assures  us  of  the 
existence  of  its  proper  object;  things  visible  are 
not  the  object  of  this  sense ;"  and  consequently  we 
can  have  no  assurance  this  way  of  so  much  as  the 
existence  simple  of  such  objects.  I  know  not  how 
it  may  sound  to  another,  but  to  me  to  say,  I  can 
feel  a  visible  object,  is  just  such  another  piece  of 
sense  as  to  say,  I  can  see  the  sound  of  a  trumpet, 
or  hear  the  colours  of  a  rainbow.  One  would 
think  it  should  be  granted  me  that  a  visible  object 
is  visible,  and  that  a  tangible  object  is  tangible, 
and  that  seeing  and  feeling  are  two  different  things 
or  sensations ;  but  it  is  the  same  thing  to  me  though 
they  were  one  and  the  same;  for  if  so,  then  as  vis- 
ion is  feeling,  so  feeling  is  vision;  and  then  I  have 
proved  already  that  a  visible  object,  as  such,  is  not 
external,  whereas  if  they  are  different  they  must 
have  different  objects,  be  the  names  of  them  what 
they  will;  and  then  a  visible  object  will  be  one 
thing,  and  a  tangible  object  another:  and  therefore 
how  the  existence  of  a  tangible  object  should  be- 
come an  argument  for  the  existence  (much  more 
the  extra-existence)  of  a  visible  object,  is  indeed 
past  my  skill  to  understand,  any  farther  than  this, 
that  if  I  understand  anything  at  all,  I  understand. 


5a  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

and  I  think  I  have  shewn,  this  to  be  a  plain  and 
glaring  contradiction.    And  so  I  proceed  to 

Objection  3. 

Which  is  Mr.  Des  Cartes's;'*'  and  that  ac- 
cording to  the  best  of  my  remembrance  is  this:  he 
concludes  the  being  of  an  external  world  from  the 
truth  and  goodness  of  God,  who  is  not  to  be  sup- 
posed to  deceive  us  in  our  involuntary  judgments 
or  inclinations.  [This,  I  say,  I  take  to  be  his 
meaning,  though  my  manner  of  expressing  it  be 
very  different  from  that  of  his  two  great  followers, 
Mr.  Malebranche  *^'  and  Mr.  Norris,§^^  for  which 
I  refer  my  reader  to  the  places  cited  at  the  bottom. 
Whether  I  have  done  him  justice,  or  not,  I  leave 
to  be  disputed  by  those  who  think  I  have  not.  In 
the  mean  time,  the  reason  which  I  give  for  dif- 
fering from  these  great  persons  is,  because  as  they 
have  represented  his  argument,  it  seems  to  be  in- 
consistent with  itself,  and  has  not  so  much  as  the 
appearance  of  being  an  objection;  whereas,  as  I 
have  here  given  it,  it  seems  to  have  some  appear- 
ance, though  how  far  it  is  from  being  a  real  ar- 
gument against  anything  I  am  concerned  for,  will 
appear  by  this  that  foUoweth.] 

Answer. 

I.     If  by  the  being  of  an  external  world,  be 


*  Search's  Illustrations,  page  112.  37 

§  Theory  of  the  Ideal  World,  Vol.  1,  p.  208. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  53 

meant  the  being  of  a  world,  which,  as  external,  is 
supposed  to  be  invisible,  this  is  nothing  to  my  pres- 
ent purpose,  but  belongs  wholly  to  my  Second  Part; 
wherein  I  shall  attempt  to  shew  that  an  external 
world  is  simply  an  impossibility,  which  external 
world  will  be  also  there  supposed  to  be  invisible. 
But  if  by  the  being  of  an  external  world  be  meant 
the  same  as  the  external  being,  or  (as  I  have  hith- 
erto called  it)  the  extra-existence  or  externeity  of 
the  visible  or  sensible  world,  it  is  then  indeed  an 
objection  against  the  point  I  am  now  upon.  Ac- 
cordingly, 

2.  I  say,  that  in  my  opinion  it  is  no  imputa- 
tion on  the  truth  and  goodness  of  God  to  affirm, 
much  less  to  attempt  to  prove,  that  the  visible 
world  is  not  external.  It  is  no  business  of  mine  to 
prove  this  negative,  though  it  be  the  easiest  thing 
in  the  world  so  to  do.  Let  them  prove  the  con- 
trary who  build  their  whole  cause  of  an  external 
world  upon  the  force  of  it.  It  is  enough  for  me 
that  I  have  shewn  by  many  arguments  that  the  vis- 
ible world  is  not  external.  These  arguments  either 
conclude,  or  they  do  not;  if  not,  let  this  be  made 
appear  by  a  just  and  distinct  answer  to  them ;  but 
if  they  do,  the  point  is  gained,  and  they  must  be 
persons  strangely  disposed,  who  after  this  will  ex- 
pect I  should  take  their  word,  when  they  say,  that 
the  truth  or  goodness  of  God  is  concerned,  that 
that  should  be  false,  which  is,  and  must  be  sup- 


54  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

posed  to  be  true.  But  to  be  something  more  par- 
ticular I  answer, 

First,  That  I  deny  the  supposition  of  the  in- 
voluntariness  of  our  judgments  for  the  externeity 
of  the  visible  world.  For  this  it  is  enough  that  I 
myself  am  one,  who  am  so  far  from  being  invol- 
untarily determined  to  this  assent,  that  I  can,  and 
have  already  demonstrated  that  it  is  not  external. 

Secondly,  We  should  come  to  a  fine  pass  of 
reasoning  indeed,  if  this  manner  of  proceeding 
were  allowed  to  be  good,  viz.  I  am  inclined  to 
judge  such  or  such  a  thing  to  be  so  or  so;  ergo,  // 
is  as  I  would  have  it,  because  God  will  not  deceive 
me?^  It  is  in  vain  in  this  case  to  appeal  to  reason 
and  argument;  nay,  though  God  himself  should 
supply  us  with  reason  against  our  inclination,  nay, 
and  give  us  his  word  that  our  inclination  is  erron- 
eous, yet  still  we  are  bound  to  stand  by  it,  and  even 
plead  the  authority  of  God  against  himself.  But, 
lastly.  Do  I  hear  this  from  a  Cartesian,  even  from 
Des  Cartes  himself,  who  is  for  nothing  more  known 
in  the  world  than  for  giving  us  many  instances 
wherein  a  common  inclination  may  be,  and  is  er- 
roneous; as  in  judging  light  to  be  in  the  sun,  heat 
in  the  fire,  or  in  the  hand,  colours  on  external  ob- 
jects,"*"  &c.  In  all  these  cases  we  are  as  much  in- 
clined as  in  judging  the  visible  world  to  be  ex- 
ternal; and  yet  it  is  enough  with  him  and  his  fol- 
lowers for  the  confutation  of  these  inclinations, 
that  they  have  good  reason  to  the  contrary:  and 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  55 

this  methinks  should  be  enough  in  any  case,  and 
with  any  persons,  unless  we  are  resolved  to  be  un- 
reasonable, and  even  profess  ourselves  Sceptics, 
and  if  so,  I  confess  I  am  silenced/^ 


PART  II. 


That  there  is  no  external  world,  and,  That  an  ex- 
ternal world  is  a  being  utterly  impossible.*^ 

INTRODUCTION. 

HAVING  shewn  in  my  former  part  that  the 
visible  world  is  not  external,  I  come  now  to  the 
other  thing  proposed  in  the  beginning,  namely  to 
demonstrate  more  at  large,  or  simply,  that  an  ex- 
ternal world  is  a  being  utterly  impossible,  or  that 
there  is  no  such  world.  Now  to  this,  as  before,  I 
shall  proceed  by  steps. 


CHAP.  I. 
ARGUMENT  I. 


AND  here  I  affirm,  in  the  first  place,  that  (ab- 
stracting from  any  argument  directly  proving  this 
point)   we  are  bound  already  so  far  to  conclude 


56  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

that  there  is  no  external  world,  as  that  it  is  against 
all  the  laws  of  fair  reason  and  argument  to  sup- 
pose or  make  mention  of  any  such  world.  For  if 
a  visible  world,  as  such,  is  not  external,  an  external 
world,  as  such,  must  be  utterly  invisible,  and  if  in- 
visible, unknowable,  unless  by  revelation/^ 

For,  first,  an  external  world  (if  there  be  any 
such  thing)  is,  I  suppose,  allowed  by  all  to  be  a 
creature  ;"*  but  the  being  of  a  creature  is  not  to  be 
proved  by  reason,  for  reason  converses  only  in 
things  necessary  or  eternal,  whereas  a  creature,  as 
such,  is  contingent,  and  temporary;  so  that  in  vain 
shall  we  seek  to  reason  to  assure  us  of  the  existence 
of  an  external  world. 

Then,  secondly,  it  is  here  supposed  that  we 
should  seek  to  as  little  purpose  to  the  testimony  of 
sense,  since  an  external  world,  as  such,  is  here  sup- 
posed to  be  absolutely  invisible.  Whether  we 
have  any  notice  from  revelation  of  the  being  of 
any  such  world  shall  be  considered  in  its  proper 
place.''^  In  the  mean  time  I  here  suppose  also, 
Thirdly,  that  we  have  no  such  notice,  so  that,  as 
the  case  stands  at  present,  an  external  world  is  a 
being  utterly  unknown. 

But  now  I  have  always  received  it  as  a  law, 
that  we  ought  never  to  reason  but  upon  known 
ideas ;  and  if  this  be  just  and  reasonable,  an  exter- 
nal world,  as  being  unknown^  ought  to  have  as  lit- 
tle place  in  our  reasonings  as  if  we  knew  for  certain 
that  there  was  no  such  world. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  57 

Nay,  on  the  supposition  of  its  being  unknown, 
we  are  not  only  bound  to  omit  the  mention  of  it, 
but  also  warranted  to  conclude  that  there  is  no  such 
world.  This,  I  say,  must  be  an  allowed  conse- 
quence, till  such  time  as  some  other  pretends  the 
contrary;  and  he  must  prove  too  as  well  as  pretend, 
else  the  consequence  stands  good  against  him. 

Here  then  is  my  advantage;  we  all  know  and 
are  agreed  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  visible 
world,  and  that  a  visible  object,  as  such,  is  not  ex- 
ternal: on  the  other  hand,  we  are  as  much  agreed, 
at  least  it  is  here  supposed  that  we  are  agreed,  that 
we  know  nothing  at  all  of  an  external  world,  sup- 
posed, as  such,  to  be  invisible :  but  it  is  a  maxim  in 
science,  that  eadem  est  ratio  non  entis  Gf  non  ap- 
parentis.  I  conclude  therefore  outright  that  there 
is  no  such  world. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  we  think  it  our  duty 
to  reason  only  on  the  supposition  of  body  and  spirit^ 
thinking  and  extended  beings,  viz.  because  we  have 
no  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  any  creature, 
which  is  neither  of  these.  Hence  we  think  it  a 
very  good  and  safe  way  of  arguing,  to  make  the 
exclusion  of  the  one,  the  consequence  of  the  posi- 
tion of  the  other,  and  so  vice  versa.  Thus  philos- 
ophers use  to  prove  that  colour,  light,  heat,  sound, 
&c.  belong  to,  or  are  affections,  of  spirits,  because 
they  are  not  included  in  the  idea  which  we  have  of 
body.  The  principle  or  major  proposition  of 
which  argument  is  plainly  this.     There  are  but 


58  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

two  sorts  of  beings  in  the  world,  viz.  spirit  and 
matter;  then  the  minor  is  this,  viz.  light,  &u:.  do  not 
belong  to  matter,  ergo,  they  belong  to  spirit.  Now 
if  this  way  of  arguing  is  good,  it  is  so  by  virtue  of 
that  principle,  that  we  ought  to  reason  only  on 
known  ideas,  and  that  things  which  appear  not, 
are  but  equal  to  things  which  are  not;  and  it  is  in 
virtue  of  the  same  that  I  here  plead  a  right  to  con- 
clude that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  external 
world. 

I  pretend  not  this  to  be  demonstration  of  the 
point  simply,  as  if  I  should  say  that  a  thing's  being 
unknown  were  a  direct  argument  of  its  not  being  at 
all ;  but  yet  this  is  something  so  very  near  of  kin  to 
a  demonstration,  and  so  every  way  serving  all  the 
ends  and  purposes  of  a  demonstration,  that  whoever 
has  the  advantage  of  it  on  his  side,  has  as  little  to 
fear  from  an  adversary,  as  he  that  can  produce  ten 
thousand  demonstrations.  For  this  is  an  evident 
principle  or  rule  of  reasoning,  that  a  thing  un- 
known ought  never  to  be  supposed,  and  therefore 
till  it  be  supposed,  it  is  the  very  same  thing  as  to 
us  as  if  there  were  no  such  thing  at  all.  To  sup- 
pose the  being  of  a  thing  granted  to  be  unknown, 
with  him  who  affirms  that  it  is  nothing  at  all,  is  to 
beg  the  question ;  whereas,  to  suppose  it  to  be  noth- 
ing at  all  upon  the  same  concession,  is  not  to  beg 
the  question;  I  mean  any  fair  or  legal  one,  because 
on  one  hand,  no  one  has  any  right  to  make  that  a 
question  which  he  professes  that  he  knows  nothing 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  59 

of ;  and  on  the  other,  every  one  has  a  right  not  only 
to  question  the  existence,  but  also  to  suppose  the 
non-existence  of  what  is  granted  to  be  unknown. 
So  that  whilst  this  is  granted,  in  the  case  before  us, 
I  have  the  same  advantage  against  any  one  who 
shall  suppose  an  external  world  (viz.  either  in  actu 
formali,  as  in  opposition  to  what  I  here  contend 
for,  or  in  actu  exercito,^^  in  the  resolution  of  any 
philosophical  or  general  question,  which  depends 
on  the  yea  or  nay  of  this  point,)  as  if  I  were  girt 
about  with  ever  so  many  demonstrations, 

I  might  therefore  fairly  rest  here,  and  save 
myself  the  labour  of  producing  any  direct  or  osten- 
sive  arguments  against  the  being  or  possibility  of 
an  external  world :  but  to  give  my  reader  the  best 
satisfaction  I  can,  and  also  to  establish  my  conclu- 
sion in  some  measure  answerably  to  the  good  use 
and  moment  of  it,  I  am  content  to  propose  the  fol- 
lowing demonstrations. 


CHAP.  II. 
ARGUMENT  II. 


AN  external  world  is  here  supposed  to  be  in- 
visible, even  utterly  or  absolutely  so,  absolutely 
incapable  of  being  an  object  of  vision  or  percep- 
tion ;  insomuch,  that  though  it  were  here  supposed 
that  an  external  world  were  capable  of  existing,  or 


6o  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

that  any  power  were  sufficient  to  produce  such  a 
thing  or  being,  yet  no  power  can  be  supposed  to  be 
sufficient  to  make  it  visible  or  seen.  For  a  visible 
world,  as  such,  is  not  external,  as  has  been  shewn 
already:  so  that  to  say,  that  an  external  world  may 
(by  any  cause)  become  visible,  is  a  contradiction  in 
terms. 

Well  now,  an  external  world  is  supposed  to  be, 
or  to  imply  creature;  so  that  if  there  be  any  such 
thing  in  being,  it  is  so,  because  God  has  willed, 
made  or  created  it. 

But  for  what  end,  or  use,  or  purpose,  can  we 
suppose  that  God  should  create  an  invisible  world? 
A  world,  which,  as  invisible,  is  incapable  of  being 
inhabited,  incapable  of  being  known?  For  my 
part  I  can  think  of  no  use  which  such  a  world  can 
be  of.  And  considering  that  such  a  world  is  here 
granted  to  be  unknown,  it  is  not  incumbent  on  me 
to  shew  that  it  can  be  of  no  use,  but  on  them  to  shew 
the  contrary,  who  are  concerned  for  the  being  of 
it.  So  that  till  this  be  done  I  have  a  right  to  sup- 
pose that  it  is  of  no  use  at  all,  and  consequently  to 
affirm  that  there  is  no  such  world. 

For  though  the  principle  must  take  its  chance 
to  be  either  admitted  or  denied,  as  men  shall  please 
to  judge  (only  that,  as  I  observed  just  now,  he  must 
prove  his  point,  who  will  venture  on  the  denial  of 
it,)  still  the  consequence  is  good,  and  must  pass 
with  all  for  demonstration,  that  a  creature  which  is 
not,  cannot  be  of  any  use,  is  at  best  but  a  possibility^ 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  6i 

but  such  a  possibility  as  neither  will,  nor  can  be 
produced  into  act. 

This,  with  certain  wits,  may  appear  to  be  a 
contradiction ;  and  perhaps  I  should  mend  the  mat- 
ter but  little  by  the  answer  I  am  most  inclined  to 
make  them,  namely,  that  though  it  be  so,  yet  it  is 
nevertheless  true;  nay,  that  I  could  easily  shew 
them  a  hundred  such  contradictions,  which  yet  they 
themselves  will  acknowledge  to  be  true.  But  I  am 
content  so  far  to  favour  the  iniquity  of  words,  as  to 
explain  by  a  distinction  this  appearing  difficulty. 

I  say  then,  that  things  are  possible  or  impos- 
sible, after  a  twofold  manner.  One  is,  when  in  the 
idea  or  conception  of  the  thing  there  is,  or  is  not, 
any  repugnancy  or  contradiction. 

This  is  what  may  be  called  an  internal  or  in- 
trinsic possibility,  or  impossibility;  possibility 
where  there  is  not,  impossibility  where  there  is,  this 
supposed  repugnancy. 

The  other  is,  when  the  repugnancy  or  impedi- 
ment is,  or  is  not,  (not  in  the  thing  itself,  but)  in 
the  cause,  or  time,  or  some  other  circumstance  or 
affection  of  the  thing.  But  in  this  place  I  am  con- 
cerned only  with  the  first  of  these,  viz.  the  cause. 

A  thing  is  possible  in  its  cause,  when  there  is, 
in  the  idea  of  its  cause,  no  impediment  to  be  found, 
forbidding  its  existence,  or  which  is  the  same,  with- 
holding the  efficient  from  producing  it  into  act; 
and  when  the  contrary  to  this  happens,  then  the 
thing  is  impossible.     For,  since  everything  exists 


6a  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

by  its  cause,  it  will  as  certainly  not  exist  if  the 
cause  does  not  produce  it,  as  if  in  its  own  idea  it 
implied  a  contradiction.  And  if  the  supposed  im- 
pediment in  the  cause  be  invincible,  the  existence 
of  the  thing  supposed  becomes  properly  impos- 
sible. This  I  would  therefore  call  an  external  or 
extrinsic  possibility  or  impossibility.  A  thing  then 
may  be  both  possible  and  impossible  in  these  dif- 
ferent respects;  that  is,  intrinsically  possible,  but 
extrinsically  impossible;  and  therefore  of  such  a 
thing  it  may  be  be  said  without  any  contradiction, 
that  though  it  be  admitted  to  be  possible,  (viz. 
intrinsically,)  yet  it  is  such  a  possibility,  as  neither 
will,  nor  can,  be  produced  into  act,  (viz.  by  reason 
of  an  impediment  found  in  its  cause,  which  though 
an  extrinsic,  is  yet  a  real  impossibility  against  the 
being  of  it.) 

But  now  this  is  the  case  before  us,  viz.  of  an 
external  or  invisible  world.  Admitting  it  to  be 
possible  with  regard  to  the  thing  itself,  that  such  a 
world  should  exist;  yet  an  useless  creature  cannot 
possibly  be  made,  when  we  regard  its  cause,  viz. 
God,  who  can  do  nothing  to  no  purpose,  by  reason 
of  his  wisdom.'*^  Here  then  lies  the  impediment 
spoken  of  in  the  cause,  which  makes  it  extrinsically, 
but  yet  really  impossible,  that  there  should  be  any 
such  world.  I  say  really  so,  because  the  wisdom 
by  which  God  acts  is  necessary  and  immutable ;  and 
therefore  if  it  be  simply  against  the  order  of  wis- 
dom to  do  an  useless  act,  the  impediment  against 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  63 

the  doing  of  it  is  to  the  full  as  invincible,  as  if  a 
repugnancy  were  found  in  the  idea  or  conception 
of  the  thing  itself,  here  supposed  to  be  done,  or  not 
done;  and  consequently  an  useless  effect  is  a  real 
impossibility. 

But  I  have  often  found  upon  examination, 
that  where  an  extrinsic  impossibility  lies  against 
any  point,  we  need  but  search  to  the  bottom  of  it, 
and  we  shall  find  an  intrinsic  repugnancy  in  the 
thing  itself.  And  this  I  think  I  have  seen  to  be  the 
case  of  an  external  world,  as  I  suppose  will  appear 
from  some  of  the  following  chapters. 


CHAP.  III. 
ARGUMENT  III.'*' 

AS  for  instance.  An  external  world,  whose 
extension  is  absolute,  that  is,  not  relatively  depend- 
ing on  any  faculty  of  perception,  has  (in  my  opin- 
ion,) such  a  repugnancy  in  its  extension,  as  actually 
destroys  the  being  of  the  subject  world.  The  re- 
pugnancy is  this,  that  it  is,  or  must  be,  both  finite 
and  infinite. 

Accordingly  then  I  argue  thus.  That  which  is 
both  finite  and  infinite  in  extent,  is  absolutely  non- 
existent, or  there  is,  or  can  be,  no  such  world.  Or 
thus,  an  extent  or  expansion,  which  is  both  finite 
and  infinite,  is  neither  finite  nor  infinite,  that  is,  is 


64  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

no  expansion  at  all.  But  this  is  the  case  of  an  ex- 
ternal expansion,  ergo^  there  is,  or  can  be,  no  such 
expansion. 

I  know  not  what  will  pass  with  some  men  for 
argument,  if  both  the  matter  and  manner  of  this 
be  not  approved  of.  For  first,  what  can  well  be 
more  evident  than  both  the  premises?  That  a 
thing,  in  the  same  respect,  cannot  be  both  finite  and 
infinite;  or  that  a  thing  which  in  the  idea  of  it  im- 
plies both  finite  and  infinite,  is  in  act  neither  finite 
nor  infinite;  and  that  what  is  neither  finite  nor 
infinite,  is  not  at  all,  are  (with  me,  and  I  suppose 
with  all  pretenders  to  reason,)  such  prime  princi- 
ples of  science,  that  I  must  needs  depend  that  these 
will  never  be  called  in  question  by  any  but  pro- 
fessed sceptics.  Then  as  to  the  minor,  its  evidence 
is  to  me  so  glaring,  and  (in  the  little  conversation 
I  have  had  in  the  learned  world)  so  universally 
assented  to,  that  I  am  rather  inclined  here  also  to 
make  my  appeal  for,  than  endeavour  to  shew  the 
truth  of  it.  This  of  the  extent  of  an  external 
world,  is  that  which  is  called  opprobrium  philoso- 
phorunij  being  a  point  owned  by  all  to  have  an 
invincible  demonstration,  both  for  and  against  it. 
Some  indeed,  by  way  of  hypothesis,  have  held  it 
to  be  finitely,  and  some  to  be  infinitely,  extended, 
according  as  either  of  these  has  best  served  the  ends 
of  some  other  points  they  have  been  concerned  for. 
But  I  have  never  yet  met  with  any  one  so  hardy  as, 
in  defence  of  one,  to  have  endeavoured  to  dissolve 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  65 

or  answer  the  arguments  lying  on  the  other  side  of 
the  contradiction.  For  this  reason  I  need  not  here 
name  either  the  one  sort,  or  the  other,  but  conclude 
outright,  even  with  universal  consent,  that  an  ex- 
pansion external  is  both  (that  is  neither)  finite  and 
infinite.     Then, 

Secondly,  as  to  the  form  or  manner  of  this 
argument,  it  has  first  evidently  this  to  plead  for 
itself,  that  there  is  nothing  in  its  conclusion  but 
what  is  in  the  premises  which  shews  it  to  be  no  fal- 
lacy, but  a  legal  and  just  argument.  And  also  this, 
secondly,  that  it  is  exactly  parallel  with  several 
arguments  which  I  could  name,  allowed  by  all  to 
be  good,  and  even  perfectly  demonstrative. 

As  for  instance,  suppose  a  man  should  advance 
the  notion  of  a  triangular  square.  Or  suppose,  two 
persons  contending  about  the  attributes  of  this 
strange  idea:  one  arguing  from  the  idea  of  tri- 
angle, that  it  has  but  three  angles;  and  the  other 
contending  that  it  must  have  four,  from  the  idea  of 
a  square;  what  could  any  reasonable  stander-by 
conclude  from  this,  but  that  the  thing  they  are  dis- 
puting about  is  nothing  at  all,  even  an  impossibility 
or  contradiction?  Nay,  the  disputants  themselves 
must  needs  close  in  with  this  manner  of  arguing; 
and  that  on  two  accounts. 

First,  in  that  this  manner  of  arguing  accommo- 
dates the  difference  between  them,  and  salves  the 
honour  of  both.  For  by  this  both  appear  to  be  in 
the  right  in  the  precise  points  they  are  contending 


66  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

for;  and  wrong  only  in  something  which  they  are 
both  equally  concerned  for,  viz.  the  supposition  of 
the  being  of  a  triangular  square,  which  is  the  thing 
supposed  by  consent  between  them.     But  chiefly. 

Secondly,  in  that  the  person  who  argues  in  this 
manner  must  be  allowed  to  have  the  law  of  reason 
on  his  side,  and  may  compel  them,  on  their  own 
principles,  to  assent  to  his  conclusion.  This  is 
done  by  granting  to  each  party  his  point,  namely, 
that  a  triangular  square  is  both  triangular  and 
square  or  quadrangular.  This  done,  they  have 
nothing  to  do  but  to  answer  each  other's  arguments, 
which  it  is  here  supposed  they  cannot  do.  By  this 
therefore  each  grants  the  other  to  be  in  the  right. 
So  that  for  a  stander-by  to  grant  both  to  be  in  the 
right,  is,  in  this  case,  a  demonstration  that  they  are 
both  in  the  wrong;  or  in  other  words,  that  the 
thing  they  are  disputing  about  is  nothing  at  all. 

I  have  mentioned  this  possible^  rather  than  any 
actual^  instance  of  this  kind,  because  I  would  give 
an  instance  wherein  I  may  be  sure  to  have  every- 
one of  my  side.  For  certainly  no  one  can  doubt 
whether  this  be  a  good  argument  or  not. 

A  figure  which  is  both  triangular  and  quad- 
rangular, is  not  at  all. 

But  this  is  the  case  of  a  triangular  square. 

Ergo^  there  is  no  such  figure. 

The  force  of  this  argument  has  never  been  dis- 
puted and  I  dare  say  never  will :  whereas  to  have 
put  a  case,  which  has  been  actually  a  matter  of  dis- 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  67 

pute,  (of  which  sort  I  believe  some  might  be 
named,)  though  equally  conclusive,  had  yet  been 
less  plain  and  evident,  because  what  has  been,  may 
be  again;  and  so  to  some  I  had  seemed  to  prove  a 
notum  by  an  ignotum. 

But  now,  in  the  present  case,  which  is  granted 
to  be  clear,  I  have  nothing  to  do  but  to  shew  it  to 
be  parallel  with  that  which  I  before  mentioned. 
And  this  is  an  easy  work.  For  (as  in  this  possible 
one  about  the  attributes  of  a  triangular  square  there 
may  be,  so)  there  has  actually  been  a  dispute  be- 
tween philosophers  concerning  one  attribute,  viz. 
the  extent  of  an  external  world.  One  side,  from 
the  idea  of  its  being  external,  has  proved  it  to  be 
infinite;  the  other,  from  the  idea  of  its  being  cre- 
ated, &c.  has  proved  it  to  be  finite.  Both  suppose 
it  to  be  external,  both  to  be  created.  At  the  same 
time  neither  of  them  so  much  as  pretends  to  answer 
the  arguments  on  the  side  opposite  to  his  own ;  but 
only  to  justify  his  own  point  directly.  And  yet 
both  will  grant,  that  if  an  external  world  be  both 
finite  and  infinite,  it  is  the  same  thing  as  to  say  there 
is  no  such  world. 

Well  then,  here  I  interpose,  as  before,  and  say, 

A  world  which  is  both  finite  and  infinite,  is 
not  at  all. 

But  this  is  the  case  of  an  external  world. 

ErgOj  there  is  no  such  world. 

Here  the  honour  of  both  is  salved;  here  both 
the    major    and    minor    are    their   own;    here    a 


68  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

stander-by  has  the  same  advantage  as  before;  so 
that  what  should  hinder  an  easy,  and  even  uni- 
versal, assent  to  the  conclusion? 


CHAP.  IV. 
ARGUMENT  IV. 

FROM  the  maximum^  1  come  next  to  the  min- 
imum naturale;  or  to  the  question  about  the  divisi- 
bility of  matter,  quantity  or  extension. 

And  here  I  affirm  in  like  manner  as  before, 
that  external  matter  is  both  finitely  and  infinitely 
divisible;  and  consequently,  that  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  external  matter. 

The  argument  in  form  stands  thus. 

Matter  which  is  both  finitely  and  infinitely 
divisible,  is  not  at  all. 

But  this  is  the  case  of  external  matter. 

Ergo,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  external  matter. 

The  major  of  this  argument  is  the  first  prin- 
ciple of  science,  it  being  the  same  in  other  words, 
as  to  say,  that  what  is,  is,  or  that  it  is  impossible  for 
a  thing  to  be,  and  not  be.  For  finite  and  infinite 
are  just  so  to  each  other,  as  being,  and  not  being. 
Finite  is  to  be  limited,  infinite  to  be  not  limited. 
Or  rather  thus,  infinite  is  to  be  absolute,  finite,  to 
be  not  absolute.  So  that  it  is  as  plainly  impossible 
for  the  same  thing  to  be  both,  as  both  to  be,  and  not 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  69 

be  at  the  same  time,  or  in  the  same  respect,  &c. 
For  both  the  respect,  and  time,  and  everything  else, 
which  is  or  can  be  made  the  condition  of  the  truth 
of  this  principle,  is  also  found  in  the  major  of  the 
present  argument;  and  consequently  nothing  can  be 
more  evident,  than  that  what  is,  or  in  its  idea  im- 
plies both  finite  and  infinite,  is  not  at  all. 

But  now  this  I  say  is  the  case  or  implication 
of  external  matter,  which  is  the  minor  or  assump- 
tion of  the  same  argument. 

External  matter,  as  a  creature,  is  evidently 
finite,  and  yet  as  external  is  as  evidently  infinite,  in 
the  number  of  its  parts,  or  divisibility  of  its  sub- 
stance; and  yet  nothing  can  be  more  absurd  than 
such  an  infinite  divisibility. 

But  I  need  not  deduce  these  things  to  any 
farther  length,  since  no  philosopher  that  I  have 
ever  met  with  has  ever  doubted  of  this  matter,  it 
being  universally  agreed  that  there  is  an  invincible 
demonstration  on  both  sides  of  this  question  of  the 
divisibility  of  matter,  so  that  I  have  nothing  to  do 
but  to  conclude  that  the  thing  or  matter  concerning 
which  this  question  proceeds  is  a  mere  nothing,  or 
contradiction;  yet  I  expect  to  be  told,  that  it  has 
been  the  least  of  the  thoughts  of  these  philosophers 
to  conclude  as  I  here  do,  since  not  one  has  ever 
doubted  of  the  existence  of  external  matter.  To 
this  I  answer. 

First,  perhaps  so;  but  who  can  help  this?  Is 
it  not  enough  for  this  conclusion,  that  we  are  all 


70  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

agreed  in  the  premises,  and  that  there  is  nothing  in 
the  conclusion  but  what  is  in  the  premises?  If  in 
this  case  men  will  hold  the  premises,  but  deny  the 
conclusion,  this,  at  best,  can  be  no  better  than  inad- 
vertence; but  to  do  this,  after  the  conclusion  is 
formally  deduced,  or  the  whole  syllogism  is  laid 
before  them,  is  no  better  than  errant  scepticism. 
And  I  must  be  excused  if  I  contend  not  with  an 
adversary  of  this  sort.  But  secondly,  one  would 
think  by  the  descriptions  which  they  themselves 
are  used  to  give  of  external  matter,  that  all  philoso- 
phers should  be  very  ready  to  subscribe  to  this  con- 
clusion for  its  own  sake,  as  I  have  partly  shewn 
already,  and  shall  make  appear  more  fully  before 
I  finish  this  work. 

Again,  I  expect  to  be  told  that  the  matter 
which  I  here  speak  of  is  conceived  to  be  very  dif- 
ferent from  that  concerning  which  philosophers 
have  disputed,  in  the  question  about  the  divisibility 
of  extension,  and  also  in  that  about  the  extent  of  the 
world,  (whether  infinite  or  finite;)  particularly 
that  the  matter  or  extension  which  they  speak  of  is 
supposed  to  be  visible,  whereas  that  which  I  am 
speaking  of  is  supposed  to  be  invisible.     I  answer,"*' 

Perhaps  so;  I  admit  that  the  matter  usually 
spoken  of  by  philosophers  is  supposed  by  them  to 
be  visible,  and  that  the  matter  which  I  am  here 
speaking  of  is  supposed,  and  also  proved,  to  be  in- 
visible. Nevertheless  it  must  needs  be  granted  that 
the  matter  spoken  of  by  philosophers  is  supposed 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  71 

by  them  to  be  external ;  if  not,  it  must  be  because 
they  hold  that  visible  mater  is  not  external,  or,  that 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  external  matter;  neither  of 
which  will,  I  believe,  be  easily  granted,  much  less 
(which  is  necessary  in  this  place)  contended  for 
against  me.  If  then  the  matter  they  speak  about 
is  supposed  by  them  to  be  external,  this  is  all  that  I 
am  concerned  for  at  present;  the  question  between 
us  being  only  this  simply,  whether  external  matter 
exists,  or  not?  or,  as  usually  expressed  in  latin.  An 
detur  materia  externa}  No,  say  I;  for  it  implies 
such  and  such  contradictions,  which  destroy  the  be- 
ing of  it,  or  render  its  existence  impossible.  Well ; 
and  what  will  an  adversary  say  to  this?  Will  he 
deny  that  it  implies  these  supposed  contradictions? 
No;  it  is  here  supposed  that  all  philosophers  agree 
in  affirming  this  point.  Will  he  then  deny  the 
conclusion,  whilst  he  affirms  the  premises?  No, 
certainly;  for  this  is  formal  scepticism,  or  no  other 
than  a  denial  of  all  truth,  and  reason,  and  conse- 
quence, at  once.  What  remains  then,  but  that  we 
all  conclude  that  external  matter  is  a  thing  abso- 
lutely impossible? 

But  you  will  say,  to  conclude  this  with  con- 
sent, is  to  conclude  the  non-existence  of  visible  mat- 
ter, since  philosophers  pretend  to  speak  of  no  mat- 
ter but  what  they  supposed  to  be  visible.  I  an- 
swer, 

First,  why  then  I  must  conclude  the  same 
without   consent;   the   damage   one   would   think 


72  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

should  not  be  great,  provided  it  be  allowed  that  my 
conclusion  is  true;  and  for  this  I  appeal  to  the 
arguments  by  which  I  prove  it,  and  which  I  sup- 
pose may  be  good,  though  they  should  happen  to 
want  consent.  But,  secondly,  I  deny  that  the  mat- 
ter concerning  the  divisibility  of  which  the  ques- 
tion usually  proceeds,  is  supposed  by  philosophers 
to  be  visible  matter.  This  is  evident  from  this, 
that  the  matter  of  which  they  speak,  is,  and  must 
be,  supposed  to  exist  after  ever  so  many  divisions 
of  it,  even  when  it  is  become  invisible,  by  the  fre- 
quency of  its  being  divided. 

It  is  not  therefore  visible,  but  external,  matter, 
considered  as  external,  of  which  philosophers  have 
disputed ;  and  of  which  they  say  that  it  is  both  infi- 
nitely and  finitely  divisible  and  extended.  And 
this  idea  of  its  being  external,  or  independent  (as 
to  its  existence  simple)  on  any  mind  or  perceptive 
faculty,  is  so  absolutely  necessary  to  both  these 
questions,  that  neither  of  them  has  any  appearance 
of  being  a  question,  upon  the  removal  of  this  idea, 
and  placing  visible  in  its  stead.  For  a  visible 
world,  or  visible  matter,  considered  as  not  external, 
exists  plainly  as  visible,  and  consequently,  as  such, 
is  extended,  as  such,  is  divisible.  So  that  after  this 
it  carries  a  contradiction  with  it,  so  much  as  to  en- 
quire whether  it  be  extended,  farther  than  it  is  seen 
to  be  extended,  or  divisible,  farther  than  it  is  seen 
to  exist.  So  that  however  by  accident  philoso- 
phers may  have  jumbled  together  the  two  ideas  of 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  73 

visible  and  external,  external  is  the  idea  only  they 
are  concerned  with,  and  therefore  it  is  external 
matter  alone  whose  existence  is  encumbered  with 
the  forementioned  contradictions;  and  so  incum- 
bered, I  say,  as  to  make  it  necessary  for  us  to  con- 
clude that  it  is  absolutely  impossible  there  should 
be  any  such  thing.  But  yet  so  partial  have  I  found 
some  towards  an  external  world,  that  when  nothing 
has  been  found,  which  could  with  any  appearance 
be  objected  against  the  evidence  of  this  and  the 
foregoing  argument,  they  have  even  drest  up  for- 
mal nothing  into  the  shape  of  an  objection:  for  I 
have  been  sometimes  told  (and  that  with  an  air  of 
unusual  gravity,  as  if  the  being  of  a  real  universe 
depended  on  their  concern  for  it;  nay,  as  if  religion 
itself  must  fail  if  there  be  no  external  world,)  that 
a  thing  may  be,  and  must  sometimes  be,  judged  by 
us  to  be  true,  whose  manner  of  existence  we  can- 
not comprehend.  That  of  this  sort  are  several 
articles  of  our  christian  faith,  as  for  instance,  the 
trinity  in  unity,  the  incarnation  of  the  son  of  God, 
&c.  which  we  believe  to  be  true,  though  we  ac- 
knowledge them  to  be  mysteries,  nay,  and  are  con- 
tent to  own,  that  with  regard  to  our  shallow  rea- 
sonings, they  are  attended  also  with  contradictions. 
Why  then  must  we  conclude  that  there  is  no  exter- 
nal world,  because  of  the  contradictions  which 
seem  to  attend  the  position  of  it?  And  to  this  pur- 
pose I  find  it  said  by  a  very  judicious  author*, 

•Art  of  thinking.SO 


74  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

that  it  is  good  to  tire  and  fatigue  the  mind  with 
such  kind  of  difficulties  (as  the  divisibility  of  mat- 
ter, &c.)  in  order  to  tame  its  presumption,  and  to 
make  it  less  daring  ever  to  oppose  its  feeble  light 
to  the  truths  proposed  to  it  in  the  gospel,  &c.  I  an- 
swer, 

1.  It  is  a  sign  indeed  that  our  understandings 
are  very  weak  and  shallow,  when  such  stufif  as  this 
shall  not  only  pass  for  common  sense,  but  even  look 
like  argument;  and  herein  I  confess  my  own  as 
well  as  my  neighbour's  weakness.     However, 

2.  If  we  will  reason  at  all,  we  cannot  well 
have  a  more  evident  principle  to  go  upon  than  this, 
that  being  is  not  not-being]  that  what  is,  is;  or  that 
it  is  impossible  for  the  same  thing  both  to  be  and 
not  be.  If  so,  we  must  either  say  that  humility 
of  judgment  is  no  virtue,  or  that  there  is  still  room 
enough  left  for  the  exercises  of  it,  whilst  we  hold 
this  principle  without  the  least  doubt  or  wavering. 
Nay, 

3.  It  seems  to  me,  that  if  we  will  reason  at 
all,  we  should  freely  judge  of  whatsoever  we  per- 
ceive, so  as  first  of  all  to  agree  in  this,  that  whatso- 
ever we  perceive  to  be,  is:  for  though  it  were  true 
indeed  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  truth,  or 
though  the  light  of  our  understandings  were  ever 
so  weak  and  feeble,  yet  till  we  have  discovered  this 
to  be  the  case,  and  whilst  we  all  agree  to  reason  one 
with  another,  that  must  pass  for  the  truth  which  we 
perceive,  and  that  must  pass  for  perceiving  which 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  75 

at  present  we  are  capable  of,  be  it  what  it  will  in 
the  eye  of  a  superior  judgment  or  understanding. 
To  boggle  therefore  at  this,  is  not  reasoning,  but 
refusing  to  reason  at  all ;  is  not  humility  of  judg- 
ment, but  open  and  avowed  scepticism?  Is  not  an 
acknowledgment  of  the  infinity  of  truth,  but  an 
evil,  and  profane,  and  atheistical,  denial  of  it? 
And  yet, 

4.  Nothing  more  than  this  is  requisite  in  the 
case  before  us:  nothing,  I  say,  but  to  affirm  that 
being  is,  and  not  to  deny  our  own  evident  percep- 
tions. The  first  of  these  is  the  resolution  of  the 
major,  and  the  other  of  the  minor,  of  both  the  fore- 
going arguments,  whereby  I  demonstrate  the  im- 
possibility of  an  external  world:  for  can  anything 
be  more  evident  than  that  finite  and  infinite  are 
exclusive  of  each  other;  and  that  an  idea  which 
implies  both  is  an  impossibility  in  fact?  And  can 
we  pretend  to  perceive  any  thing  at  all,  when  we 
pretend  to  doubt  whether  this  is  not  the  fact  or 
implication  of  external  matter?  Should  we  doubt 
in  this  manner,  if  the  subject  spoken  of  were  a  cir- 
cular square,  or  triangular  parallellogram?  If  not, 
I  would  fain  know  where  our  ignorance  lies,  which 
is  the  foundation  of  the  objection?  We  are  ig- 
norant indeed  that  there  is  any  such  thing  as  ex- 
ternal matter,  (and  one  would  think  for  this  rea- 
son we  should  be  so  far  from  having  any  partial- 
ity towards  the  being  of  it,  that  we  should  conclude 
of  course  that  there  is  no  such  thing  in  being,) 


76  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

but  on  the  other  hand  we  cannot  so  much  as  pre- 
tend ignorance  of  the  premises  by  which  this  con- 
clusion is  enforced.  They  are  as  evident  as  the 
light,  and  also  (as  far  as  ever  I  could  inform  my- 
self) universally  acknowledged:  where  then  is  the 
difficulty,  supposed  by  the  forementioned  author, 
in  the  question  about  the  divisibility  of  matter,  &c. 
wherewith  it  is  so  good  to  fatigue  our  presumptu- 
ous minds?  Why,  no  where  that  I  can  think  but 
here,  viz.  to  conceive  how  it  is  possible  that  such 
a  thing  can  exist,  whose  idea  implies  so  manifest 
a  contradiction :  and  if  this  be  all  the  difficulty,  it 
immediately  vanishes,  or  loses  its  name,  as  soon  as 
we  suppose  that  there  is  no  such  thing  or  matter, 
or  make  this  the  question,  whether  there  be  any 
such  thing,  or  not?  For  then,  instead  of  difficulty, 
it  becomes  light  and  argument,  and  is  no  other 
than  a  demonstration  of  the  impossibility  of  its  ex- 
istence.    But  now, 

5.  This  does  not  in  the  least  affect  so  as  to 
become  a  parallel  case  with  the  doctrine  of  the 
trinity,  &c.  and  that  for  several  reasons.     As, 

First,  In  that  all  who  believe  this  doctrine  are 
very  ready  to  acknowledge  (and  that  with  reason 
too)  that  there  is  something  incomprehensible  in 
it;  whereas  in  the  demonstrations  by  which  ex- 
ternal matter  is  proved  to  be  both  finite  and  in- 
finite, (viz.  in  extent  and  divisibility,)  I  have 
shewn  already,  no  ignorance  can  be  so  much  as 
pretended.    Then  again, 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  77 

Secondly,  the  articles  of  our  faith  concerning 
the  trinity,  &c.  are,  by  consent,  allowed  to  be  ex- 
empt or  particular  cases,  such  as  are  not  to  be  made 
precedents  for  our  believing  any  other  points,  not- 
withstanding the  difficulties  which  are  seen  to  at- 
I       tend  them.     And  this. 

Thirdly,  for  a  very  good  reason;  namely,  be- 
I  cause  as  to  the  truth  or  fact  of  these  doctrines  we 
have  an  evidence  irrefragable  from  another  quar- 
ter, (which  is  at  least  equal  to  the  evidence  of 
reason,)  viz.  the  word  of  God,  which  assures  us  of 
these  things,"  whereas  we  are,  or  are  supposed  to 
be,  wholly  ignorant  of  the  being  or  existence  of  an 
external  world.    And  after  all, 

Lastly,  I  utterly  deny  that  there  is  any  con- 
tradiction in  the  doctrines  of  the  trinity,  &c.  even 
rationally  considered,  which  circumstance  makes 
this  and  the  case  of  an  external  world  to  the  last 
degree  unparallel."  But  now,  it  is  the  parallell- 
ism  of  these  points  which  is  the  thing  contended 
for  in  the  objection;  and  if  so,  where  is  the  man 
that  with  a  serious  face  will  argue  this  matter  with 
me?  Who  will  say,  I  will  not  give  up  my  judg- 
ment for  an  external,  invisible,  unknown  world, 
notwithstanding  the  manifest  contradictions  which 
attend  the  mention  of  it,  on  any  other  terms  but 
that  of  affirming  or  granting  that  there  is  a  con- 
tradiction in  the  doctrine  of  the  ever-blessed  trin- 
ity? A  socinian"  or  arian^*  will  not  say  this,  it  be- 
ing evident  that  the  objection  is  very  nonsense  in 


78  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

their  mouths;  and  sure  I  am  that  an  orthodox  per- 
son would  be  ashamed  to  say  so:  and  yet,  if  it  be 
not  granted  immediately  that  there  is  (as  far  as 
our  understandings  can  dive  or  penetrate)  a  con- 
tradiction in  the  supposed  articles  of  the  trinity, 
&c.  the  objection  (even  on  this  account  alone)  is 
without  all  foundation,  and  is  no  other  than  an 
ignoratio  elenchi,  in  other  words,  talking  of  chalk 
with  those  that  talk  of  cheese. 


CHAPTER  V. 
ARGUMENT  V. 


ANOTHER  argument,  whereby  it  is  to  be  de- 
monstrated that  there  is  no  external  world,  is,  that 
in  such  a  world  it  is  impossible  there  should  be 
any  such  thing  as  motion;  or  rather  (lest  this 
should  not  seem  absurdity  enough  to  stop  men's 
judgments  in  favour  of  such  a  world)  it  may  be 
proved  from  the  most  simple  and  evident  ideas, 
both  that  there  may,  and  also  that  there  cannot  be, 
any  motion  in  it. 

That  there  may  be  motion  ^n  an  external 
world,  is  sufficiently  evident  from  this,  that  it  is 
supposed  to  be  a  creature :  if  so,  I  have  an  almighty 
power  on  my  side  to  help  forward  the  conclusion, 
namely,  that  it  is  moveable.  And  the  argument  in 
form  will  stand  thus. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  79 

The  power  of  God  is  sufficient  to  move  cre- 
ated matter, 

But  external  matter  is  supposed  to  be  created ; 

Ergo^  the  power  of  God  is  sufficient  to  move 
it. 

On  the  other  hand,  nothing  is  more  evident 
than  the  impossibility  of  motion  in  an  external 
world,  considered  as  external.  And  that,  first,  in 
the  whole;  secondly,  as  to  the  several  parts  of  it. 

I.     As  to  the  whole  I  argue  thus; 

An  infinite  body  or  expansion  is  not  capable 
of  being  moved  by  any  power  whatsoever. 

But  an  external  world  is  infinite  in  expansion ; 

Ergo,  an  external  world  is  absolutely  im- 
moveable, or  incapable  of  being  moved  by  any 
power  whatsoever. 

That  an  infinite  expansion  is  absolutely  im- 
moveable is  too  evident  to  be  proved,  unless  this 
will  be  admitted  as  something  more  so;  namely, 
that  motion  supposes  a  place  possessed,  and  after- 
wards quitted  for  another,  which  yet  is  impossible 
and  contradictory,  when  affirmed  of  an  expansion 
or  body  actually  infinite,  which,  as  such,  implies 
the  possession  of  all  place  already;  which  circum- 
stance therefore  makes  the  motion  of  such  a  body 
or  world  a  fact  absolutely  impossible.    And  then, 

Secondly,  that  an  external  world,  as  such,  is 
infinite  in  expansion.  I  appeal  to  those  argu- 
ments whereby  this  proposition  is  usually  proved 
by  philosophers,  and  which  are  allowed  by  all  to 


8o  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

be  demonstrative.  I  shall  not  here  fill  my  paper 
with  the  mention  of  any  one,  because  I  suppose 
my  reader  does  not  need  my  information,  and  also 
because  it  will  be  time  enough  to  do  this,  when  I 
am  advertized  of  an  adversary.  I  shall  only  ob- 
serve this,  (as  believing  it  may  be  of  some  use  to 
those  who  shall  be  at  the  pains  of  considering  this 
matter,)  namely,  that  whatever  arguments  have 
been  used  to  prove  the  world  to  be  infinite  in  ex- 
tent, will  be  found  to  have  proceeded  on  the  for- 
mal notion  of  its  being  external;  whereas  those 
which  have  been  produced  on  the  contradictory 
part  have  been  altogether  silent  as  to  this  idea,  and 
have  proceeded  either  on  the  idea  of  its  being  cre- 
ated, or  on  the  absurdities  attending  the  supposi- 
tion of  infinite;  by  which  proceeding  it  has  still 
been  granted,  that  notwithstanding  these  argu- 
ments and  absurdities,  an  external  world,  as  such, 
must  needs  be  infinite.  Since  therefore  an  infinite 
world  or  expansion  is  not  capable  of  being  moved, 
I  conclude  that  an  external  world,  considered  in 
the  whole,  is  a  being  absolutely  immoveable. 

II.  In  like  manner  it  seems  to  be  impossible 
that  there  should  be  any  such  thing  as  motion  in  an 
external  world,  considered  in  the  several  parts  of 
it. 

For  motion  is  supposed  to  be  a  translation  of 
a  body  from  one  point  or  place  to  another.  Now 
in  such  translation  the  space  or  line  through  which 
the  body  moved  is  supposed  to  pass,  must  be  actu- 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  8i 

ally  divided  into  all  its  parts.  This  is  supposed 
in  the  very  idea  of  motion :  but  this  all  is  infinite, 
and  this  infinite  is  absurd,  and  consequently  it  is 
equally  so,  that  there  should  be  any  motion  in  an 
external  world. 

That  an  external  line  or  space  is  compounded 
of  infinite  parts  or  points,  is  evident  by  the  same 
argument  by  which  any  body  or  part  of  matter 
(supposed  to  be  external)  is  proved,  and  also  al- 
lowed to  be  so ;  namely,  from  the  idea  of  its  being 
quantity,  body,  or  extension,  and  consequently  di- 
visible, and  not  annihilable  by  division,  which  last 
is  supposed  in  the  idea  of  its  being  external.  But 
then,  on  the  other  hand,  to  affirm  that  a  line  by  mo- 
tion or  otherwise  is  divided  into  infinite  parts,  is 
in  my  opinion  to  say  all  the  absurdities  in  the  world 
at  once.     For, 

First,  This  supposes  a  number  actually  in- 
finite, that  is,  a  number  to  which  no  unit  can  be 
added,  which  is  a  number  of  which  there  is  no 
sum  total,  that  is,  no  number  at  all;  consequently, 

Secondly,  By  this  means  the  shortest  motion 
becomes  equal  to  the  longest,  since  a  motion  to 
which  nothing  can  be  added  must  needs  be  as  long 
as  possible.    This  also, 

Thirdly,  will  make  all  motions  equal  in  swift- 
ness, it  being  impossible  for  the  swiftest  in  any 
stated  time  to  do  more  than  pass  through  infinite 
points,  which  yet  the  shortest  is  supposed  to  do. 
To  which  may  be  added, 


82  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

Lastly,  That  such  motion  as  this,  however 
short  in  duration,  must  yet  be  supposed  to  be  a 
motion  of  all  or  infinite  ages,  since  to  every  point 
of  space  or  line  through  which  any  body  is  sup- 
posed to  pass,  there  must  be  a  point  of  time  cor- 
respondent: but  infinite  points  of  time  make  an 
infinite  time  or  duration,  &c. 

These  are  some  of  the  absurdities  which  at- 
tend the  supposal  of  motion  in  an  external  world; 
whence  I  might  argue  simply,  that  such  a  world 
is  impossible :  but  lest,  as  I  said  before,  this  should 
not  be  thought  absurdity  enough,  that  is,  lest  any 
one  should  admit  such  a  world,  notwithstanding 
the  impossibility  of  motion  in  it,  I  rather  chuse 
to  defend  and  urge  both  parts  of  the  contradiction, 
and  conclude  the  impossibility  of  the  being  of  such 
a  world,  from  both  the  possibility  and  impossibil- 
ity of  motion  in  it.  The  argument  in  form  stands 
thus. 

A  world,  in  which  it  is  both  possible  and  im- 
possible that  there  should  be  any  such  thing  as 
motion,  is  not  at  all ; 

But  this  is  the  case  of  an  external  world; 

Ergo,  there  is  no  such  world. 

I  suppose  I  need  not  here  remind  my  reader 
that  I  have  proved  already,  and  that  it  is  here  sup- 
posed, that  a  visible  or  sensible  world  is  not  ex- 
ternal ;  neither,  if  he  has  at  all  gone  along  with  me 
in  this  discourse,  need  I  undertake  to  shew  that 
these  absurdities  about  motion  do  not  in  the  least 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  83 

affect  a  sensible  or  visible  world,  but  only  an  ex- 
ternal world.  Nevertheless,  if  upon  a  due  perusal 
of  what  I  have  here  written,  this  seems  yet  to  be 
wanting,  I  s'hall  be  ready,  as  soon  as  called  upon, 
to  give  my  reader  the  best  satisfaction  I  am  capa- 
ble of  as  to  this  matter. 


CHAP.  VI. 
ARGUMENT  VI. 

AGAIN,  it  is  with  me  an  argument  against 
the  being  of  an  external  world,  that  there  is  no  hy- 
pothesis of  vision,  that  I  can  imagine,  or  ever  heard 
of,  on  the  supposition  of  such  a  world,  but  what 
in  the  fact  or  act  of  it  implies  an  impossibility. 

I  pretend  not  to  have  conversed  with  the  writ- 
ings of  philosophers;  I  am  sure  not  enough  with 
their  persons,  to  know  all  the  opinions  there  are  or 
may  have  been  about  the  method  of  vision ;  and  so 
must  content  myself  with  those  that  I  have  met 
with,  which  are  only  these  two  that  at  this  time  I 
can  remember,  or  think  worth  the  repeating. 

One  is  the  Aristotelian,  or  old  account,  which 
supposes  certain  images  to  scale  off  from  external 
objects,  and  fly  in  at  the  eye,"  &c.  and  the  other 
is  the  Cartesian,  or  new  hypothesis,  which,  instead 
of  images,  or  resemblances  of  objects,  scaling  off 
from  the  objects  themselves,  accounts  for  vision 


84  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

from  the  reflection  of  subtle  matter,  (viz.  that 
which  proceeds  in  a  direct  line  from  the  sun)  from 
the  object  to  the  eye,  &c. 

I  stand  not  here  to  enquire  which  of  these  is 
true,  or  the  most  probable  account  of  vision,  on 
the  supposition  of  an  external  world,  being  here 
concerned  not  in  physics,  but  metaphysics,  or  an 
enquiry  into  simple,  not  hypothetical,  truth. 
Neither  am  I  concerned  to  consider  these  two  hy- 
potheses apart,  though  they  are  so  vastly  different; 
for  as  different  as  they  are  upon  the  whole,  they 
agree  in  all  that  which  I  am  concerned  to  take 
notice  of,  namely,  that  the  act  of  vision  is  the  ef- 
fect of  certain  parts  of  matter,  (whether  images, 
or  not,)  which  proceeding  from  the  objects,  re- 
spectively affect  or  act  upon  the  optic  nerve,  &c. 

This  is  that  which  I  take  to  be  an  impossibil- 
ity, or  so  attended  with  difficulties  in  the  actu  ex- 
ercito  of  it,  as  to  be  the  nearest  to  an  impossibility 
of  any  thing  that  we  know  of.     For, 

First,  these  parts,  as  being  material  or  ex- 
tended, must  needs  be  impenetrable,  that  is,  they 
must  each  possess  a  space  by  itself,  and  cannot 
(two  or  more,  much  more  an  infinite  number  of 
them)  be  crouded  into  one  point,  or  the  place  of 
one.  Nevertheless  it  is  possible  for  a  man's  eye  in 
one  and  the  same  point  to  see  a  vast  and  almost 
infinite  number  of  objects  which  are  in  heaven  and 
on  earth.  There  is  then  a  necessity  that  from  each 
of  these  bodies  there  should  be  communicated  or 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  85 

sent  a  line  or  train  of  subtle  parts  or  images  upon 
the  one  point  of  the  eye,  which,  how  it  is  possible 
to  be  in  fact,  I  leave  to  be  considered  by  all  those 
who  profess  to  know  what  they  mean,  when  they 
say,  bodies  are  impenetrable. 

Secondly,  there  is  not  any  one  point  in  the  uni- 
verse, wherein  the  eye  supposed  or  fixed,  cannot 
perceive  an  innumerable  company  of  objects. 
There  is  not  then  any  one  point  in  the  universe, 
wherein  lines  of  subtle  matter,  or  images,  from  all 
these  supposed  innumerable  objects,  do  not  actu- 
ally concentre.  If  this  is  thought  possible  by  any, 
I  must  be  content  to  leave  it  with  them,  since  noth- 
ing is  more  evident  with  me,  than  that  the  fact  of 
this  is  utterly  impossible. 

From  these  and  such  like  absurdities,  which 
attend  every  hypothesis  of  vision  in  an  external 
world,  I  think  I  am  bound  to  conclude  that  there 
is  no  such  world.  For  it  seems  to  me  at  present, 
that  if  there  is  an  external  world,  one  or  other 
of  these  accounts  of  vision  must  needs  be  the  true, 
that  is  fact.  But  as  these  appear  to  be  impossible 
in  fact,  they  seem  to  derive  their  impossibility  upon 
the  world  which  they  belong  to,  or  which  supposes 
them. 

This,  I  say,  will  follow,  till  some  other  ac- 
count of  vision,  in  an  external  world,  be  produced 
or  named,  which  is  not  liable  to  these,  or  any  like 
absurdities;  or  which  even  on  the  concession  of 


86  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

an  external  world,  may  not  plainly  be  demonstrat- 
ed to  be  false. 

In  the  mean  time  nothing  of  all  this  affects 
a  sensible  or  visible  world,  supposed  and  granted 
to  be  not  external.  For  then,  any  hypothesis  of 
vision,  which  has  no  other  falsehood  in  it,  but  what 
is  derived  upon  it  from  the  non-existence  or  im- 
possibility of  an  external  world,  will  be  the  true 
hypothesis,  or  account  of  vision.  For,  by  truth  in 
this  case,  will  then  be  meant  no  other  than  the  will 
of  God,  the  great  author  of  nature,  who  giveth  us 
such  and  such  sensations,  by  such  and  such  laws. 
And  in  this  sense,  a  law  or  rule  of  vision,  may  be 
possible  and  even  true  in  its  cause,  though  it  has 
no  truth  in  itself,  or  is  impossible  in  fact.  And  so, 
with  this  explanation,  I  am  very  ready  to  say,  that 
the  second,  or  Cartesian  account  is  the  true  hy- 
pothesis of  vision.  For,  though  there  be  indeed 
no  external  world,  yet  such  a  world  exists  as  far  as 
it  is  possible;  and  it  has  been  granted  in  the  begin- 
ning, that  it  is  according  to  the  will  of  God,  that 
the  visible  world  should  carry  in  it  every  charac- 
ter of  being  external,  except  the  truth  of  fact, 
which  is  absolutely  impossible.  But  the  discovery 
of  this  last  is  within  the  province  of  metaphysics, 
which  has  to  do  only  with  simple  being  or  exist- 
ence; whereas  this  about  the  method  of  vision  is 
a  question  of  a  grosser  size,  and  a  much  lower  de- 
gree of  abstraction;  and  its  resolution  is  to  be 
sought  for  only  in  the  will  of  God,  by  which  he 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  87 

willed  his  creatures,  viz.  material  creatures.  But 
in  this  will  we  see  an  external  world,  even  an  ex- 
ternal visible  world,  as  I  observed  just  now.  So 
that  this  being  the  first  will,  must  be  first  supposed, 
or  taken  for  granted  by  consent.  And  then,  I  be- 
lieve, it  will  be  found  that  this  account  of  vision 
(as  well  as  several  parts  of  the  same  philosophy 
which  have  been  objected  against)  will  have  lost 
all  its  difficulty,  and  must  pass  for  true. 


CHAP.  VII. 
ARGUMENT  VII. 

AGAIN,  as  by  an  external  world  we  are  sup- 
posed to  mean  certain  objects  which  do  not  exist 
in,  or  in  dependance  on,  any  mind  or  faculty  of 
perception,  at  least  of  any  creature ;  so  when  I  con- 
template the  idea  of  such  a  self-subsisting  being, 
I  profess  I  am  put  hard  to  it  to  reconcile  it  with 
the  character  of  a  creature,  or  to  discover  how  it 
can  be  understood  to  subsist  at  all  on  the  mind,  or 
will,  or  power,  of  God,  who  is  supposed  to  be  the 
creator  of  it.^^    For, 

First,  as  to  its  being  simply^  it  is  past  my  skill 
to  distinguish  it  from  being  simple,  absolute,  or 
universal.  We  are  taught  indeed  to  say,  that  ev- 
ery creature  of  God  needs  the  same  power  to  pre- 
serve, which  was  necessary  to  the  creation  of  it;" 


88  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

and  christian  philosophers  are  generally  agreed, 
that  this  power  of  God  is  so  necessary  to  the  pres- 
ervation, or  continued  being,  of  every  creature  as 
such,  that  it  must  return  to  its  primitive  nothing, 
merely  from  the  abstraction  or  withdrawing  of  this 
power. 

But  do  we  understand  what  we  say,  when  we 
apply  this  doctrine  to  an  external  world,  either  in 
the  whole,  or  in  the  several  parts  of  it?  We  see  it 
indeed  in  the  idea  which  we  have  of  creature,  and 
in  the  absurdities  which  attend  an  absolute  exist- 
ence applied  to  anything  but  God  alone;  but  do 
we  see  any  such  dependance  as  to  being  or  existence 
in  the  idea,  which  we  conceive  of  an  external 
world?  Consider  but  this  house,  this  tree,  this  any- 
thing amongst  the  objects  of  an  external  world,  or 
of  the  visible  world,  supposed  (as  usual)  to  be 
external,  is  there  any  sign  of  weakness  or  depend- 
ance in  any  of  these  things  considered  by  us  in  this 
view?  Will  not  an  external  house  stand  or  be,  un- 
less a  foreign  power  continue  to  support  it?  Or 
does  it  seem  to  us  to  be  any  thing  like  those  things 
of  which  we  speak,  when  we  speak  of  certain  be- 
ings which  have  no  subsistence  of  their  own,  no 
truth  of  being  but  in  relation  or  resemblance,  and 
which  would  cease  to  be,  barely  by  an  abstraction 
of  a  supporting  power,  which  is  different  from  the 
things  themselves?  A  house  indeed  may  be  a  good, 
or  useful,  or  convenient  house,  only  as  it  stands 
related  to  an  idea  in  the  mind,  or  intellect  of  its 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  89 

maker,  and  may  be  said  to  stand  in  its  present 
form,  only  as  supported  by  certain  foreign  causes; 
but  we  are  speaking  here,  not  of  the  external  form, 
but  of  the  simple  truth  or  being  of  things;  and 
even  in  this  respect  we  say  that  things  subsist  al- 
together by  a  relation  to  the  intellect,  or  in  de- 
pendance  on  the  will  of  God.  But  I  say,  does  this 
seem  to  be  the  case  of  an  external  piece  of  matter? 
Do  we  conceive  this  as  having  no  absolute  being, 
or  substance  of  its  own?  as  a  mere  nothing,  but  by 
resemblance,  and  what  would  cease  to  be  on  the 
instant  of  the  cessation  of  God's  will  to  preserve 
it?  I  know  what  another  may  answer  to  all  these 
questions,  and  I  cannot  help  it,  let  men  answer 
what  they  will ;  but  still  I  must  insist  and  say,  that 
if  another  will  affirm,  that  he  thus  conceives  of 
external  matter,  he  must  teach  me  to  do  the  same 
from  some  other  idea  besides  that  of  creature, 
namely,  from  the  consideration  of  the  thing  itself  \ 
or  else  I  must  conclude  that  he  affirms  this,  not  be- 
cause he  understands  any  thing  of  the  matter  spok- 
en of,  but  because  the  truth  in  general  forces  him  to 
say  this.  But  this  is  the  chief  thing  which  makes 
against  his  point.  For  to  say  that  external  matter 
exists  wholly  on  the  will  of  God,  because  this  is 
the  condition  of  a  creaturely  existence,  is  only  to 
say  in  general,  that  the  existence  of  a  creature  is 
necessarily  thus  dependant.  But  this  is  what  I  af- 
firm; and  hence  arises  the  difficulty,  viz.  how  we 
can  conceive  external  matter  to  exist  by  this  rule, 


90  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

or  how  to  reconcile  the  absolute  and  stable  exist- 
ence of  matter  supposed  to  be  external,  with  this 
necessary  and  indispensable  character  of  a  creat- 
ure's being.  My  business  is  to  deny  that  there  is 
any  such  creature  for  this  reason,  because  it  carries 
in  the  idea  of  it  an  absolute  kind  of  existence, 
which  no  creature  is  capable  of;  and  for  this  I  ap- 
peal to  the  judgment  of  all  others;  so  that  if  an- 
other will  yet  contend  that  there  is  any  such  creat- 
ure, he  must  not  argue  with  me  that  it  does  and 
must  so  exist  because  it  is  a  creature,  for  this  is 
plainly  begging  the  question;  but  must  make  an- 
swer on  the  other  hand,  how  a  creature,  which  is 
and  must  be  understood  to  have  a  self-subsistence, 
or  a  proper  substance  of  its  own,  can  be  said  to  ex- 
ist, whilst  it  is  acknowledged,  as  before,  that  every 
creature,  as  such,  exists  altogether  in  dependance 
on  the  power  or  will  of  God.  This  is  the  difficulty 
which  attends  an  external  world,  considered  in  its 
several  parts.    And  this. 

Secondly,  is  rather  increased,  if  we  consider 
it  in  the  whole;  for  then  nothing  but  its  expansion 
comes  under  consideration.  And  this  is  plainly 
infinite.  And  if  not  infinite  nothing^  must  be  in- 
finite something^  that  is,  being  or  substance.  But 
is  there  any  thing  in  this  idea  which  squares  with 
the  indispensable  character  of  a  creature?  For 
this  I  appeal  to  every  one's  idea  of  an  expanded 
universe,  particularly  to  theirs,  who  (if  I  may 
guess,)  are  not  a  few,  who  from  a  consideration  of 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  91 

the  firm  and  substantial  existence  of  the  visible 
world,  supposed  by  them  to  be  external,  think 
themselves  compelled  to  believe,  that  simple  space 
or  extension  is  the  very  substance  of  God  himself; 
and  therefore  how  to  conceive  it  possible  that  such 
a  thing  should  exist,  which  on  one  hand  we  are 
compelled  to  call  a  creature,  and  on  the  other  can- 
not forbear  to  understand  as  God,  I  leave  to  be 
explained  by  those  who  yet  retain  any  fondness  for 
such  a  thing.  Thus  much  of  the  existence  simple 
of  an  external  world;  I  come  next  to  consider  the 
unity  which  it  implies. 

Here  then  I  observe,  that  an  external  world 
implies  in  it  all  the  unity,  which  any  being  what- 
soever, which  universal  being,  which  God  himself 
is  capable  of. 

Consider  it  in  its  whole,  and  it  has  the  unity 
of  infinity.  It  is  one  alone,  and  is  absolutely  in- 
capable of  being  multiplied  by  any  power  what- 
soever; which  is  as  much  as  can  be  said  of  God, 
and  even  more  than  they  have  a  right  to  say,  who 
consider  him,  not  as  universal,  but  some  particular 
being.  Consider  it  in  its  several  parts,  or  bodies 
included  in  it,  and  each  particle  of  matter  has  such 
a  unity  in,  or  identity  with  itself,  as  I  think  should 
not  be  ascribed  to  any  thing  but  God,  who  alone 
is  the  same  yesterday,  to-day,  and  forever.  Again, 
I  consider,  that  an  external  world,  is  independent 
on  the  will  of  God,  considered  in  its  expansion, 
which  will   and  must  be  infinite,  whether  God 


91  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

pleases  to  make,  or  will  it  to  be  so  or  not,  suppos- 
ing only  that  he  wills  to  produce  or  make  any  the 
least  extent,  or  that  any  the  least  part  or  extent  is 
made,  or  in  being. 

As  for  instance,  let  God  be  supposed  to  will 
the  being  of  a  certain  cubical  part  of  matter  or  ex- 
tension, about  the  bigness  of  a  common  die.  This, 
I  say,  is  impossible  in  fact,  and  this  draws  another 
impossibility  after  it,  which  is,  that  by  this  the  will 
of  God  is  over-ruled  or  frustrated  by  the  work  of 
his  own  hands.  For  what  should  bound  this  cub- 
ical extent?  It  must  be  something,  or  nothing.  If 
nothing,  it  is  plainly  infinite ;  if  something,  it  must 
be  matter  or  extension ;  and  then  the  same  question 
returns,  and  will  infinitely  return,  or  be  never  sat- 
isfied under  an  extent  actually  infinite.  But  this  is 
an  independency  of  being,  which  I  think  can  be- 
long to  no  creature,  it  being  the  same  with  that 
which  we  use  to  call  necessary  existence.  I  con- 
clude therefore  that  there  is  no  such  creature  as 
an  external  world. 

Lastly,  much  the  same  sort  of  difficulty  occurs 
if  we  consider  it  in  not  being,  after  it  has  been  sup- 
posed to  exist.  That  God  can  annihilate  every 
creature  which  he  has  made,  is,  I  think,  a  maxim 
undisputed  by  any;  if  so,  I  think  it  plainly  follows, 
that  that  which  in  its  idea  implies  an  utter  impos- 
sibility of  being  annihilated,  is  a  thing  in  fact  im- 
possible. But  this,  I  say,  is  the  case  or  implication 
of  an  external  world.     This  is  evident  from  the 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  93 

foregoing  article,  which  shews  the  absolute  neces- 
sity of  its  being  infinite,  on  the  supposition  of  the 
being  of  but  the  least  part  or  particle  of  it:  for 
certainly  if  nothing  less  than  infinite  can  exist,  or 
be  made,  no  part  of  this  infinite  can  be  unmade,  or 
annihilated.  And  therefore  though  in  words  we 
may  say  that  God  can  annihilate  any  part  of  it, 
yet  we  utter  that  in  words,  of  which  we  can  have 
no  conception,  but  rather  the  contrary  to  it.  For 
annihilate  it  in  supposition  as  often  as  you  will, 
yet  still  it  returns  upon  you ;  and  whilst  you  would 
conceive  it  as  nothing,  it  becomes  something  to 
you  against  your  will ;  and  it  is  impossible  to  think 
otherwise,  whatever  we  may  say. 

I  believe  I  should  lose  my  time  and  pains  if 
I  should  attempt  in  this  place  to  shew,  that  the 
supposition  of  a  visible,  which  is  not  an  external 
world,  is  attended  with  none  of  these  difficulties. 
This  would  be  a  thankless  office  with  all  those  who 
are  not  yet  convinced,  but  that  an  external  world 
may  yet  stand,  notwithstanding  these  pretended 
difficulties;  and  it  would  be  an  injury  to  those  that 
are,  as  preventing  them  in  certain  pleasant  and 
very  easy  considerations.  And  so  I  leave  it  to  take 
its  chance  with  all  my  readers  in  common. 


CHAP.  VIII. 

ARGUMENT  VIII. 

ANOTHER  difficulty  which  siill  attends  the 
notion  of  an  external  world,  is,  that  if  any  such 


94  „  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

world  exists,  there  seems  to  be  no  possibility  of  con- 
ceiving, but  that  God  himself  must  be  extended 
with  it. 

This  I  take  to  be  absurdity  enough  in  reason, 
to  hinder  us  from  supposing  any  such  world.  But 
so  unfortunate  are  the  stars  of  this  idol  of  our  ini- 
agination,  that  it  is  as  much  impossible,  on  another 
account,  that  it  should  exist,  though  this  were  no 
absurdity,  or  though  it  were  supposed  and  allowed 
that  God  himself  were  extended. 

I  suppose  then  in  the  first  place,  that  God  is 
not  extended.  If  so,  I  say  there  can  be  no  external 
world.  For  if  there  be  an  external  world,  and  if 
it  be  a  creature,  we  must  suppose  that  God  is  every 
where  present  in,  and  with  it;  for  he  is  supposed 
to  preserve  and  do  every  thing  that  is  done  in  it. 
To  deny  this,  is  to  shut  him  out  of  the  universe, 
even  altogether  to  deny  his  being.  On  the  con- 
trary, to  affirm  that  he  is  thus  present  with  every 
part  and  particle  of  it,  is  to  make  him  co-extended, 
which  is  contrary  to  the  supposition. 

Yes,  it  may  be  said,  God  is  extended,  and 
consequently  there  may  be  an  external  world,  not- 
withstanding this  dilemma.    I  answer, 

Secondly,  be  it  so  that  he  is  extended,  (to 
humour  a  corrupt  and  absurd  itch  of  argumenta- 
tion,) yet  this  avails  nothing  towards  the  being  of 
an  external  world,  but  directly  towards  the  non- 
existence of  it.  For  if  God  be  extended,  and  as  we 
must  also  say  infinitely  extended,  where  shall  we 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  95 

find  room  for  an  external  world?  Can  two  ex- 
tensions, infinite  extensions,  coexist?  This  is  ev- 
idently impossible.  So  that  all  the  choice  we  are 
left  to  is  to  acknowledge  God  or  an  external  world ; 
which,  I  think,  is  a  choice  we  need  not  long  be  de- 
liberating upon.  I  conclude,  therefore,  that  if 
God  is,  there  is  no  external  world. 

I  know  but  one  way  of  answering  this  argu- 
ment, and  that  is,  to  affirm  that  an  external  world 
is  God  himself,  and  not  a  creature  of  God.  But 
till  some  one  shall  be  so  hardy  as  to  appear  publicly 
in  defence  of  this,  I  shall  think  it  but  a  loss  of  time 
and  pains  to  consider  of  or  debate  it. 


CHAP.  IX. 
ARGUMENT  IX. 

I  promised  in  some  part  of  argument  IV.  that 
I  would  consider  farther  of  what  philosophers  say 
of  external  matter'^  and  here  I  intend  to  be  as  good 
as  my  word.^^ 

I  have  shewn  in  my  former  part  of  this  treat- 
ise,* that  the  matter  so  much  disputed  of  by  phil- 
osophers is  not  understood  by  them  to  be  visible. 
This  of  itself  is  an  argument  that  they  had,  or 
could  pretend  to  have,  but  a  very  faint  and  imper- 
fect idea  of  the  thing  they  were  speaking  of.    Ac- 

•Chap.  I.  Sect  ii.  Argument  5. 


96  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

cordingly,  I  shall  here  proceed  to  shew,  that  they 
neither  did,  nor  could,  pretend  to  mean  anything 
at  all  by  it.    And, 

First,  for  the  definitions  which  they  have  de- 
livered to  us  of  matter,  Aristotle  defines  it  thus. 

vAiy  aiTiov  cc  ov  yiverai  Tt. 

Materia  est  ex  qua  res,  vel  aliquod  est.  This,  by 
no  inconsiderable  philosopher,  t  is  called  optima 
definitio  materiae.  And  the  same  is  by  Baronius 
(Metaph.  page  172.)  defined  thus.  Materia  sub- 
stantialis  est  substantia  incompleta  in  qua  forma 
aliqua  substantialis  existit.  And  sometimes  again 
thus,  Substantia  incompleta  capax  formae. 

These  are  all  the  definitions  that  I  shall  men- 
tion, and  these  I  suppose  are  sufficient  to  convince 
us  that  they  meant  nothing  at  all  by  the  matter 
which  they  here  speak  of.  For  what  is  there  in 
either  of  these  definitions  besides  the  indeterminate 
notion  of  being  in  general,  that  is,  something,  but 
nobody  knows  what,  or  whether  it  be  any  thing  at 
all  or  no.  This  I  say  is  all  that  I  can  make  or 
understand  by  it;  and  this  amounts  to  the  same,  as 
if  they  had  told  us  in  plain  words,  that  they  mean 
nothing  at  all.    But  this. 

Secondly,  they  tell  us  yet  more  expressly  in 
the  descriptions  and  characters  which  they  give  of 
matter. 

As  for  instance  Baronius*  delivers  it  as  the 
common  sense  of  all  philosophers,  that  Materia 

t  Scheib.  Met  Cap.  22,  158. 
•Met  p.  189. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  97 

non  est  in  praeJicamento,  and  that  non  habet  pro- 
prie  dictum  genus.  This  is  the  same  as  if  he  had 
told  us  in  express  words,  that  the  most  they  mean 
by  it,  is  being  indefinite,  or  something,  but  they 
know  not  what.  For  that  which  is  not  in  the  pre- 
dicaments, is  allowed  to  be  neither  substance  nor 
accident,  (unless  it  be  God,  or  universal  being,) 
and  what  is  neither  of  these  is  confessedly  nothing 
at  all. 

Again,  St.  Austin^"  is  always  quoted  by  phil- 
osophers for  his  description  of  matter,  as  an  ex- 
planation of  the  common  meaning,  and  it  is  thus 
expressed. t  Materia  est  infima  omnium  rerum, 
&  prope  nihil. 

Much  after  the  same  manner  it  is  described  by 
Porphyry,^^  X  Materia  prima  ex  se  est  incorporea, 
neq;  intellectus,  neq;  anima,  neq;  aliud  secundum 
se  vivens,  informis,  immutabilis,  infinita,  impotens, 
qua  propter  neque  ens,  sed  verum  non-ens.  But 
this  is  a  little  more  than  prope  nihil,  and  I  sup- 
pose may  be  said  to  amount  fully  to  the  sense  of 
the  English  word,  nothing. 

In  like  manner  Aristotle  himself,  who  has 
given  almost  all  other  philosophers  their  cue,  is 
for  nothing  better  known  than  for  his  most  intel- 
ligible description  of  substantial  matter.  He  calls 
it  nee  quid,  nee  quale,  nee  quantum ;"  to  which  I 
think  I  may  fairly  add,  nee  aliquid,  as  the  proper 

f  L.  12.  Confess,  cap.  7. 
^  Lib.  de  Occasionib.  c.  21. 


98  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

sense  and  consequence  of  this  description.  Nay, 
to  confirm  this  as  the  true  interpretation  and  de- 
sign of  his  words,  I  have  many  times  seen  him 
quoted  by  his  followers,  for  saying  positively  that 
materia  est  non  ens;  one  instance  of  which  I  par- 
ticularly remember,  viz.  Scheibl.  Metaph.  Cap. 
22.  167. 

Perhaps  so,  you  will  say,  but  yet  all  philoso- 
phers are  agreed  in  the  being  of  it,  and  all  argue 
it  to  be,  or  to  have  a  real  existence.    I  answer. 

First,  If  they  will  contradict  their  own  po- 
sitions, as  it  is  not  in  my  power  to  help,  so  it  is  hard 
that  I  should  sufiFer  for  it.  But,  secondly,  how  is  it 
that  they  argue  the  existence  of  matter?  Do  they 
argue  it  with  a  supposed  adversary,  or  only  with 
themselves?  If  with  themselves  only,  this  is  noth- 
ing at  all ;  for  in  this  case  they  may  have  the  ques- 
tion for  asking;  and  so  this  kind  of  arguing  is  only 
grimace  and  banter.  But  if  they  argue  it  with  an 
adversary,  who  is  supposed  to  doubt  it,  I  am  this 
adversary,  and  let  their  reasons  be  produced. 

In  the  mean  time  I  affirm  that  they  argue 
only  with  themselves ;  that  is,  they  grant  themselves 
the  question,  upon  all  occasions,  and  whensoever 
they  please. 

Their  arguments  are  such  as  these,  some  of 
which  I  have  mentioned  already.* 

Matter  is,  or  exists,  say  they,  because  it  is,  or 
is  supposed  to  be  created.    Here  the  adversary,  if 

•  Part  I.  Chap.  i.  Sect  II.  Arg.  VI. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  99 

any,  is  supposed  to  grant  that  it  is  created,  but  yet 
to  doubt  whether  it  is,  or  exists,  or  not.  That  is, 
he  is  supposed  to  be  a  drivelling  fool,  or  no  adver- 
sary at  all,  which  is  plainly  the  case. 

Again,  matter  is,  or  exists,  because  it  is  sup- 
posed to  be  part  of  a  real  compositum.  This  is  the 
very  same  case  as  before. 

For  surely  whoever  can  be  brought  to  grant 
that  its  a  real  part  of  a  compositum,  cannot  be 
supposed  to  doubt  whether  it  exists  or  not. 

Again,  if  matter  were  nothing,  it  could  do 
nothing,  it  could  not  be  the  subject  of  generation 
and  corruption;  but  this  last  is  supposed  (thanks 
to  the  kind  opponent!)  Ergo,  matter  is  not  noth- 
ing. 

Again,  (saith  Christopher  Schiebler,  Cap.  15, 
45.)  Materia  habet  essentiam,  quia  ens  est.  And 
with  the  same  ease  you  are  told  by  all  philosophers 
together,  that  ens  est  quod  habet  essentiam.  This 
is  round  about  our  coal-fire,  in  other  words,  argu- 
ing in  a  circle,  or  no  arguing  at  all. 

Again,  (Cap.  22,  167.)  he  puts  the  question 
simply,  an  materia  sit  ens.  And  this  is  the  reso- 
lution of  it.  If  matter  were  not  ens,  it  would  be 
the  same  thing  to  say,  that  any  thing  fit  ex  nihilo, 
as  ex  materia.  And  again,  it  must  be  something, 
because  something  is  constituted  of  it. 

These  and  such  like  (for  I  am  tired  with  re- 
peating them)  are  the  mighty  arguments  by  which 
philosophers   demonstrate   the   being  of  external 


100  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

matter.  If  you  will  take  their  words  you  may;  for 
I  think  nothing  is  more  evident  than  that  this  is  all 
you  have  to  do  in  the  case;  unless  (which  I  think 
much  more  advisable)  you  will  chuse  to  believe 
with  me,  that  they  never  designed  any  other  than 
to  amuse  the  ignorant,  but  yet  to  give  every  intelli- 
gent reader  an  item,  by  this  procedure,  that  the 
matter  they  are  speaking  about  is  nothing  at  all. 

If  so,  I  have  a  vast  authority  on  my  side: 
which,  if  not  sufficient  to  inforce  the  conclusion 
simply  with  all  readers,  because  some  there  may  be 
who  have  but  little  opinion  of  this  kind  of  author- 
ity, yet  with  all  must  have  this  effect,  to  remove  the 
prejudice  which  may  lie  on  their  minds  against 
this  my  conclusion,  on  the  account  of  its  appearing 
strangeness  and  novelty.  And  though  some  authors 
on  certain  subjects  may  have  good  reason  rather  to 
cherish  than  lessen  the  opinion  of  their  novelty,  yet 
considering  all  things,  if  I  were  certain  to  have  re- 
moved what  these  are  supposed  to  desire  by  any- 
thing I  have  said  in  the  present  chapter,  I  am  per- 
suaded it  would  avail  me  more  in  the  event,  than 
ten  thousand  the  most  evident  demonstrations  with- 
out it.  And  indeed  it  was  the  prospect  of  this  ef- 
fect alone,  which  induced  me  to  number  this  chap- 
ter amongst  my  arguments  against  the  being  of  an 
external  world. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  loi 

CHAP.  X. 

Objections  answered. 

BUT  now  it  is  time  to  attend  to  what  may  be 
urged  on  the  other  size,  viz.  in  favour  of  an  ex- 
ternal world. 

But  what  favour  can  belong,  or  be  due,  to  that 
which  is,  or  can  be  of  no  use,  if  it  were  in  being, 
which  is  all  over  contradiction,  which  is  contrary 
to  the  truth  and  being  of  God,  and  after  all  is  sup- 
posed to  be  utterly  unknown?  Who  would  ever 
attempt  to  form  an  argument  for  the  being  of  such 
a  thing  as  this?  For  as  unknown,  it  must  be  sup- 
posed to  be  nothing,  even  by  those  who  are  pre- 
paring themselves  to  prove  that  it  is  something.  So 
that  well  may  all  particular  objections  be  said  to  be 
false  or  insufficient,  when  it  is  against  the  suppo- 
sition of  the  question  to  suppose  any  objections  at 
all,  or  but  the  possibility  of  an  objection. 

Nevertheless,  where  men  are  thoroughly  in- 
clined to  hold  fast  their  point,  notwithstanding  all 
the  evidence  in  the  world  to  the  contrary,  there  is  a 
possible  room  for  two  or  three  things,  which,  for 
aught  I  know,  some  persons  may  call  objections. 
And  they  are  these  that  follow. 

Objection  I. 

Does  not  the  scripture  assure  us  of  the  exist- 
ence of  an  external  world." 


I02  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

Answer. 

1.  Not  as  I  know  of.  If  it  does,  you  would 
do  well  to  name  to  me  that  text  wherein  this  is  re- 
vealed to  us;  otherwise,  I  have  no  way  to  answer 
this  objection  but  that  of  taking  into  consideration 
every  sentence  in  the  whole  bible,  which  I  am  sure 
you  will  believe  is  more  than  I  need  do.     But, 

2.  To  do  this  objection  all  the  right  I  can,  I 
will  suppose  a  passage  or  two  in  the  word  of  God; 
and  I  should  think,  if  such  a  one  is  any  where  to  be 
found,  it  will  be  in  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis, 
where  Moses  speaks  of  the  creation  of  the  material 
world.^'*  Here  it  is  said,  that  in  the  beginning  God 
created  the  heaven  and  the  earthy  and  also  that  all 
material  things  were  made  some  days  before  the 
first  man,  and  so  cannot  be  said  to  exist  only  rela- 
tively on  the  mind  of  man.^^     To  this  I  answer, 

I.  This  objection  from  scripture  is  taken 
from  Mr.  Malebranche,*^^  and  is  his  last  resort  on 
which  to  found  the  being  of  an  external  world. 
But  then  the  external  world,  which  he  contends 
for,  is  proved  by  him  before,  and  here  supposed 
to  be  no  object  of  sense,  and  consequently  invisible. 
And  it  was  for  this  reason  (it  being  an  objection 
peculiar  to  this  author)  that  I  deferred  the  men- 
tion of  it  to  this  place,  where  also  an  external  world 
is  supposed  to  be  invisible.  Here  then  my  answer 
to  the  author  is  this,  that  the  tendency  of  this  pas- 

•  Search's  Illustr.  Tom.  ii.  p.  114.    Taylor's  Translation.  Ed.  2. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  103 

sage  of  scripture  is  not  to  prove  the  being  of  an 
external  (supposed  to  be  an)  invisible  world,  but 
the  external  being  or  existence  of  the  visible  world : 
for  it  is  here  supposed  that  the  visible  world  existed 
before  the  first  man  saw  it.  But  this  is  as  much 
against  himself  as  me,  and  therefore  is  no  objection, 
as  coming  from  that  quarter.  But  another  may 
think  that  there  is  an  answer  due,  not  only  to  the 
author,  but  to  the  objection  itself.  Be  it  so,  I  an- 
swer, 

2.  That  it  seems  to  me  there  is  nothing  in  this 
passage  which  affirms  the  visible  world  to  be  exter- 
nal. And  my  reason  for  this  is,  because  there  is 
nothing  in  it  but  what  is  very  consistent  with  be- 
lieving that  the  visible  world  is  not  external. 

For  first,  is  it  said  that  God  created  the  heaven 
and  earth?  Meaning  by  it,  that  all  those  things 
which  either  we  or  any  other  intelligent  creatures 
behold,  are  not  their  own  causes  of  existence,  or  of 
an  existence  necessary,  but  receive  and  derive  their 
whole  being  from  another  cause,  viz.  God.  Is  any 
thing  of  this  denied  in  consequence  of  affirming, 
that  a  visible  object,  as  such,  is  not  external?  Or, 
does  this  make  it  to  be  of  necessary  existence,  or  to 
be  its  own  cause,  or  to  be  the  effect  of  any  thing  but 
the  will  of  God,  who  after  the  counsel  of  his  own 
will  gives  or  causes  such  and  such  sensations  in  us? 
Or,  secondly,  is  there  (as  some  learned  interpreters 
have  thought)  a  particular  sense  and  meaning  in 
the  words,  in  principto,      'Ev  apx^i  or      n-tfKia      ** 


I04  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

if  one  design  of  the  text  was  to  tell  us,  that  God  the 
father  made  all  things  by  and  through,  and  in,  his 
Son,  who  is  frequently  in  scripture  characterized 
by  this,  as  by  a  proper  name?  If  so,  is  it  incon- 
sistent with  this  doctrine  to  hold  that  a  visible  ob- 
ject, as  such,  is  not  external  to  the  mind  or  faculty 
which  perceives  it?  So  far  from  this,  that  this 
doctrine  seems  to  be  intelligible  only  on  this  hy- 
pothesis; and  I  think  I  have  shewn  already,  that 
an  external  world,  as  such,  (whether  visible  or  in- 
visible) is  of  too  absolute  an  existence  to  exist  only 
in  the  mind  or  will  of  God,  or  the  son  of  God,  as 
every  creature  is  said  to  do  in  this  text.  So  that  if 
this  text,  thus  interpreted,  proves  any  thing  to  the 
present  purpose,  it  proves  the  contrary  to  that 
which  it  is  alledged  for.  Or,  thirdly,  is  it  said,  that 
the  visible  world  existed,  or  had  its  being,  before 
the  first  man  Adam  was  created?  And  did  it  not 
thus  exist  when  Apx^  beheld  it,  when  it  had  past 
the  Wisdom,  and  was  come  into  the  will  of  God? 
Or  might  not  the  angels  see  and  live  in  it,  (who 
knows  how  long)  before  the  man  whom  we  call 
Adam  was  produced  into  being?  Or,  lastly,  must 
all  this  go  for  nothing  because  of  the  little  syllable 
the^  which  is  prefixed  in  the  text  to  the  words 
heaven  and  earth?  as  if  by  this  we  were  obliged 
to  understand  an  absolute  and  strict  identity  be- 
tween the  visible  world,  considered  in  the  will  of 
God,  or  in  the  minds  of  the  angels,  and  that  which 
was  afterwards  perceived  by  Adam?    This  is  a 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  105 

slender  thread  indeed,  whereon  to  hang  the  whole 
weight  of  an  universe.  But  must  I  myself  be  for- 
bid the  use  of  this  important  word  the^  because  I 
hold  that  a  visible  object  is  not  external;  and  be- 
cause in  consequence  of  this  position  there  will  be 
found  only  an  identity  of  similitude  between  the 
visible  world  which  God  made  in  the  beginning, 
and  that  which  Adam  had  a  sensation  of;  and  con- 
sequently between  that  which  Peter  and  that  which 
John  sees,  at  the  same  or  different  times?  Must  I 
never  say  that  I  have  seen  the  sun,  because  on  my 
hypothesis  the  sun  which  I  am  supposed  to  see,  is 
not  the  same  strictly  with  that  which  God  seeth,  or 
which  is  seen  by  another  person?  And  must  I 
for  this  reason  never  use  the  expression  of  the  vis- 
ible world,  the  heaven  and  earth,  &c.?  ^^  But  then, 
will  that  be  denied  to  God,  which  is  and  must  be 
allowed  to  me?  Where  then  is  there  so  much  as 
an  appearance  of  an  objection  in  the  text  before  us? 
For  my  part,  I  can  see  none,  either  in  this,  or  any 
other  that  I  know  of,  in  the  word  of  God,  but  what 
is  fully  answered  in  what  I  have  replied  to  this; 
and  therefore  cannot  but  believe  that  it  would  be 
time  ill  spent  to  suppose  or  name  any  other.  Yet, 
thirdly,  others  I  might  very  easily  name,  such  as 
those  which  speak  of  the  apparition  of  angels,  of 
several  miracles,  particularly  that  of  coming  into  a 
room  whilst  the  doors  were  shut,  &c.  which  sup- 
pose the  visible  world  to  be  not  external ;  and  this 
would  be  turning  the  objector's  cannon   against 


io6  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

himself.  But  I  shall  spare  my  reader,  the  objector 
and  myself,  and  so  add  no  more  particulars  to  my 
answer  in  this  place. 

Objection  2. 

Is  there  no  allowance  due  or  to  be  made  to 
that  strong  and  natural  inclination  which  all  men 
have  to  believe  an  external  world? 

Answer  i. 

You  may  remember  the  mention  of  this  ob- 
jection *  before,  where  I  told  you  it  is  the  argu- 
ment by  which  Mr.  Des  Cartes  satisfied  himself 
of  the  existence  of  an  external  world.^* 

In  my  answer  to  it  I  supposed  two  things, 
either  that  by  an  external  world  was  meant  the 
being  of  a  world,  which,  as  external,  is  supposed 
to  be  invisible,  or  the  external  being  of  the  visible 
world.  To  the  last  of  these  meanings  I  have  given 
in  my  answer,  which  my  reader  either  does  or  may 
recollect  at  pleasure.  I  am  now  (according  to  my 
promise  in  that  place)  to  make  answer  to  this 
objection  in  the  first  of  the  forementioned  mean- 
ings. 

This,  in  all  right  and  reason,  should  be  the 
true  intent  and  meaning  of  this  great  philosopher. 
For  my  own  part  I  think  I  could  very  easily  shew, 
that  either  he  must  mean  this,  or  be  inconsistent 
with  himself,  which  is  to  mean  nothing  at  all ;  and 

•  Part  I.  Chap.  II.  Objection  3. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  107 

if  so,  the  objection  is  answered  before  any  part  of 
it  is  considered.  But  I  need  not  be  at  the  trouble 
of  entering  into  this  inquiry,  it  being  sufficient  in 
this  place  to  shew,  that  in  the  sense  supposed  it  has 
not  the  reality,  or  so  much  as  the  pretence,  of  being 
an  argument.  And  that  is  done  in  a  word,  by  de- 
nying the  supposition  of  it,  which  is,  that  we  have 
any  the  least  inclination  to  believe  the  existence 
of  an  external  world,  supposed  to  be  invisible. 
This  is  evident  at  first  sight,  and  yet  this  alone 
destroys  the  whole  force  of  the  objection.  "Strange! 
That  a  person  of  Mr.  Des  Cartes's  sagacity  should 
be  found  in  so  plain  and  palpable  an  oversight; 
and  that  the  late  ingenious  Mr.  Norris  should 
be  found  treading  in  the  same  track,  and  that  too 
upon  a  solemn  and  particular  disquisition  of  this 
matter.^'  That  whilst  on  one  hand  they  contend 
against  the  common  inclination  or  prejudice  of 
mankind,  that  the  visible  world  is  not  external, 
they  should  yet  appeal  to  this  same  common  in- 
clination for  the  truth  or  being  of  an  external 
world,  which  on  their  principles  must  be  said  to  be 
invisible,  and  for  which  therefore  (they  must  needs 
have  known  if  they  had  considered  it)  there  neither 
is,  nor  can  be,  any  kind  of  inclination." 

Well,  you  will  say,  but  is  there  no  allowance 
due  to  the  natural  inclination,  which  we  all  have 
to  believe  that  the  visible  world  is  external,  and 
consequently  this  way,  that  there  is  an  external 
world. 


io8  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

Answer  2. 

Yes  certainly,  provided  you  believe  the  truth, 
viz.  that  there  neither  is,  nor  can  be,  any  such  thing 
as  an  external  world,  you  may  freely  make  use 
of  the  common  language,  (which  is  a  creature  of 
God,  and  which  by  his  messengers,  and  even  in 
his  own  person,  he  has  sanctified  to  us  the  use  of, 
if  we  believe  the  truth,)  notwithstanding  that  there 
is  scarce  a  word  in  it,  but  what  supposes  the  being 
of  an  external  world,  or  that  the  visible  world  is 
external.  It  is  the  truth  which  makes  us  free,  and 
they  only  are  in  bondage  who  are  ignorant  of  the 
truth,  or  refuse  to  admit  it.  If  therefore  it  be  true, 
that  there  is  no  external  world,  common  language 
is  indeed  extremely  corrupt;  but  they  only  are  in- 
volved in  this  corruption  who  know  not  this  truth, 
or  deny  the  evidence  of  it.  And  the  same  argu- 
ments by  which  it  is  demonstrated  to  be  a  truth, 
prove  the  use  of  all  language  unclean  to  such  as 
these.  For  such  are  servants  to  the  power  of  a 
corrupt  language,  and  know  not  their  right  of  free- 
dom from  it;  and  this  makes  them  guilty  of  all  the 
errors  which  it  supposes.  Whereas  those  who 
know  and  believe  this  truth,  are  free  to  use  any 
language,  or  way  of  speaking,  wherein  this  truth 
is  not  formally  or  directly  contradicted,  without 
being  accountable  for  the  corruption  of  human 
language.  Thus  we  believe  the  circumvolution  of 
the  earth,  and  the  central  rest  of  the  sun,  according 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  109 

to  the  Copernican  system;  but  yet  so  much  is  due 
to  the  natural  inclination  which  we  all  find  in  our- 
selves to  believe  the  contrary,  as  to  excuse  and  jus- 
tify us  in  the  use  of  a  language  altogether  Ptole- 
maic. Thus  we  know  and  can  demonstrate,  that 
the  light  which  we  behold  is  not  any  property  or 
affection  of  the  sun,  supposed  to  be  in  the  heavens ; 
but  an  affection  in,  or  belonging  to  ourselves;  yet 
we  are  altogether  free  from  the  error  of  supposing 
the  contrary,  though  we  often  say  that  the  sun  is 
luminous,  or  words  to  that  effect. 

Thus  again,  when  the  sun  shines  full  in  our 
face,  though  we  know  for  certain  that  the  pain  we 
feel  is  not  in  our  eye,  but  only  in  our  souls,  yet  so 
much  is  due  to  the  natural  inclination,  whereby  we 
judge  that  all  sensations  are  in  our  bodies,  that  we 
are  free  on  a  thousand  occasions  to  suppose  the  con- 
trary in  words,  as  we  always  do  when  we  say,  that 
the  light  of  the  sun  affllicts  our  eyes,  or  makes  them 
sore,  that  our  head  or  tooth  aches,  or  other  words 
to  this  purpose.  Thus  lastly,  (to  go  but  one  step 
higher,  even  that  one  which  mounts  us  into  that 
region  of  truth  or  abstraction  which  the  present 
theory  supposes  us  to  be  in,)  though  we  know  (as 
by  this  time  I  hope  we  know)  that  an  external 
world  is  a  being  absolutely  impossible;  yet^  or 
rather  because  we  know  this,  we  are,  on  infinite 
occasions,  free  from  the  error  on  the  contrary  side, 
though  we  use  a  language  which  continually  sup- 
poses the  visible  world  to  be  external.     This  I  say 


no  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

is  the  liberty  of  believing  the  truth,  and  this  truth 
thus  believed,  does  so  fully  sanctify  even  a  corrupt 
and  erroneous  language  to  our  use,  as  to  make  it 
our  duty^  as  well  as  liberty^  (even  a  debt  we  owe 
to  the  great  Author  of  Nature  and  of  language,) 
to  express  our  minds  to  each  other  in  a  way  suitable 
to  our  present  state,  though  both  our  nature  and 
our  language  suggest  and  suppose  the  contrary 
to  this  truth.  And  now  I  hope  this  objection  is 
fully  answered.  But  I  expect  another  in  its  place, 
(which  is  near  about  the  same  as  to  force  and  con- 
sequence,) and  that  is  to  be  told. 

Objection  3. 

That  the  late  judicious  Mr.  Norris,  who  (in 
his  Ideal  World,  vol.  i.  chap,  iv.)  purposely  con- 
sidered this  question  of  an  external  world,  was  yet 
so  far  from  concluding  as  I  have  here  done,  that 
he  declares  it  to  be  no  other  than  errant  scepticism 
to  make  a  serious  doubt  or  question  of  its  existence. 

Answer. 

I  have  chosen  to  place  this  in  the  form  of  an 
objection,  that  I  may  seem  rather  to  defend  my- 
self, than  voluntarily  oppose  this  author,  for  whose 
writings  and  memory  I  have  a  great  esteem.  But 
what  shall  I  say  in  this  case?  Must  I  give  up  all 
the  arguments  by  which  I  have  shewn  that  there  is 
no  external  world,  in  complaisance  to  this  cen- 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  iii 

sure,  because  it  is  the  great  and  excellent  Mr.  Nor- 
ris's?  But  has  he  supported  this  saying  by  any 
arguments  in  favour  of  that  which  he  calls  it  scep- 
ticism to  doubt  of?  Has  he  proved  an  external 
world  to  be  of  the  number  of  those  evident  truths 
which  are  of  no  reasonable  doubt,  nor  to  be  seri- 
ously questioned  by  any  sober  understanding?  Or 
so  much  as  pretended  to  answer  any  argument  al- 
ledged  for  its  non-existence?  No,  not  a  word  of 
this  is  to  be  found  in  the  whole  chapter,  unless  the 
argument  from  inclination,  which  is  the  subject  of 
the  former  objection,  will  be  here  named  against 
me.  Well  then,  and  must  this  too  pass  for  an  ar- 
gument, notwithstanding  that  I  have  shewn  the 
weakness  of  it?  And  so,  must  all  that  I  have 
hitherto  contended  for,  submit  to  the  power  of  this 
great  authority,  on  peril  of  my  being  thought  a 
sceptic? 

But  is  not  this  the  way  to  be  betrayed  into  the 
very  dregs  of  scepticism,  to  make  a  doubt  of  one's 
own  most  evident  perceptions  for  fear  of  this  im- 
putation? Or  can  a  man  give  better  proof  that 
this  does  not  belong  to  him,  than  by  putting  (as  I 
have  all  along  done)  his  cause  or  assertion  on  the 
issue  of  a  fair  debate  on  plain  reason  and  argu- 
ment? And  can  anything  be  a  plainer  mark  of 
scepticism  than  to  refuse  to  stand,  or  be  concluded 
by  this  issue,  appealing  from  thence  to  judgment 
or  authority?  This  is  what  I  said  from  the  begin- 
ning, and  I  have  shewed  it,  I  think,  in  every  in- 


112  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS   • 

stance  of  an  objection  since,  that  my  adversary  all 
along  is  no  other  than  prejudice,  which  is  formal 
scepticism;  and  yet  nothing  has  been  so  constantly 
charged  against  myself  as  this  very  imputation. 
And  it  is  this  alone  which  has  made  it  so  consider- 
able with  me,  as  to  set  formally  about  an  answer 
to  it. 

But  to  speak  particularly  to  the  author's  cen- 
sure, with  which  we  are  at  present  concerned. 

Is  it  so  much  as  true  in  fact  that  he  has  said 
any  such  thing  as  is  affirmed  in  the  objection? 
This  perhaps  even  a  sceptic  will  contend  fairly 
with  me ;  for  facts  are  the  things  they  are  observed 
to  be  most  fond  of.  Well,  let  this  be  tried  (as  it 
ought  to  be)  by  his  own  words. 

There  are  two,  and  as  I  remember  but  two, 
passages  in  this  chapter  which  speak  at  all  to  this 
purpose.  One  is  page  i88,  the  other  205.  In  the 
first  of  these  I  immediately  find  these  words. 
"Much  less  would  I  be  suspected  of  indulging  a 
sceptical  humour,  under  colour  of  philosophical 
doubting,  to  such  an  extravagance  as  to  make  any 
serious  question  of  that  general  and  collective  ob- 
ject of  sense  a  natural  world:"  the  other  is  this; 
"But  as  to  the  existence  of  bodies,  though  it  be  a 
thing  of  no  reasonable  doubt,  nor  to  be  seriously 
questioned  by  any  sober  understanding,"  &c. 

Here  the  thing  that  is  not  to  be  doubted  of, 
(at  the  hazard  of  the  sobriety  of  our  understand- 
ing, and  upon  peril  of  scepticism,)  is  the  existence 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  113 

of  bodies,  the  existence  of  a  natural  world,  which 
is  supposed  to  be  the  object  of  sense.  Well,  and 
what  is  this  to  me?  Have  I  been  doubting  of  the 
existence  of  bodies?  Or  of  the  natural  or  sensible 
world?  Let  the  meanest  of  my  readers  be  my  wit- 
ness, that  I  have  been  so  far  from  doubting  of  any 
thing  of  this,  that  I  have  even  contended  on  all  oc- 
casions that  nothing  is,  or  can  be,  more  evident  than 
the  existence  of  bodies,  or  of  a  sensible  world. 
Have  I  repeated  the  same  thing  some  hundreds 
of  times,  and  yet  still  is  there  need  to  have  it  ob- 
served, that  an  external  world  is  the  moot  point 
between  us?  That,  not  the  existence^  but  the  extra- 
existence  of  the  sensible  world,  is  the  point  I  have 
been  arguing  against?  And  that,  not  a  natural, 
supposed  to  be  a  sensible^  world,  but  an  external 
world,  as  such,  is  impossible?  But  there  is  not  a 
word  of  an  external  world  in  the  two  sentences 
before-mentioned;  and  therefore  nothing  in  the 
least  against  the  conclusion  which  I  am  concerned 
for. '' 

True,  you  will  say,  but  this  was  only  a  mistake 
in  the  manner  of  expressing  it;  for  that  the  whole 
drift  and  argument  of  this  chapter  supposes  the 
subject  to  be  an  external  world.     I  answer. 

Right;  that  is  the  thing  I  have  been  all  this 
while  expecting,  viz.  a  little  of  his  argument  in 
the  place  of  his  authority;  and  you  see  this  we  must 
come  to  before  there  can  be  any  decision. 

But  alas!  to  what  purpose?     For  I  find  these 


114  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

words  in  the  very  title  of  his  chapter,  viz.  That 
the  existence  of  the  intelligible  is  more  certain 
than  that  of  the  natural  and  sensible  world.  This 
destroys,  and  doubly  destroys,  all  again.  For, 
first,  here  he  speaks  not  of  an  external,  but  sensi- 
ble, world;  and  of  this,  not  of  its  external  existence, 
which  is  the  point  I  have  been  arguing  against; 
but  simply  of  its  eixstence,  which  is  the  point  I 
have  been  arguing  for.     And  yet, 

Secondly,  His  end  proposed  is  not  to  aggra- 
vate, but  lessen,  its  certainty:  and  this  is  the  drift 
and  argument  of  the  whole  chapter,  at  least  of 
about  thirty  pages  of  it;  the  rest  being  employed 
in  a  digression  concerning  the  comparative  cer- 
tainty of  faith  and  reason. 

But  is  this  the  main  design  and  purpose  of 
this  chapter,  to  lessen  the  evidence  of  an  external 
world?  To  shew,  (as  he  plainly  does,  and  for 
which  I  refer  my  reader,  to  shew,  I  say)  that 
neither  reason,  nor  sense,  nor  revelation,  is  suffi- 
cient to  assure  us  of  the  existence  of  any  such 
things :  nay,  that  the  argument  used  by  Des  Cartes, 
before  mentioned,  ^^  in  which  he  places  his  last 
resort,  falls  short,  and  is  deficient,  for  which  we 
have  his  own  express  words  in  the  208th  page? 
And  can  that  same  author  say,  in  the  midst  of  all 
this,  that  the  existence  of  an  external  world  is  a 
thing  of  no  reasonable  doubt,  nor  to  be  seriously 
questioned  by  any  sober  understanding,  &c.  sure- 
ly it  could  be  no  mistake  that  he  omitted  the  word 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  115 

external,  unless  he  designed  to  question  his  own 
understanding,  and  formally  pronounce  himself  a 
sceptic. 

Well,  you  will  say,  but  it  is  a  matter  of  fact 
that  he  has  argued  against  something.  I  answer, 
he  has  so,  for  it  is  evident  to  demonstration  that  he 
has  argued  against  himself;  and  not  only  so,  but 
also  as  sceptically  as  is  possible. 

For  after  all  nothing  is  more  evident,  than  that 
his  censure  and  arguments  proceed  upon  the  very 
same  subject;  and  that  is,  not  the  external  exist- 
ence, but  the  existence  simple  of  the  natural  world. 
This  natural  world  is  sometimes  by  him  called 
bodies^  sometimes  the  visible  or  sensible  world: 
being  about  to  aggrandize  the  evidence,  or  ob- 
jective certainty,  as  to  us,  of  his  intelligible  or  ideal 
world,  he  endeavours  to  shew,  that  it  is  much  more 
certain  to  us  than  the  existence  of  the  natural,  or 
sensible^  world ;  and  that  because  we  have, 

1.  More, 

2.  Better,  reasons  to  assure  us  of  its  existence. 
These  are  his  very  words,  as  may  be  seen  in 

the  1 88th  page,  even  in  that  very  page  in  which  is 
found  the  censure  on  all  those  who  so  much  as  offer 
to  question  the  existence  of  the  natural  world. 
But  now  the  fact  is,  that  he  does  question  its  ex- 
istence both  here,  and  throughout  the  whole  course 
of  this  chapter.  What  can  be  more  evidently  in- 
consistent, more  evidently  sceptical,  than  this  man- 
ner of  proceeding?    What!     Doubt  of  the  exist- 


ii6  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

ence  of  bodies,  sensible  bodies?  Well  may  this  be 
called  indulging  a  sceptical  humour  under  the 
colour  of  philosophical  doubting.  And  is  this  so 
called  too  by  the  very  person  who  does  it?  This 
is  not  only  to  be  guilty  of  scepticism  himself,  but 
also  to  be  self-condemned. 

The  sum  of  this  whole  matter  is  this:  if,  by  the 
existence  of  the  sensible  world,  Mr.  Norris,  in  this 
censure,  is  said  to  mean  not  the  existence  simple, 
but  the  extra-existence  of  it,  his  arguments  direct- 
ly contradict  his  censure,  which  is  a  full  answer  to 
his  authority  in  this  matter.  If  on  the  other  hand 
he  be  said  to  mean  as  he  himself  speaks,  this  is, 
first  of  all,  nothing  at  all  to  me,  who  doubt  not  of 
the  existence,  but  only  of  the  extra-existence,  of  the 
sensible  world:  then,  secondly,  he  is  in  this  as  much 
contrary  to  himself,  as  on  the  other  supposition, 
in  that  he  formally  doubts  of,  and  even  argues 
against,  that  which  he  calls  it  scepticism  to  doubt 
of.  And,  thirdly,  which  is  as  bad  as  any  of  the 
rest,  he  doubts  formally  of  a  point  which  is  not 
capable  of  being  doubted  of,  viz.  the  simple  exist- 
ence of  the  visible  world.  To  all  which,  lastly,  I 
may,  and  also  must,  add  this,  that  this  second  sup- 
position is  something  more  than  an  //,  it  being  evi- 
dently the  case  in  fact,  that  his  whole  discourse  in 
this  place  is  only  of  the  existence  simple  of  the 
sensible  or  visible  world;  and  not  a  word  of  its 
extra-existence,  on  the  concession  of  its  existence 
simple,  is  so  much  as  mentioned  or  implied. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  117 

I  doubt  not  but  on  sight  of  the  title  page  many 
of  my  readers  will  judge,  and  be  ready  to  say,  sure- 
ly the  whole  world  is  full  of  arguments  against  so 
strange  an  assertion,  as  that  there  is  no  external 
world.  And  perhaps,  in  this  place,  some  may 
wonder  that  I  end  here  with  the  mention  of  so  few 
objections :  but  let  such  as  these  try  to  add  to  their 
number;  they  may  possibly  find  it  more  difficult 
than  they  imagine. 

In  the  mean  time  I  expect  to  be  understood 
by  some,  when  I  ask  their  pardon  for  the  trouble 
I  have  given  them,  in  thus  seriously  considering 
so  many  trifling  objections:  objections  which  for 
the  most  part  have  been  lame  on  both  their  legs, 
the  language  of  prejudice  only,  and  having  scarce 
so  much  as  an  appearance  to  introduce  them.  But 
indeed  I  thought  I  could  do  no  less,  considering 
the  dispositions  of  far  the  greatest  part  of  those 
whom  I  have  conversed  with;  who  will  be  so  far 
from  blaming  me  on  this  account,  that  they  will 
be  ready,  even  at  this  time,  to  take  part  with  these 
objections.  Even  such  as  these  I  would  please, 
if  possible ;  but  being  too  sure  of  the  event,  I  have 
nothing  left  to  do,  but  to  acquit  myself,  by  cutting 
off  all  occasion  of  offence  which  might  be  taken 
at  my  leaving  unmentioned,  or  unanswered,  any 
objection  which  I  have  heard,  or  found,  or  which 
may  reasonably  be  judged  I  ought  to  have  found: 
And  in  this  respect  I  profess  I  have  done  my  best, 
which,  I  think,  is  all  that  can  be  expected  of  me. 


ii8  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

The  Conclusion  of  the  Whole. 


Of  the  use  and  consequences  of  the  foregoing 
treatise. 


Having  demonstrated,  as  I  think,  my  point 
prefixed  in  the  title  page,  viz.  the  utter  impossibil- 
ity of  an  external  world;  and  supposing  also  that 
this  is  here  granted  me  by  my  reader;  he  has  a 
right  to  demand,  of  what  use  and  consequence  is 
all  this  to  men,  or  to  the  moral  world. 

Now  in  order  to  return  as  plain  and  distinct 
an  answer  as  I  can,  and  as  can  well  be  expected 
from  me  in  this  place,  to  this  question,  I  would 
chuse  to  split  it  into  two,  making  the  words  use 
and  consequence  to  stand  for  two  different  things: 
and  I  shall  begin  with  the  last,  viz.  the  conse- 
quences of  this  position,  no  external  world.  To 
the  question  concerning  which  I  have  these  two 
things  to  answer. 

First,  I  know  not  why  my  reader  should  not 
take  my  word,  (I  mean  till  he  himself  has  made 
inquiry,)  when  I  assure  him  that  the  consequences 
of  this  position  are  exceeding  many  in  number.  If 
this  will  pass,  I  again  assure  him,  that  I  have 
found  by  more  than  a  ten  years  experience,  or  ap- 
plication of  it  to  divers  purposes,  that  this  is  one 
of  the  most  fruitful  principles  that  I  have  ever  met 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  119 

with,  even  of  general  and  universal  influence  in 
the  field  of  knowledge :  so  that,  if  it  be  true,  as  is 
here  supposed,  it  will  open  the  way  to  ten  thou- 
sand other  truths,  and  also  discover  as  many  things 
to  be  errors,  which  have  hitherto  passed  for  true. 
But  this. 

Secondly,  may  in  some  measure  appear  to  my 
attentive  reader,  even  before  he  has  made  inquiry, 
and  though  he  makes  some  scruple  of  believing 
me  on  my  word :  for  he  cannot  but  have  taken  no- 
tice, that  all  language  not  only  supposes,  but  is 
almost  wholly  built  on  the  supposition  of,  an  ex- 
ternal world.  With  this  is  leavened  all  our  com- 
mon discourse,  and  almost  every  thing  that  is  found 
in  the  writings  of  philosophers:  so  that  with  half 
an  eye  it  must  needs  be  seen,  that  were  a  man  to 
call  all  his  former  thoughts  and  opinions,  all  he 
has  read  in  books,  or  heard  in  conversation,  to  an 
examination  or  review,  in  the  light  of  this  position, 
he  would  find  a  mighty  work  upon  his  hands,  in 
correcting  only  former  errors,  setting  aside  the  pos- 
itive part  of  deducing  truths  in  their  room. 

This,  I  think,  is  all  that  can  be  said  in  general, 
in  answer  to  the  question  concerning  the  conse- 
quences of  this  position:  and  I  believe  my  reasons 
will  be  judged  to  be  sufficient  for  not  entering  into 
the  particular  deduction  of  these  consequences:  as 
first,  that  this  would  be  all  over  digression  in  this 
place:  and  secondly,  such  a  digression  as  would 
swell  the  volume  to  more  than  ten  times  its  present 


120  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

size:  but  chiefly,  thirdly,  for  that  I  know  myself 
to  be  unqualified  for  so  great  a  work,  which  is  no 
less  than  the  compiling  a  new  system,  at  least  of 
general  knowledge.  Perhaps  the  little  which  I 
have  here  supplied  may  move  some  more  compre- 
hensive genius  to  begin  where  I  conclude,  and 
build  something  very  considerable  on  the  founda- 
tion which  is  here  laid.  But  I  must  be  allowed  to 
be  a  proper  judge  even  in  my  own  case,  when  I 
profess  that  I  am  far  from  being  equal  to  so  vast 
an  undertaking.  However,  secondly,  I  will  add 
a  word  or  two  concerning  the  use  of  the  foregoing 
treatise:  by  this,  as  distinct  from  the  former  head, 
I  would  be  understood  to  mean, 

1.  The  subject  matters  with  regard  to  which 
it  may  be  of  use. 

2.  Its  particular  usefulness  with  regard  to 
religion. 

3.  The  proper  manner  after  which  it  should 
be  used. 

4th  and  lastly,  the  particular  use  and  advan- 
tage which  I  myself  propose  by  it. 

First,  as  to  the  subject  matter,  it  may  possibly 
be  asked,  whether  every  thing  must  pass  for  false 
which  does  not  square  with  this  hypothesis,  sup- 
posing it  to  be  true?  Or,  whether  because  it  is 
true,  that  there  is  no  external  world,  we  must  there- 
fore use  this  language  in  discourse,  or  writing  on 
ev^ry  kind  of  subject?     To  this  I  answer. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  121 

I.  That  I  have  in  good  measure  prevented 
this  inquiry  in  my  second  answer  to  the  second  ob- 
jection, Part  II.  where  I  have  shewn  that  we  are 
at  liberty,  and  also  in  some  measure,  obliged  to 
use  the  common  language  of  the  world,  notwith- 
standing that  it  proceeds  almost  wholly  on  the  sup- 
position of  an  external  world:  for,  first,  language 
is  a  creature  of  God,  and  therefore  good,  viz.  for 
use,  notwithstanding  this  essential  vanity  which  be- 
longs to  it.  By  this  God  spake  the  world  into  be- 
ing when  he  said,  Let  there  be  light,  let  there  be 
a  firmament,  a  sun,  moon,  and  stars,  &c.  and  they 
were :  all  these  things  were  made  in  the  beginning, 
even  in  the  word,  and  wisdom,  and  will  of  God; 
and  therefore  in  him  they  are  true,  even  externally 
true,  according  to  the  language  by  which  they  were 
willed  into  being,  though  in  themselves  they  carry 
an  impossibility  of  so  existing.  But  this  does  not 
justify  the  goodness  of  this  language  with  regard 
to  us;  or  rather,  justify  us  sinners  in  the  use  of 
this  language,  without  reflecting,  secondly,  that  we 
are  redeemed  or  recreated  by  the  same  Word  of 
God,  who  has  taken  on  himself  the  iniquity  of  all 
things;  who,  as  one  of  us,  has  used  this  common 
language,  and  even  bore  it  with  him  on  his  cross; 
who,  by  his  Spirit  in  his  apostles,  has  spoken  all 
the  languages  of  the  world,  making  thereby  ev- 
ery tongue  his  own,  and  who,  lastly,  in  a  word, 
has  pronounced  every  thing  to  be  clean  to  those 
who  believe.     I  answer  therefore, 


122  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

2.  That  there  are  certain  subjects  which  re- 
quire the  use  of  this  common  language;  and  on 
which,  to  speak  in  the  language  of  this  hypothesis, 
would  be  both  ridiculous  and  unjust;  unjust  to 
the  will,  and  to  the  word,  of  God,  who  has  made 
and  sanctified  common  language  to  our  use,  and 
consequently  to  the  obligation  of  our  christian  lib- 
erty; and  ridiculous,  in  that  on  several  subjects  of 
discourse  the  use  of  any  other  than  the  common 
ways  of  expression  would  be  altogether  vain,  non- 
sensical and  absurd.  I  might  easily  give  a  thou- 
sand instances  of  the  truth  of  this ;  but  it  were  pity 
to  prevent  the  many  witlings  of  the  present  age, 
who  by  this  would  lose  their  whole  field  of  knowl- 
edge, with  relation  to  this  subject,  and  would  have 
nothing  left  whereby  to  ridicule  what  they  are  in- 
capable of  understanding.  I  leave  it  therefore,  to 
pamphleteers,  doggrel  rhimers,  and  comedians,  to 
expose  the  language  of  this  treatise,  by  applying 
it  to  improper  subjects:  for  since  the  only  end  of 
this  kind  of  wit  is  not  so  much  as  pretended  to  be 
truth,  but  only  laughter  and  diversion,  I  am  content 
to  be  the  subject,  and  also  to  laugh  for  company,  as 
having  no  pretence  to  the  moving  of  one  smile  by 
any  thing  I  have  here  said.  Allowing  therefore 
all  due  advantage  to  little  wits  of  all  sorts  and  sizes, 
I  answer, 

3.  Thirdly,  that  whenever  we  are,  or  pretend 
to  be,  serious,  I  would  recommend  the  language  of 
this  discourse  to  be  used  only  on  subjects  the  most 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  123 

general,  simple,  or  universal,  I  do  not  say,  in  phil- 
osophy only  in  general,  or  in  this  or  that  particular 
branch  of  it;  for  I  profess  to  understand  but  very 
little  of  either,  as  words  and  ideas  have  been  usu- 
ally linked  together.  I  say  therefore  only,  as  before, 
the  most  simple,  general  or  universal  subjects ;  sub- 
jects wherein  the  question  is  strictly  about  truth, 
particularly  such  wherein  the  question  supposed 
receives  any  alteration  from  the  supposition  or 
denial  of  an  external  world. 

Well,  you  will  say,  but  then  it  seems  it  has  but 
little  to  do  with  religion,  which  is  a  subject  best 
understood  or  treated  of  in  the  common  ways  of 
speaking:  by  this  I  am  led  in  the 

Second  place,  to  consider  the  particular  use- 
fulness of  this  position  or  hypothesis  with  regard 
to  religion.     Accordingly  I  make  answer; 

First,  It  has  been  often  my  fortune,  and  may 
be  again,  to  have  this  question  put  to  me  by  such 
as  have  not  been  able  to  comprehend  the  reasons  by 
which  I  justify  my  point  of  no  external  world; 
which,  by  a  very  natural  progress,  has  given  them 
a  mighty  zeal  against  the  conclusion.  In  this  case, 
their  only  refuge  to  avoid  an  utter  silence,  has  been 
to  urge  this  question  about  its  usefulness  as  to  re- 
ligion. The  pretence  of  this  is,  that  religion  is 
their  only  care,  or  the  end  of  ail  their  inquiries; 
so  that  if  it  does  not  immediately  appear  that  this 
hypothesis  tends  to  the  promotion  of  religion,  they 


124  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

are  fairly  excused  from  believing,  or  so  much  as 
attending  to  it. 

But  now  to  such  as  these,  surely  nothing  can 
be  easier  than  to  return  a  sufficient  answer.  But  I 
think  the  best,  in  this  case,  is  to  make  none  at  all. 
For  first,  it  is  evident  that  the  end  or  drift  of  this 
question  is  not  to  urge  any  thing  against  the  truth 
of  my  conclusion,  but  only  to  excuse  its  authors 
from  so  much  as  inquiring  into  it.  But  this  cer- 
tainly is  a  point  I  can  never  be  supposed  to  contend 
against,  whilst  I  am  suffered  to  live  out  of  bedlam. 
And  therefore  since  this  is  all  that  is  demanded  by 
this  question,  it  must  needs  be  very  impertinent  to 
go  about  to  answer  it  any  otherwise  than  by  saying, 
Sir,  you  have  free  leave  to  think  of  what  subjects 
you  please ;  especially  having  chosen  the  better  part 
already,  viz.  religion,  and  nothing  else,  to  employ 
your  meditations  on,  &c.  But,  secondly,  it  happens 
well  enough  for  the  ends  of  my  discourse  at  present, 
that  my  reader  is  here  supposed  to  have  inquired 
already  into  the  truth  of  my  conclusion,  and  also 
to  have  discovered  it  to  be  true. 

And  this  gives  the  question  concerning  its  use- 
fulness as  to  religion,  a  very  different  turn  and 
sense  from  what  it  had  before.  For  now  though 
it  may  be  the  effect  of  curiosity  only,  yet  it  very 
probably  may  be  the  effect  of  a  serious  desire  of 
farther  knowledge,  and  of  a  true  regard  for  re- 
ligion, and  therefore  ought  to  be  so  reputed. 
Whereas  the  same,  as  before  proceeding,  is  even 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  125 

designed  as  a  bar  to  knowledge,  and  is  plainly  no 
other  than  a  religious  disguise.  But  whatever  be 
the  true  cause  or  principle  of  this  last,  I  must  needs 
acknowledge  its  right  to  an  answer.  Accordingly 
I  affirm, 

Secondly,  that  I  consider  the  present  treatise, 
as  a  matter  of  no  little  use,  or  good  consequence, 
with  regard  to  religion;  that  I  have  found  the 
truth  of  this  by  a  long  or  very  considerable  experi- 
ence; and  in  a  word,  that  (be  it  taken  how  it  will 
by  certain  vain  pretenders)  I  will  be  bold  to  pre- 
tend, even  in  my  own  behalf,  such  a  real,  and  even 
exclusive,  regard  for  religion,  that  I  would  never 
have  troubled  an  unwilling  world  with  this  dis- 
course, (notwithstanding  the  infinite  use  which  I 
conceive  it  to  be  of  with  respect  to  simple  or  uni- 
versal truth,)  had  it  not  been  for  its  particular 
usefulness  with  respect  to  religion;  and  conse- 
quently for  the  benefit  of  those  few  who  I  expect 
will  find  the  truth  of  what  I  here  affirm. 

I  am  sensible  this  will  pass  for  very  slender 
authority  with  some,  and  perhaps  too  for  an  objec- 
tion with  others;  unless  for  their  satisfaction  I 
produce  the  points  concerning  which  I  affirm  this 
discourse  to  be  of  use.  But  I  have  proved  my 
point  already,  viz.  all  that  is  in  my  title  page,  and 
I  shall  prove  no  more,  till  I  am  aware  of  the  suc- 
cess of  this,  or  hear  from  my  reader  himself,  what 
farther  demands  he  may  have  upon  me.  Never- 
theless, that  I  may  avoid  the  imputation  of  having 


126  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

passed  over  but  the  name  of  an  objection,  without 
an  answer,  I  will  go  out  of  the  track  of  my  in- 
tended method  so  far,  as  to  charge  myself  with  the 
debt  of  one  instance  of  this  sort;  and  that  is,  the 
point  of  the  real  presence  of  Christ's  body  in  the 
eucharist,  on  which  the  papists  have  grafted  the 
doctrine  of  transubstantiation. 

Now  nothing,  I  think,  can  be  more  evident, 
than  that  both  the  sound  and  explication  of  this 
important  doctrine  are  founded  altogether  on  the 
supposition  of  external  matter;  so  that  if  this  be 
removed,  there  is  not  any  thing  left,  whereon  to 
build  so  much  as  the  appearance  of  a  question. 

For  if  after  this  it  be  inquired  whether  the 
substance  of  the  bread  in  this  sacrament  be  not 
changed  into  the  substance  of  the  body  of  Christ, 
the  accidents  or  sensible  appearances  remaining  as 
before ;  or  suppose  this  should  be  affirmed  to  be  the 
fact,  or  at  least  possible,  it  may  indeed  be  shewn 
to  be  untrue  or  impossible,  on  the  supposition  of  an 
external  world,  from  certain  consequential  absurdi- 
ties which  attend  it;  but  to  remove  an  external 
world,  is  to  prick  it  in  its  punctum  saliens,  or 
quench  its  very  vital  flame.  For  if  there  is  no 
external  matter,  the  very  distinction  is  lost  between 
the  substance  and  accidents,  or  sensible  species  of 
bodies,  and  these  last  will  become  the  sole  essence 
of  material  objects.  So  that  if  these  are  supposed 
to  remain  as  before,  there  is  no  possible  room  for 
the  supposal  of  any  change,  in  that  the  thing  sup- 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  127 

posed  to  be  changed  is  here  shewn  to  be  nothing 
at  all. 

I  have  chosen  to  instance  in  this,  rather  than 
any  other  point  of  divinity  or  religion,  because  this 
of  transubstantiation  is  one  of  the  most  important 
doctrines  of  the  Roman  church;  which  church  at 
the  same  time  happens  to  hold  the  insufficiency  of 
the  scriptures.  Now  as  these  two  opinions  happen 
to  concur  in  the  same  persons,  it  may  possibly  prove 
an  umbrage  to  certain  weak  and  tender  spirits,  as 
if  my  affirming  only  without  proof,  that  the  pres- 
ent treatise,  is  of  such  mighty  use,  with  regard  to 
religion,  were  an  intrenchment  on  the  sufficiency 
of  the  gospel  revelation,  and  consequently  an  ap- 
proach towards  the  error  of  popery.  This  is  the 
objection  hinted  at  before,  viz.  the  great  and 
mighty  objection,  for  the  sake  of  which  I  have 
departed  from  my  method,  and  broken  my  resolu- 
tion. But  it  is  high  time  however  now  to  return 
and  proceed. 

The  third  thing  which  I  proposed  to  speak 
to,  is  the  proper  manner  after  which  I  would  de- 
sire this  treatise  to  be  made  use  of.     And  here 

Let  the  first  thing  be,  to  read  it  thoroughly 
and  attentively.  It  is  not  so  long  but  it  may  be 
read  more  than  once  without  any  very  consider- 
able expence  of  time.  However,  let  it  so  be  read 
as  to  be  perfectly  understood  to  be  either  true  or 
false.  If  false,  I  would  desire  my  reader  to  give 
me  notice  of  the  discovery,  that  I  may  discharge 


ia8  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

myself  of  the  guilt  of  having  published  a  falshood 
in  so  confident  a  manner;  and  also  such  a  falshood 
as  bids  open  defiance  to  so  considerable  part  of 
whatsoever  men  have  hitherto  pretended  to  know. 
This  I  think  is  a  fair  request.  But  my  reader  is 
here  supposed  to  understand  it  in  another  light,  or 
to  look  upon  it  to  be  true. 

If  so,  I  must  nevertheless  desire  him  to  employ 
all  his  skill  or  attention  for  some  time  to  make  it  as 
familiar  as  possible  to  his  understanding.  If  he 
fails  in  this  he  will  find  his  assent  slide  from  him 
he  knows  not  how;  and  he  will  come*  in  a  little 
time  to  an  effectual  disbelief  of  it,  whilst  he  con- 
tinues to  believe  it.  This  is  the  manner  of  men, 
with  respect  to  truths,  either  very  simple,  or  pecu- 
liarly religious;  there  lying  an  equal  prejudice  or 
opposition  of  sense  against  both  these  kinds  of 
truths.  This,  by  the  way,  is  some  sort  of  argument 
that  there  is  a  nearer  affinity  between  these  two 
kinds  of  truth  than  is  commonly  imagined;  but  I 
am  content  in  this  place  to  suppose  them  very  dif- 
ferent. And  be  they  as  different  as  they  will,  yet 
sure  I  am,  that  the  subject  of  this  treatise  is  of  the 
number  of  those  which  make  the  least  impression, 
even  after  they  are  assented  to;  or  against  which 
the  strongest  prejudices  are  found  to  lie.  For  noth- 
ing can  be  more  evident  to  the  first  or  natural 
apprehensions  of  men,  than  that  even  the  sensible 
or  visible  world  is  external.  And  I  believe  I  shall 
find  enough  of  this  from  my  experience  with  other 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  129 

persons,  to  make  it  needless  to  attest  the  truth  of  it 
upon  my  own.  If  so,  and  if  it  be  true  notwith- 
standing that  there  is  no  external  world,  I  must 
again  desire  my  reader  to  use  his  utmost  diligence 
and  attention  to  render  this  truth  as  sensible  to  him- 
self as  possible;  which  he  will  find  to  be  done  only 
by  a  very  frequent  meditation  on,  or  exercise  of 
himself  in  it.  And  here,  (if  I  may  for  decency 
sake  be  allowed  to  press  this  matter  any  farther,) 
I  would  advise  him. 

First,  to  exercise  himself  for  a  little  time  in 
writing  on,  or  rather  against,  it.  Let  him  try  to 
add  to  the  objections  which  I  have  already  con- 
sidered, or  respond  afresh  to  the  answers  which  I 
have  given  to  them;  and  perhaps  his  surprise  to 
find  the  little  effect  of  this  experiment,  may  add 
some  grains  to  the  firmness  of  his  assent. 

After  this  it  would  confirm  him  not  a  little  to 
make  the  same  experiment  in  discourse  with  others, 
whether  learned  or  unlearned  matters  not  much, 
if  I  have  rightly  observed;  unless  it  be  that  the 
learned  in  this  case,  usually  make  the  least  pertin- 
ent objections.  This  method  will  in  some  measure 
engage  even  self  love  on  the  side  of  truth,  which 
will  mightily  help  to  overbear  the  force  of  common 
prejudice  against  it. 

But  lastly,  if  after  all  this  endeavour  he  yet 
find  it  difficult  (as  I  believe  he  certainly  will)  to 
keep  the  edge  of  his  attention  fixed,  so  as  not  to 
think  it  still  more  evident  that  the  visible  world  is, 


I30  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

than  that  it  is  not  external,  let  him  practise  with 
himself  an  easy,  but  a  very  useful,  art,  which  is  to 
use  himself  to  meditate  on  this  subject  with  either 
his  eye  or  imagination  fixed  on  a  looking-glass. 
This,  he  may  remember,  was  one  of  the  instances 
given  (Part  I.  Chap.  I.  Sect.  I.)  to  shew,  that  the 
seeming  externeity  of  a  visible  object  is  no  argu- 
ment of  its  real  externeity:  and  it  has  since  ap- 
peared that  all  visible  objects  are  equally  external ; 
or  that  that  which  is  usually  called  the  visible 
world,  is  indeed  no  more  external  than  what  is 
usually  called  the  reflection  or  image  of  it  in  a 
looking  glass.  Nevertheless  it  is  much  easier  to 
apprehend  or  believe  this,  with  respect  to  objects 
seen  in  a  glass,  than  to  such  as  are  seen  out  of  a 
glass ;  and  it  is  only  my  reader's  ease  that  I  am  at 
this  time  consulting. 

Now  by  these  and  such  like  means,  I  suppose, 
even  my  Aristotelian  reader  (who  by  his  studies 
has  been  long  unqualified  to  receive  or  apprehend 
pure  unbodied  truths)  will  become  master  of  this 
subject,  as  simple  as  it  is,  or  understand  it  with  the 
same,  or  some  degree  of  the  same,  ease  or  feeling, 
wherewith  he  usually  understands  ideas  that  are 
more  complex.  And  if  so,  he  is  prepared  for  all 
the  ends  and  uses  of  it.     The  chief  of  which  is  this, 

Secondly,  to  carry  it  about  with  him,  and  use 
it  as  one  would  do  a  key,  or  mirror,  or  almost  any 
other  kind  of  mechanical  or  useful  instrument.  To 
carry,  I  say,  not  the  body  of  the  present  treatise,  or 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  131 

SO  much  as  one  argument  of  it,  in  his  memory,  but 
only  the  conclusion,  viz.  no  external  world,  which 
is  just  what  is  in  the  inscription  or  title  page. 

With  this,  as  with  a  key,  he  will  find  an  easy 
solution  of  almost  all  the  general  questions  which 
he  has  been  used  to  account  very  difficult,  or  per- 
haps indissoluble. 

And  as  a  mirror,  held,  as  it  were,  in  his  hand 
before  the  writings  of  others,  it  will  discover  to 
him  many  errors,  where  before  he  little  expected 
to  find  them;  besides  that  it  will  open  to  him  a 
new  scene  of  truths,  which  have  not  hitherto  been 
so  much  as  inquired  after. 

In  a  word,  let  him  read  and  think  with  this 
one  proposition  always  present  in  his  mind,  and  I 
am  persuaded  he  will  need  no  assistance  of  mine 
to  make  it  appear  to  him,  that  it  is  of  the  greatest 
use  and  consequence  in  the  inquiry  after  truth. 

And  now  I  have  nothing  to  add,  but  a  word 
or  two  concerning  the  particular  use  or  advantage, 
which  I  myself  propose  from  having  written  this 
discourse.     And  that  is, 

First,  the  probability  by  this  means,  of  having 
the  truth  of  it  thoroughly  examined:  which  is  rare- 
ly done  to  any  purpose  in  discourse,  and  indeed 
in  any  private  way;  besides  that,  I  would  consult 
the  common  benefit  as  well  as  my  own. 

Secondly,  and  lastly,  that  by  this  means  I  have 
freed  myself  from  many  difficulties;  in  case  I 
should  live  to  appear  in  public  on  any  subject. 


I3a  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

which  is  either  a  consequence  of  this,  or  any  way 
depends  on,  or  interferes  with  it."*  I  speak  this 
from  an  experience  very  often  repeated.  And  this, 
at  last,  has  reduced  me  to  this  necessity,  either 
never  to  attempt  to  write  on  any  but  the  most  ordin- 
ary and  popular  subjects,  (which  is  a  work  I  have 
too  good  reason  to  leave  to  others,)  or  resolve  in 
the  first  place  to  set  heartily  about  this,  and  estab- 
lish it  once  for  all;  as  I  hope  I  have  here  done. 

If  so,  I  have  no  more  to  do  for  the  time  to 
come,  but  only  to  refer  to  what  I  have  here  written 
and  published:  which  is  a  liberty  I  may  possibly 
reap  the  advantage  of  in  discourse  on  some  other 
subject:  but  which  I  shall  be  sure  to  use,  and  make 
the  most  of,  in  case  this  should  be  replied  to  by  any 
partial,  unfair,  or  scoffing  adversary. 

THE  END. 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  133 

NOTES=^ 

»  (p.  6)  Compare  "Principles  of  Human  Knowledge"  Sec.  3- 
"To  me  it  is  .  .  .  evident  that  the  various  sensations,  or  ideas  im- 
printed on  the  sense,  however  blended  or  combined  together  (that  is, 
whatever  objects  they  compose),  cannot  exist  otherwise  than  in  a  mind 
perceiving  them." 

^  (P-  9)  Collier  conceives  of  God  as  will,  or  power,  which  has 
brought  into  existence  all  created  things.  He  accepts  this  doctrine  on 
Scriptural  authority  without  proof,  for,  he  says,  "We  are  told,  that 
God  made  heaven  and  earth,  or  the  whole  material  world  —  and  for 
as  much  as  it  is  the  word  of  God,  it  may  well  pass,  with  us  christians, 
for  an  unquestionable  axiom."  (Specimen  of  True  Philosophy,  p.  115 
of  the  Parr  edition).  Des  Cartes  and  Berkeley  regard  knowledge  of 
God  as  the  "certitude  and  truth  of  all  science"  ("Meditations"  V.,  p.  83 
of  the  Open  Court  edition),  but  they  present  proof  for  His  existence 
and  the  knowledge  of  it. 

3  (p.  lo)  This  objection  was  indeed  later  brought  forward  by 
one  of  Collier's  correspondents,  Mr.  Shepherd.  (Benson's  "Memoirs" 
pp.   48-49). 

4  (p.  II )  Malebranche  opposes  this  conception  in  the  "Recherche 
de  la  Verite,"  Livre  "i^^,  znde  Partie,  Chap.  HI. 

5  (p.  12)  Thus  the  natural  world  of  every  person  exists  in  his 
mind  alone,  and  between  the  natural  worlds  of  individual  minds  exists 
the  relation  of  similitude,  not  of  numerical  identity.  See  Pt.  H,  Chap. 
X,  Obj.  I.  Answer. 

6  (p.  13)  Cf.  Collier's  letter  to  Dr.  Clarke  (Benson's  "Memoirs," 
p.  36),  Berkeley  uses  practically  this  same  division  of  the  subject,  since 
in  the  "New  Theory  of  Vision"  he  grants,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
the  external  existence  of  tangible  objects,  while  in  the  "Principles"  he 
denies  the  external  existence  of  all  matter. 

7  (p.  16)  Cf.  Collier's  letter  to  Dr.  Low  (Benson's  "Memoirs,"  p. 
21-22). 

8  (p.  17)  Cf.  Malebranche,  "Recherche  de  la  Verit6,"  £claircisse- 
ment  to  Livre  L,  Chap.  X. 

9  (p.  17)  Cf.  Collier's  first  letter  to  Solomon  Low,  (Benson's 
"Memoirs,"  pp.  25-28). 

»o  (p.   20)    Cf.   Berkeley's   "Principles,"   Sees.    18,  33,  41 ;   Third 


*  Notes   15,  19    (in  part),  21,  27,  28,  39,  59  and  62  have  been 
added  by  Miss  Calkins;  Notes  29,  46  and  50  by  Dr.  Rand. 


134  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

"Dialogue  between  Hylas  and  Philonous,"  Open  Court  edition,  pp.  97 
ff. ;  Des  Cartes,  "Meditations"  VI.,  Open  Court  edition,  p.  88. 

"  (p.  22)  The  "several  parts"  of  the  "much  celebrated  writings" 
are  as  follows: 

Des  Cartes  "Meditations"  II,  III,  VI ;  "Principles  of  Philosophy," 
Part  I,  Props.  IV,  LXVI,  LXVII,  LXVIII,  LXX,  Part  II,  Props.  I,  IV. 

Malebranche's  "Recherche  de  la  Verite,"  Livre  I,  Chap.   10. 

"An  Essay  Towards  the  Theory  of  the  Ideal  or  Intelligible 
World,"  by  John  Norris,  Rector  of  Bemerton,  near  Sarum.  2  vols. 
London,  1701  and  1704.     Vol.  II,  pp.  238  seq. 

12  (p.  22)  Cf.  Des  Cartes  "Meditations,"  VI,  Open  Court  edition, 
p.  loi,  and  "Principles,"  Part  IV,  Prop.  CXCVI. 

'3  (p.  23)   I  have  not  been  able  to  trace  this  quotation. 

14  (p.  23)   Cf.  Des  Cartes,  "Principles,"  Part  II,  Props.  I-IV. 

'S  (p.  23)  On  the  relation  of  accidents  to  substance,  cf.  Aristotle, 
Analytica  Post  I.  c.  IV;  and  Thomas  Aquinas,  "Summa  Theologica," 
I.  II.,  Qu.  7,  Art.  I,  Concl.  ad  2:  aliquid  dicitur  accidens  —  quia  inest 
ei,  sicut  album  dicitur  accidens  Socratis. 

16  (p.  24)  Des  Cartes  uses  this  same  instance  of  the  uncertainty 
of  the  evidences  of  the  senses  in  "Meditations,"  I,  and  in  "Principles," 
Part  I,  Prop.  IV. 

17  (p.  25)  Cf.  Low's  objection  and  Collier's  answer,  Benson's 
Memoirs,"  p.  24. 

'8  (p.  28)  With  the  teaching  of  these  paragraphs,  cf.  Collier's 
first   letter  to   Solomon  Low,   Benson's   "Memoirs,"   pp.   21-24. 

19  (p.  32)  The  first  formal  statement  of  the  principle  of  contra- 
diction is  that  of  Aristotle.  Cf.  Metaphysics  III  (r)  3,  1005  b; 
rh  -yhp  a,iiTb  S,fw,  inrdpxeiv  re  Kal  /xi)  inrdpxfiv  dd^varov  rwt  airrQi  Kal  Kard 
r6  ainb.  (Cf.  also,  IX  (I.)  1057a,  34;  X,  (K)  1062,3,  22),  Cf.  Nor- 
ris's  use  of  this  principle  {op.  cit.,  I,  chap.  IV,  p.  195)  where  he  quotes 
from  Suarez,  in  his  proof  that  sense  can  not  assure  us  of  the  existence 
of  an  external  world. 

20  (p.  36)  Cf.  Berkeley,  "Principles,"  3-7,  22-25;  "Dialogues," 
I,  Open  Court  ed.,  pp.  11-12:  "sensible  things  are  those  only  which  are 
immedately   perceived   by   sense." 

^'  (P-  37)  Collier,  who  plainly  reads  Aristotle  second-hand,  here 
credits  him  with  the  theory  of  sensible  emanations  which  he  never 
held.  (Cf.  Psychology,  II,  7,  418  b:  rb  cfxhs  .  .  .  oiS^  diroppor/ffdi/MTOi 
oWev^s)  "light  is  not  —  emanation  of  any  body").  This  doctrine,  that 
perception  is  mediated  by  small  particles  given  off  from  the  surface 
of  a  body,  dates  back  to  Empedokles  and  Demokritos.  Cf.  J.  I.  Beare, 
Greek  Theories  of  Elementary  Cognition  (Oxford,  1906). 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  135 

Collier's  contrast  between  the  active  and  the  passive  intellect  is  equally 
un-Aristotelian. 

^^  (P-  39)  Cf.  Malebranche,  "Recherche  de  la  Vcrite"  Livre  3n>e 
2nde  Partie,  Chap.  VI,  "Que  nous  voyons  toutes  choses  en  Dieu,"  and 
Norris,  "Theory  of  the  Ideal  World" :  Vol.  II,  p.  441. 

23  (p.  40)  See  Part  II,  chap.  IV,  Arg.  IV  and  chap.  IX,  Arg. 
IX  for  further  discussion  of  this  point. 

24  (p.  40)  Franciscus  Suarez,  (1548-1617),  a  Jesuit  theologian 
and  philosopher  of  Granada,  who  made  many  original  contributions  to 
scholastic  philosophy.  He  was  a  follower  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  and 
the  author  of  "Disputatio  Metaphysicae,"  (Paris  1619).  It  was  prob- 
ably this  book  with  which  Collier  was  familiar,  for  Norris  refers  to  it: 
"Theory  of  the  Ideal  or  Intelligible  World,"  Vol.  I,  chap.  IV,  pp.  195, 
205,  etc.  The  British  Museum  Catalogue  gives  the  book  as  published 
at  Moguntiae  in  1605. 

25  (p.  40)  Christopher  Scheibler  is  the  author  of  "Opus  Meta- 
physicum",  Greszen,  1617.  The  British  Museum  Catalogue  gives  the 
full  title  as  "Opus  Metaphysicum,  duobus  libris  universum  hujus 
scientiae   systema  comprehendens."     Marpurgi,   1637. 

26  (p.  40)  The  Scottish  philosopher,  Robert  Baron,  who  was  pro- 
fessor of  Divinity  in  Marischal  College,  Aberdeen.  His  "Metaphysica 
generalis"  was  published  in  London  at  some  time  between  1657  and  1661. 
The   British    Museum   contains  three  copies  of  this  book. 

27  (p.  41)  Actus  (iv^pyeia)  entitativus,  "essential  reality"  (con- 
trasted with  potentia  {56vafus)  pura,  "pure  potentiality."  The  distinc- 
tion is  first  made  by  Aristotle  and  is  perpetuated  by  the  Schoolmen. 
Cf.  Aristotle,  Metaphysics,  Book  VIII.  (O);  Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa 
Theolog'tca,  I.I.,  Qu.  41,  Art.  4,  Concl.  ad  2.  To  Aristotle,  verbally 
followed  by  the  Schoolmen,  matter  is  mere  potentiality. 

28  (p.  42)  This  appears  to  refer  to  the  doctrine  of  St.  Thomas: 
Angels,  though  created,  are  immaterial  beings  and  therefore,  like  God, 
they  know  corporeal  things  without  being  affected  by  them  (though 
God  alone  knows  through  his  own  essence).  Compare  Summa  TheoL, 
I,  14,  v.,  Concl. ;  also  I.,  57,  I.  concl.  Sicut  Deus  per  suam  essentiam 
materialia  cognoscit,  ita  angeli  ea  cognoscunt  per  hos  quod  sunt  in  eis 
per  suas  intelligibiles  species.  Human  beings,  on  the  other  hand,  in 
whom  mind  is  united  with  body,  know  material  things  in  part  through 
the  action  of  the  external  objects  on  the  senses.  Compare  Summa 
TheoL,  I.  I.,  Qu.  84,  Art.  4,  Concl. 

29  (p.  42)  The  reference  probably  is  to  Plato's  doctrine  that  sensi- 
ble reality  is  object  of  opinion,  or  belief,  not  of  knowledge.  Cf.  Repub- 
lic, V,  477  seq.,  VI,  509  seq.\  and  Timaios,  29. 


136  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

30  (p.  45)   Cf.  Berkelej's  "Principles,"  Section  54. 

31  (p.  46)  It  seems  incredible  that  Collier  should  not  cite  Berke- 
ley at  this  point,  were  he  familiar  with  the  "Essay"  or  with  the 
"Principles." 

3^  (p.  47)  Part  I,  chap.  I,  Section  II,  IV,  V,  and  VI. 

33  (p.  49)  This  objection  was  brought  forward  later  by  Solomon 
Low.     Cf.  Collier's  answer,  Benson's  "Memoirs,"  pp.  28-30. 

34  (p.  50)  "He  must  have  a  very  Metaphysical  Sense  that  shall 
feel  Existence,  but  not  a  very  Metaphysical  Understanding  that  shall 
think  he  does.  For  to  feel  that  a  thing  Exists,  is  the  same  as  to  feel  a 
Proposition." 

^5  (p.  51)  This  distinction  between  the  objects  of  sense  and  of 
touch  is  emphasized  by  Berkeley,  whose  "Theory  of  Vision"  is  written 
in  part  to  "consider  the  difference  there  is  betwixt  the  ideas  of  Sight 
and  Touch."     "Essay  towards  a  New  Theory  of  Vision,"  Section  I. 

36  (p.  52)  "It  cannot  be  doubted  that  every  perception  we  have 
comes  to  us  from  some  object  different  from  our  mind ;  for  it  is  not 
in  our  power  to  cause  ourselves  to  experience  one  perception  rather 
than  another —  ...  It  may,  indeed,  be  matter  of  inquiry  whether  that 
object  be  God,  or  something  different  from  God;  but  because  we 
perceive,  or  rather,  stimulated  by  sense,  clearly  and  distinctly  appre- 
hend, certain  matter  extended  in  length,  breadth,  and  thickness.  .  .  . 
God  would,  without  question,  deserve  to  be  regarded  as  a  deceiver,  if  he 
directly  and  of  himself  presented  to  our  mind  the  idea  of  this  extended 
matter,  or  merely  caused  it  to  be  presented  to  us  by  some  object  which 
possessed  neither  extension,  figure,  nor  motion.  For  we  clearly  con- 
ceive this  matter  as  entirely  distinct  from  God,  and  from  ourselves, 
or  our  mind ;  and  appear  even  clearly  to  discern  that  the  idea  of  it  is 
formed  in  us  on  occasion  of  objects  existing  out  of  our  minds,  to  which 
it  is  in  every  respect  similar.  But  since  God  cannot  deceive  us,  for 
this  is  repugnant  to  his  nature,  .  .  .  we  must  unhesitatingly  conclude 
that  there  exists  a  certain  object  extended  in  length,  breadth,  and  thick- 
ness, and  possessing  all  those  properties  which  we  clearly  apprehended  to 
belong  to  what  is  extended.  And  this  extended  substance  is  what  we 
call  body  or  matter."  "Principles",  Part  II,  Prop.  I.  Cf.  also  "Prin- 
ciples", Part.  I,  Props.  XXIX,  XXX,  XLII,  and  "Meditations"  IV  and 
VI.     (Open   Court  ed.  p.   104). 

37  (p.  52)  In  Part  II,  chapter  X,  Collier  refers  to  this  transla- 
tion of  Malebranche  as  "Search's  Illustr.  Taylor's  Translation."  This 
reference  must  be  to  the  translation  of  "La  Recherche  de  la  Verite" 
published  in  1694  by  Thomas  Taylor,  M.  A.  of  Magdalen  College, 
Oxford.     A  copy  is  in  the  British  Museum.     The  full  title  is;  "Father 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  137 

Malebranche's  treatise  concerning  the  Search  after  Truth.  Trans- 
lated by  T.  Taylor."  1694.  This  reference  to  the  "Recherche"  seems 
to  be  to  the  £claircissement  of  Livre  i,  chap.  10:  "II  est  done  absolu- 
ment  necessaire,  pour  s'assurer  positivement  de  I'existence  des  corps 
de  dehors,  de  connoitre  Dieu  qui  nous  en  donne  le  sentiment  et  de 
scavoir  qu'etant  infiniment  parfait  il  ne  peut  nous  tromper." 

38  (p.  52)  "  'Tis  true  indeed  upon  the  appearances  of  Bodies,  and 
those  regular  and  uniform  Sensations  which  accompany  those  Appear- 
ances, I  find  myself  Naturally  deterrnin'd  to  think  that  they  Exist.  But 
before  I  can  rationally  conclude  that  they  do  so,  or  by  a  rtilex  act  of 
my  mind  approve  of  that  Natural  Judgment,  some  other  Considerations 
must  intervene,  since  neither  my  Sensation,  nor  my  Judgment  upon 
that  Sensation  is  of  itself  any  direct  Argument  for  it.     And  therefore 

I  cannot  but  think  M.  Descartes  was  much  in  the  right,  .  .  .  when  he 
suspended  the  Certainty,  at  least  of  Sensible  things,  upon  the  Existence 
of  God.  .  .  .  And  indeed  those  Considerations  which  are  taken  from 
the  Truth  and  Goodness  of  the  excellent  and  most  perfect  Author  of 
our  Natures,  who  there  is  no  reason  to  suspect,  would  give  us  Senses 
to  abuse  and  deceive  us  in  the  due  and  Natural  use  of  them,  are 
Sufficient  to  satisfie  all  sober  and  reasonable  Understandings  of  the 
real   Existence  of  Bodies." 

^'  (P-  54)  See  Hume's  criticism  of  this  argument,  "Inquiry," 
Sec.  XII,  Part  I.  (Open  Court  ed.  p.  163):  "To  have  recourse  to  the 
veracity  of  the  Supreme  Being,  in  order  to  prove  the  veracity  of  our 
senses,  is  surely  making  a  very  unexpected  circuit.  If  his  veracity  were 
at  all  concerned  in  this  matter,  our  senses  would  be  entirely  infallible." 

40  (p.  54)  Cf.  Des  Cartes,  "Principles,"  Part  I.  Prop.  LIII,  LIV, 
LXIII,  LXVI,  LXVIII,  LXIX,  and  Part  II,  Prop.  I  and  "Meditations" 

II  and  VI. 

**'  (P-  55 )  Collier  does  not  discuss  in  any  detail  the  point  which 
Berkeley  emphasizes,  i.  e.  that  we  know  extension  by  means  of  the 
senses,  just  as  much  as  we  know  light,  heat,  and  colour.  See  Berkeley's 
"Principles,"   Sec.   9,    10,    11. 

^'  (P-  55)  Cf,  the  letter  to  Solomon  Low,  Benson's  "Memoirs,"  p. 
24. 

43  (p.  56)  Norris  admits  that  an  external  world  is  unknowable, 
but  does  not  conclude  that  therefore  it  cannot  exist.  "Theory  of  the 
Ideal  or  Intelligible  World,"  Vol.  I,  p.  205  and  Vol.  II,  chap.  VI, 
Chap.  XII,  p.  442.  Cf.  Berkeley's  use  of  this  argument  and  the  follow- 
ing, Principles,  18-20. 

44  (p.  56)  The  external  world  is  either  creature  (created)  or  is 
self-existent,  i.  e.     God  himself.     The   latter  doctrine  seems  to  Collier 


138  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

untenable,  so  he  holds,  without  further  argument,  that  the  world  is  a 
"creature." 

45  (p.  56)  This  point  is  not,  however,  later  considered. 

*^  (P-  59)  "^^  <'^'"  formali  ...  or  in  actu  exercito":  really  or 
actually  existent  Formal  existence  is  opposed  to  merely  representative 
existence  (existence  in  thought)  ;  "practised,"  or  actual,  existence  is 
opposed  to  potential  existence. 

47  (p.  62)  Collier  regards  as  axiomatic  the  perfect  wisdom  of 
God.  Bericeley  argues  to  God's  perfection  from  the  "order  —  beauty 
and  perfection"  of  nature.     Principles  146:  Cf.  Sec.  30-32,  36. 

48  (p.  63)  See  Introduction,  page  xxiv,  for  comparison  of  Collier's 
with  Kant's  antinomies. 

49  (p.  70)  See  p.  40,  VI,  of  this  edition  of  the  "Clavis"  for  Col- 
lier's first  references  to  this  point,  and  Pt.  II,  Chap.  IX,  Arg.  IX,  for 
further  discussion.  (References  in  the  Notes,  to  the  "Clavis"  are  to  this 
edition). 

so  (p.  73)  The  reference  is  to  Part  IV,  chapter  1  of  the  Port 
Royal  "Logic  or  Art  of  Thinking,"  edited  by  A.  Arnauld  and  P. 
Nicole,    (1662). 

5'  (p.  77)  Collier's  theological  orthodoxy  is  evidenced  in  his 
ready  acceptance  of  the  authority  of  the  word  of  God,  which  he  says, 
"may  well  pass,  with  us  Christians,  for  an  unquestionable  axiom," 
"Specimen  of  True  Philosophy,"  Parr  edition,  p.  115. 

5^  (P-  77)  On  page  125  of  the  "Clavis,"  Collier  claims,  indeed, 
that  he  explains  by  his  idealism  the  apparent  contradictions  in  these 
theological   arguments. 

S^  (P'  77)  The  Socinians  were  a  sect  founded  in  Italy  in  the 
i6th  century  by  Lelio  and  Fausto  Sozzini.  By  their  denial  of  the 
divinity  of  Christ,  and  by  their  belief  in  the  moral  theory  of  the 
Atonement  and  in  man's  power  to  attain  his  own  salvation,  they  were 
the   forerunners   of   the   modern    Unitarians. 

54  (p.  77)  Arianism  is  the  name  given  to  the  Christological 
theory  of  Arius,  who  denied  that  Christ  is  "of  the  same  substance" 
with  the  Father.  The  controversy  arose  through  the  Alexandrian  dis- 
cussion of  the  Logos  in  the  early  fourth  century.  Arian  doctrine  was 
revived  in  England  in  1720  by  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke,  and  Collier  himself 
inclined  to  the  Arian  theory.     See  Benson's  "Memoirs,"  pp.  61,  62. 

55  (p.  83)  Cf.  note  21.  Here,  and  in  the  arguments  which 
follow.  Collier  evidently  follows  Malebranche,  "Recherche  de  la  Verite," 
Livre  3™^^  2nde  Partie,  chap.  II. 

56  (p.    87)    This    argument   is    directed    against   the    teaching   of 


CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS  139 

Norris,  who,  throughout  his  Essay,  represents  the  external  world,  as  a 
thing  entirely  apart  from  God,  and  yet  as  produced  by  him. 

57  (p.  87)   Des  Cartes,  "Meditations"  III,  Open  Court  ed.  p.  58. 

5^  (P-  95)  In  Pt.  I,  pp.  40-41,  and  Pt.  II,  Argument  IV,  Collier 
argues  that  the  matter  of  the  early  philosophers  must  be  invisible ;  here 
he  argues  that  the  conception  is  utterly  meaningless.  Berkeley  touches 
lightly  on  these  conceptions  as  already  out  of  date,  referring  to  the 
"so  much  ridiculed  notion  of  materia  prima,  to  be  met  with  in  Aristotle 
and  his  followers  ("Principles"  n).  In  formulating  this  conception 
of  matter,  as  a  vague  something  or  nothing,  and  as  a  supporting 
medium  of  sensible  qualities  (Clavis  p.  23),  Collier  closely  approaches 
Berkeley. 

59  (p.  96)  Cf.  Aristotle,  Metaphysics,  Bk.  IV,  (A),  c.  2,  1013a,  24. 
Cf.  Bk.  I.  (A),  c.  3,  983a,  26. 

60  (p.  97)  St.  Austin  for  St.  Augustine  is  a  contraction  common 
among  the  Schoolmen. 

^'  (P-  97)  Porphyry  {za-circa  303  A.  D.),  a  follower  of 
Plotinus. 

^^  (P-  97)  The  reference  is  to  Metaphysics  Bk.  VI.  (Z),  c.  3, 
1029a,  20:  X^w  5'  CXijc  f)  KaO''  axiT^v  fi-fire  rl  H'fiTf  iroabv  fj.-fyre 
dWo  fXTiSiv  Xiyerai  oh  &pu7Tai  t6  6v.  Cf.  IX.  (I),  c.  8,  1058,  a,  23.  See 
also,  Berkeley,  "Principles,"  80,  and  "Dialogues  between  Hylas  and 
Philonous,"  II.  (Open  Court  ed.  p.  80)  :  "So  matter  comes  to  nothing"; 
and  Hegel,  "Logik,"  I,  i,  Kap.  i :  "Das  reine  Sein  und  das  reine 
Nichts   ist    also   dasselbe." 

63  (p.  loi)  Cf.  Berkeley's  treatment  of  this  objection  in  "Prin- 
ciples" 82. 

64  (p.  102)  Cf.  Collier's  "Specimen  of  True  Philosophy."  See 
also  Introduction,  pp.  XVII  ff. 

^S  (p.  102)  See  p.  12  of  the  "Clavis"  for  Collier's  first  refer- 
ence to  this  point.  Also  see  Collier's  letter  to  Mr.  Shepherd,  quoted 
in  Benson's  "Memoirs,"  pp.  48  seq. ;  and  Berkeley's  "Dialogues,"  III, 
Open  Court  Edition,  pp.   119  ff. 

66  (p.  102)  See  Malebranche,  "Recherche  de  la  Verite,"  6clair- 
cissement  to  Livrc  I.,  chap.  X  (near  end)  ;  "Or  dans  I'apparence  de 
l'£criture  sainte,  et  par  les  apparences  des  miracles,  nous  apprenons 
que  Dieu  a  cree  un  ciel  et  une  terre — " 

67  (p.  105)  See  the  "Clavis"  pp.  108  and  120;  also  see  Berkeley, 
"Principles,"   38,   52. 

68  (p.  106)   See  Note  36. 

69  (p.  107)  Norris's  "Theory  of  the  Ideal  or  Intelligible  World," 
vol.  I,  p.  205 ;  Vol.  II,  pp.  320,  493,  563. 


140  CLAVIS  UNIVERSALIS 

70  (p.  113)  See  "Clavis"  pp.  8,  9.  Collier  answers  this  objection 
again  in  his  second  letter  to  Mr.  Low,  Benson's  "Memoirs,"  pp.  31,  33; 
in  the  letter  to  Dr.  Clarke,  Benson,  pp.  36  seq.\  and  in  the  letter  to 
Mr.  Mist,  Benson,  pp.  41  seq. 

71  (p.  114)    "Clavis,"  p.  io6. 


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